WEdecide2010
We educate for a democratic clean and independent elections for 2010
Email: wedecide2010@gmail.com
Mobile Numbers: 09182086666 09279598022
Concept
2010 Elections
The Philippines is again agog with 2010 elections. The electoral landscape is littered, mostly, with traditional politicians, a.k.a. trapos, all claiming to have grassroots beginnings and promising to be good public servants.
Once again, urban poor communities, grassroots formations, people’s organizations and other vote-rich sections are sought after, not to give them relief from drudgery, but to clinch their votes.
Trapos’ promises do not have much effect on the electorate. They have been used to it. Some of them still cling to a glimmer of hope they see from charismatic and some promising candidates. Some just consider elections a circus, a break from the otherwise monotonous life of struggle for survival. In the end, most of the constituents believe that they only have themselves to depend on.
This culture of apathy and indifference cannot be blamed on the electorate. This is the result of years of hopeless electoral exercises they have witnessed.
It is this context that WEdecide 2010 confronts. It hopes to contribute in translating the apathy and indifference of the electorate into positive actions and maximize 2010 elections to the people’s advantage.
Objectives
The general objective is to bring the real issues of the people at the forefront of the electoral exercises, make them critical about 2010 elections – its nature and dynamics, educate the voters as the principal stakeholders in this exercise, and organize them around these concerns.
In particular, the campaign hopes to:
1. Collectively study the issues of the people and the local electorate.
2. Formulate and put forward demands that would provide tactical relief for the people.
3. Challenge the candidates to take on the people’s issues.
4. Make the people’s agenda the electoral platform and the parameter in selecting candidates.
5. Call on the candidates to translate their slogans and promises into concrete and realistic platform for the people’s welfare.
6. Educate the local electorate about the nature, character and dynamics revolving around the 2010 elections to help them vote intelligently.
7. Organize groups, clusters, organizations and build an active network of intelligent electorate.
8. Clinch “Covenant” or “Pledge of Commitment” between the electorate / specific sections of voters and the candidates that would adhere to the people’s agenda.
9. Defend whatever benefits the people already had and expose candidates who, wittingly or unwittingly, are planning to take these away from them.
10. Create an active, intelligent and vigilant electorate and make their presence felt through different people’s forums and discussion groups in the local levels.
11. Popularize the people’s issues and agenda by maximizing tri-media.
12. Disseminate to the widest number the people’s issues and demands through popular propaganda materials, leaflets and the like.
13. Engage the indifferent, apathetic and skeptical sections of the populace into substantive discussions and significant actions.
WEdecide2010
Concept
This is envisioned to be the people’s alternative electoral campaign to rally significant sections of the populace to their own agenda. Its primary task is to bring into the forefront immediate issues and concerns while creating an intelligent electorate in the process.
WEdecide2010 will take off from the known issues of significant sections of the people. These issues will be talked about, studied and sharply defined as the campaign moves on. The initial resolutions will be drafted from the series of consultations which will be part of the people’s platform. These will then be lobbied to the candidates during electoral forums. Likewise, it will be popularized in media and through people’s education and propaganda campaign.
It will have the following components:
Activities
1. Localized discussions – community level, cluster of households, barangay meetings, school meetings, etc.
2. Dialogues with candidates – presentation of the people’s platform.
3. Forum with Covenant or Pledge of Commitment signing.
4. Leaders’ workshops to sharply identify issues and formulate the people’s platform.
5. Voters’ education
6. Cultural activities
7. Distribution and reproduction of electoral education materials and people’s platform
8. Dialogues among sectors
9. Radio and TV station - hopping
Inital Convenors and WEdecide 2010 Machinery
1. ServeNet (a service institution for North Luzon focus on grassroots organizing)
2. Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya – North Luzon (Movement for National Democracy)
3. Linnaaw Cultural Group
4. KaisaKa Baguio
5. MKP (Manggagawa sa Komunikasyon ng Pilipinas) – PLDT Union – Baguio
6. Digitel Employees Union – Baguio
7. Youth4Rights – People’s Rights Advocates North Luzon
8. BAMAPFE (Baguio Market Peddlers Federation)
9. Human Rights Defenders – Luzon
10. Assert NL (Action and Solidarity for the Empowerment of Teachers)
11. CWP Baguio (Communication Workers of the Philippines)
12. Green Cause Movement
13. Summer Youth Campers 2009
14. YND NL
Target Basic Unit Formations:
1. Barangay level structures
2. Barangay Clusters
3. Community – b ased organizations
Prepared by:
ServeNet September 27, 2009
 
 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
INTERAGENCY COUNTERINSURGENCY INITIATIVE
COUNTERINSURGENCY
GUIDE
January 2009
U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following departments and agencies contributed to the drafting of the
U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide:
Department of State
Department of Defense
U.S. Agency for International Development
Department of Justice
Department of The Treasury
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Agriculture
Department of Transportation
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The drafting of this Guide was led by the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State.
For their roles in the creation of the Guide, special thanks to:
David Kilcullen
Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to the Secretary of State
Lieutenant Colonel Matt Porter, UK Royal Marines
Colonel (Ret.) Carlos Burgos, U.S. Army
The Guide is available electronically at:
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Printed January 2009
January 13, 2009
COUNTERINSURGENCY
GUIDE
U.S. GOVERNMENT

PREFACE
In recent years the United States has engaged in prolonged counterinsurgency
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has supported many other friendly
governments facing internal subversion around the globe. In so doing it has both
relearned old lessons, and forged new methods and concepts for the stabilization of
moderate, freedom-oriented governments. This Guide, the first of its kind in almost
half a century, distills the best of contemporary thought, historical knowledge, and
hard-won practice. It is the best kind of doctrinal work: intellectually rigorous, yet
practical.
Irregular warfare is far more varied than conventional conflict: hence the importance
of an intellectual framework that is coherent enough to provide guidance, and flexible
enough to adapt to circumstances. Counterinsurgency places great demands on the
ability of bureaucracies to work together, with allies, and increasingly, with nongovernmental
organizations. That it is co-signed by the leaders of the Departments
of State and Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development says a
great deal about the partnership between these and other departments that has been,
and will be, required if we are to succeed in the future. Although much of our ability
to knit together lines of effort arises from the field, there is an important role for
policy-relevant thought about first order questions. This Guide provides that.
American counterinsurgency practice rests on a number of assumptions: that the
decisive effort is rarely military (although security is the essential prerequisite
for success); that our efforts must be directed to the creation of local and national
governmental structures that will serve their populations, and, over time, replace the
efforts of foreign partners; that superior knowledge, and in particular, understanding
of the ‘human terrain’ is essential; and that we must have the patience to persevere
in what will necessarily prove long struggles.
In the field, the United States has innovated in remarkable ways. Perhaps the most
important of new initiatives has been the creation of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) which bring together civilian and military personnel to undertake
the insurgency-relevant developmental work that has been essential to success in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. As those conflicts have evolved, so too have the PRTs:
their composition has changed, and so too, in some cases, has their mission. This
guide captures the kind of thinking and accumulated knowledge that has led to this
successful innovation, and its adaptation over the years.
Insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by
the United States in the 21st century. While the possibility of conventional conflict
remains, the fact is that, at the moment, the main powers of the international system
are deeply reluctant to engage in it. Insurgency, however, can and will flourish in the
modern environment. The strains created by globalization, by the collapse of weak
state structures, by demographic, environmental, and economic pressures, by the
ease of cooperation among insurgent groups and criminals, and by the appearance
of destructive radical ideologies, all augur a period in which free and moderate
governance is at risk. And in today’s world, state failure can quickly become not
merely a misfortune for local communities, but a threat to global security.
Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a
matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades
to come is a near certainty. This Guide will help prepare decision-makers of many
kinds for the tasks that will result from this fact. Like all such works, it will serve
best if treated not as a rigidly defined set of recipes, but rather, as a stimulus to
disciplined, but creative thought.
Dr. Eliot A. Cohen
Counselor of the Department of State
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary...........................................................................................2
Chapter One: Theory and Principles.................................................................5
Chapter Two: Components of COIN Strategy................................................17
Chapter Three: Actors.....................................................................................28
The Affected Government.....................................................................29
The U.S. Country Team.........................................................................30
The International Community...............................................................31
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs)...........................................32
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).............................................32
The Private Sector.................................................................................34
Chapter Four: Assessment and Planning.........................................................35
Conclusion.......................................................................................................49
Appendix A: U.S. Government Roles in COIN..............................................51
Appendix B: Web Links to Assessment & Modeling Tools............................55
Appendix C: Useful References......................................................................56
Appendix D: Acronyms and Abbreviations....................................................59
Appendix E: Contact Information................................................................... 60
2 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge
political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in
which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and
influence activities to be effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single
group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve a
complex matrix of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic
and non-hierarchical networks. To be successful, insurgencies require charismatic
leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens and funding (often from illicit
activities). They only need the active support of a few enabling individuals, but the
passive acquiescence of a large proportion of the contested population will give
a higher probability of success. This is best achieved when the political cause of
the insurgency has strong appeal, manipulating religious, tribal or local identity
to exploit common societal grievances or needs. Insurgents seek to gain control of
populations through a combination of persuasion, subversion and coercion while
using guerrilla tactics to offset the strengths of government security forces. Their
intent is usually to protract the struggle, exhaust the government and win sufficient
popular support to force capitulation or political accommodation. Consequently,
insurgencies evolve through a series of stages, though the progression and outcome
will be different in almost every case.
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military
efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes.
Unlike conventional warfare, non-military means are often the most effective
elements, with military forces playing an enabling role. COIN is an extremely
complex undertaking, which demands of policy makers a detailed understanding of
their own specialist field, but also a broad knowledge of a wide variety of related
disciplines. COIN approaches must be adaptable and agile. Strategies will usually be
focused primarily on the population rather than the enemy and will seek to reinforce
the legitimacy of the affected government while reducing insurgent influence. This
can often only be achieved in concert with political reform to improve the quality
of governance and address underlying grievances, many of which may be legitimate.
Since U.S. COIN campaigns will normally involve engagement in support
of a foreign government (either independently or as part of a coalition), success
will often depend on the willingness of that government to undertake the necessary
political changes. However great its know-how and enthusiasm, an outside
actor can never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity or counter-productive
behavior on the part of the supported government.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 3
This guide employs a COIN model that comprises five main functional components:
The political function is the key function, providing a framework of political
reconciliation, and reform of governance around which all other COIN activities
are organized. In general, a COIN strategy is only as good as the political
plan at its heart.
The economic function seeks to provide essential services and stimulate long
term economic growth, thereby generating confidence in the government while
at the same time reducing the pool of frustrated, unemployed young men and
women from which insurgents can readily recruit.
The security function is an enabler for the other functions and involves development
not just of the affected nation’s military force, but its whole security
sector, including the related legal framework, civilian oversight mechanisms
and judicial system. Establishing security is not a precursor to economic and
governance activity: rather security, economic and governance activity must be
developed in parallel.
The information function comprises intelligence (required to gain understanding),
and influence (to promote the affected government’s cause). It is
essential that the influence campaign is in tune with the strategic narrative,
resonates with the relevant audiences, is based on genuine resolve by the
affected government and that physical actions match. What makes COIN
different from other stabilization and humanitarian tasks is that both elements
of the information function will be conducted in stark competition with the
insurgents’ own information functions.
These four functions contribute to the overall objective of enabling the affected
government to establish control, consolidating and then transitioning it from intervening
forces to national forces and from military to civil institutions.
The imperative to achieve synergy among political, security, economic and information
activities demands unity of effort between all participants (the affected government,
USG agencies and coalition partners). This is best achieved through an integrated
approach to assessment and planning. A common interagency assessment of
the insurgency establishes a deep and shared understanding of the cultural, ideological,
religious, demographic and geographical factors that affect the insurgency. Such
understanding provides the foundation for policy formulation when the risks and
costs of intervention are weighed against U.S. interests in determining whether to
become involved and what form that involvement should take. This decision should
not be taken lightly; historically COIN campaigns have almost always been more
costly, more protracted and more difficult than first anticipated. Much will hinge on
the degree to which policy makers consider the affected government to be receptive
to assistance, advice and reform; it is folly to intervene unless there is a reasonable
4 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
likelihood of cooperation. If the USG does decide to become involved, then policy
makers should seek a careful balance which employs the most appropriate, most
indirect and least intrusive form of intervention yet still gives a high probability of
achieving the necessary effect. The sovereignty of the affected government must
be maintained and too high a U.S. profile may be counter-productive (historically,
some of the most successful U.S. engagements have been indirect and low key).
Once U.S. assistance is committed, a COIN strategy must be devised, ideally in
collaboration with the affected government and other coalition partners, since their
early inclusion can help mitigate the effects of operational level differences in goals,
capabilities and culture. Detailed, integrated planning then follows and a process
of continuous monitoring, evaluation and assessment is used to measure progress
and identify where changes in approach are necessary to achieve success.
Success in COIN can be difficult to define, but improved governance will usually
bring about marginalization of the insurgents to the point at which they are destroyed,
co-opted or reduced to irrelevance in numbers and capability. U.S. intervention may
cease when success is assured but before it is actually achieved. Ultimately, the
desired end state is a government that is seen as legitimate, controlling social, political,
economic and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, including
adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support of the
insurgency.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 5
CHAPTER ONE:
THEORY AND PRINCIPLES
PART A: INSURGENCY
U.S. Army General Samuel Sumner meets with the Sultans of Bayang
and Oato, Philippines, 1902
(Photo: Library of Congress)
6 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Definition
Insurgency can be defined as ‘the organized use of subversion and violence to
seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.’
Insurgents seek to subvert or displace the government and completely or partially
control the resources and population of a given territory. They do so through the use
of force (including guerrilla warfare, terrorism and coercion/intimidation), propaganda,
subversion and political mobilization. Insurgents fight government forces
only to the extent needed to achieve their political aims: their main effort is not to
kill counterinsurgents, but rather to establish a competitive system of control over
the population, making it impossible for the government to administer its territory
and people. Insurgent activity is therefore designed to weaken government control
and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and influence.
Characteristics
Many of the more renowned insurgencies of the 20th Century followed the Maoist
‘Protracted Warfare’ model; being monolithic organizations with a centralized,
hierarchical command structure, clearly defined aims and a sequenced approach to
achieve them. However, modern insurgencies are increasingly being recognized as
complex matrices of irregular actors with widely differing goals. They often lack a
centralized command structure but typically are linked by dynamic, flat networks
(often significantly enabled by modern communications systems). Motivations
within this eclectic mix may vary from religious extremism to pure criminality and
many groups may not themselves intend to become the governing authority. Often,
the only common factor will be a desire to achieve local freedom from control by
the government and its international supporters.
Ideology
During the Twentieth Century, insurgents were often motivated by Marxism, religion
or nationalism (or a combination of these). Insurgencies were often led by
university educated ‘intellectual elites’ whose personal circumstances were sometimes
far removed from those of the rank-and-file insurgents that they inspired.
Modern insurgencies are often more complex matrices of irregular actors with
widely differing goals. At least some of the principal actors will be motivated by a
form of ideology (or at least will claim to be), but that ideology will not necessarily
extend across the whole insurgent network. Modern insurgencies are typified by the
points below.
• The charisma of insurgent leaders can sometimes be more important than
ideology in convincing others to join their movement;
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 7
• Some insurgent actors will be more interested in financial reward than ideology.
This applies from the unemployed youth getting paid to fight to the criminal
gang leader exploiting a state of lawlessness;
• The basic wants, needs and grievances of the population may have little to do
with the intellectual ideology of insurgent leaders, but may still be exploited to
generate support;
• Even those fighters, sympathizers, and supporters who justify their actions
with the rhetoric and symbols provided by insurgent propagandists may not be
fully conversant with the ideology;
• Hatred that emerges during armed conflict, through atrocities and dispossession,
often overshadows the initial motivators that drove individuals and
community groups to join the insurgency or support the government;
• Players in pre-existing local conflict may draw on the insurgents (or the government)
as an external ally to help them;
• In tribal societies (as found in parts of South and Central Asia, the Middle East
and Africa) the support of one tribe or faction for the government may often
predispose tribal rivals to support the insurgents, and vice versa.
Building Networks
Insurgents require supporters, recruits, safe havens, money, supplies, weapons and
intelligence on government actions. A robust insurgency can be waged with the
support of just a small percentage of a given population. From the remaining majority,
insurgents require only compliance (acquiescence or inaction). The position of
an active individual within an insurgent network will be determined by the combination
of a number of factors including:
• The level of respect and trust they hold within a community;
• Their reputation established through previous insurgent actions;
• Their degree of motivation, ideological or otherwise;
• Their perceived loyalty to other network members;
• Their level of expertise in a particular field;
• Their access to resources, human or otherwise;
• The degree of risk they are prepared to accept.
Insurgent networks provide life support for the movements they support, but they
also entail vulnerability. Command and support networks establish lines between
isolated cells whose operational security may otherwise be impeccable. Some key
functions may be deliverable only by individuals with dubious loyalty, for example
8 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
criminal smugglers enabling logistics supply or personnel movement. Modern
information infrastructure including mobile phones and the internet provide means
of rapid communications and networking between insurgents, but are also open to
exploitation.
The most secure insurgent networks involve small numbers of active personnel
who are trustworthy and employ tight operational security. However, the insurgent
dilemma is that in order to promote the insurgency and exploit success, these small
networks have to expand, exposing themselves to action by government security
forces. Effective interdiction can lead to a cycle of expansion and contraction of
insurgent networks as security and trust is repeatedly built up and then lost.
Funding
To fund their activities, insurgents may foster an illicit economy, sometimes of
international scope, eluding government monitoring, taxation and interdiction.
Such illicit financial activities diminish government revenues, increase corruption
among local officials, and weaken the control and legitimacy of the government.
Criminal activities may include theft, extortion, trafficking (of narcotics, arms and
people), money laundering, piracy, document fraud, bribery, kidnapping and black
market activity. These funding streams will often drive insurgents into alliances
of convenience with organized crime. In some cases, long-standing insurgencies
morph into gangs or organized criminal networks that are motivated by profit and
economic self-interest, rather than ideology.
Funding may also be obtained through donations from sympathetic foreign governments,
diaspora groups and individuals. Such funding streams may be simple and
direct or complex and masked dependent on the efforts being taken internationally
to interdict them. In extreme cases, funding may be channeled through a third party
organization purportedly conducting charitable work.
Trans-National Dynamics
Most insurgencies need a physical safe haven, and may find it in neighboring
countries. Moreover, contemporary insurgencies are often supported or driven by
transnational networks with access to satellite communications, the Internet, global
media and transnational banking systems. International support may be leveraged
from diaspora or émigré communities, international institutions, friendly foreign
governments and populations, or the international media. If other countries give
support to the affected government, the insurgents may directly target public opinion
there, pressuring them to cease their assistance. Such pressure may be exerted
from the affected territory through the kidnap, torture and murder of intervening
civilian nationals, often broadcast internationally to reach the population of origin.
Alternatively, more direct effect may be achieved through terrorist attacks launched
within the intervening country itself (perhaps facilitated by immigrant or other
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 9
sympathetic community groups). Policy makers must therefore take into account
regional and global dynamics as well as the internal situation of the nation most
directly affected.
Insurgent Political Strategy
To gain the support (or at least the acquiescence) of the people, insurgents may
apply a combination of persuasion, subversion and coercion.
• Persuasion will often involve the promotion of insurgent ideology, but it can
also include the provision of money, basic social services, control of land, or
positions of authority. Insurgents may appeal to the self-interest of constituencies
through alliances with political parties, tribal leaders, ethnic or religious
groups, warlords, organized crime networks, and local bandits. To do so, they
will exploit societal trends and popular grievances or needs, manipulating
elements of religious, tribal, ethnic or local identity that resonate with some
subset of the target population. These trends do not necessarily have to be
linked directly to the ideology of insurgent leaders to be exploited by them
in the mobilization of support. Such partnerships may exacerbate localized
conflict, perpetuate instability and help mobilize support for the insurgency.
Propaganda is a key element of persuasion and is used at the local, national
and often international levels to influence perceptions of potential supporters,
opinion leaders, and opponents in the favor of the insurgents; promoting the
insurgent cause and diminishing the government’s resolve. More specifically,
propaganda may be designed to control community action, discredit government
action, provoke overreaction by security forces, or exacerbate sectarian
tension.
• Subversion is the action used by insurgents to penetrate, manipulate, undermine
or disrupt government institutions and organizations. At the same time,
insurgents may exploit competing power structures, such as tribal hierarchies,
clerical authorities or criminal networks that challenge the authority and reach
of control of the central government. In doing so, the insurgents seek to ‘out
administer’ the local authorities. Clearly, these techniques will be particularly
effective in areas where government services are weak or absent.
• Coercion can either augment or replace persuasion as a means to mobilize
support, depending on the ability of government forces to protect the population.
Insurgents seek to intimidate government supporters or collaborators, and
force community leaders to take sides in the conflict. This often entails the use
of violence as follows:
– Insurgents can use violence to intimidate or eliminate those who
oppose their aims. In particular, insurgent attacks against government
10 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
infrastructure and personnel will undermine the government’s morale,
confidence and capability, weakening its authority and control over
affected areas;
– This effect is magnified by the depiction of such violence in propaganda,
portraying the government as weak and the insurgents as strong, and
exacerbating local grievances. Propaganda is sometimes the primary
aim of insurgent violence;
– Targeting members of different ethnic or sectarian groups may engender
a sense of social identity, solidarity and alienation from the government;
– By creating violent instability, insurgents may be able to encourage
people to turn to them in preference to the government to ‘restore’
public order;
– If insurgents can provoke excessive government action against a population,
then death, injury, mistreatment, or dishonor can become a
powerful motivator for retributive action against the government.
Challenging Government Security
Insurgents usually have less conventional military capacity than the government (at
least in the early stages of insurgency) and so tend to use guerrilla tactics to inflict
damage without allowing their fighters to be engaged by equal or larger government
forces. Tactics such as raids, ambushes, assassinations, sabotage, booby traps,
and improvised explosive devices take advantage of mobility, stealth, deception
and surprise to weaken, discredit, or paralyze the less agile government security
forces. Insurgents try to manage the tempo and intensity of their activities to permit
a level of effort they can sustain indefinitely. By prolonging the conflict, they hope
to exhaust the opposition, seeking to impose unsustainable costs on the government
to force capitulation. Although the permutations of insurgent activity are contextdriven,
historical analysis shows that insurgents typically apply four basic tactics,
or variations of them, to defeat stronger security forces:
• Provocation: Insurgents often commit acts (such as atrocities) that are intended
to prompt opponents to react irrationally, in ways that harm their interests.
For example, government forces, frustrated by their inability to distinguish
fighters from non-combatants, may be provoked into indiscriminate reprisals
or harsh security measures that alienate parts of the population. Alternatively,
one tribal, religious, ethnic or community group may be provoked into attacking
another in order to create and exploit instability.
• Intimidation: Insurgents intimidate individual members of the government
(especially police and local government officials) to dissuade them from taking
active measures against the insurgents. They will also publicly kill civilians
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 11
who collaborate with government or coalition forces, thereby deterring others
who might seek to work with the government.
• Protraction: Insurgents seek to prolong the conflict in order to exhaust
opponents, erode their political will, and avoid losses. Typically insurgents
react to government countermeasures by going quiet (reducing activity and
hiding in inaccessible terrain or within sympathetic or intimidated population
groups) when pressure becomes too severe. They then emerge later to fight on.
• Exhaustion: Insurgents conduct activities such as ambushes, bombings,
attacks on government facilities, economic assets and transport infrastructure
that are designed to compel security forces to undertake numerous onerous,
high-cost defensive activities that expend scarce resources without significantly
advancing the counterinsurgents’ strategy.
Stages of Insurgency
Every insurgency develops differently, but some general patterns can be observed.
Insurgencies may evolve through some or all the stages of subversion and radicalization,
popular unrest, civil disobedience, localized guerrilla activity, and widespread
guerrilla warfare to open, semi-conventional armed conflict. Alternatively,
they may wither away to dormancy if they are effectively countered or if they fail to
capture sufficient popular support. One or more different stages may appear simultaneously
in a country or region affected by insurgency. An insurgency may actually
succeed in overthrowing the government (historically a rare event), may force
the government into political accommodation (a more common outcome), may be
co-opted by the government and cease fighting (also common), or may be crushed.
Insurgencies may be co-opted by domestic or trans-national terrorist groups, morph
into criminal networks, or wither into irrelevance. Measures that succeed against
incipient insurgencies often differ greatly from those that are effective against
mature or declining insurgencies. Thus, planners and decision-makers must clearly
understand the stage the insurgency has reached, to develop appropriate responses.
12 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
PART B: COUNTERINSURGENCY
Definition
Counterinsurgency may be defined as ‘comprehensive civilian and military
efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its
root causes’.
Best practice COIN integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and
informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness
while reducing insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should
be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence;
strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly
and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically.
Characteristics
COIN is a complex effort that integrates the full range of civilian and military agencies.
It is often more population-centric (focused on securing and controlling a
given population or populations) than enemy-centric (focused on defeating a particular
enemy group). Note that this does not mean that COIN is less violent than any
other conflict: on the contrary, like any other form of warfare it always involves loss
of life. It is an extremely difficult undertaking, is often highly controversial politically,
involves a series of ambiguous events that are extremely difficult to interpret,
and often requires vastly more resources and time than initially anticipated. In
particular, governments that embark upon COIN campaigns often severely underestimate
the requirement for a very long-duration, relatively high-cost commitment
(in terms of financial cost, political capital, military resources and human
life). The capabilities required for COIN may be very similar to those required
for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, stabilization operations, and
development assistance missions. However, the intent of a COIN campaign is to
build popular support for a government while marginalizing the insurgents: it is
therefore fundamentally an armed political competition with the insurgents. Consequently,
control (over the environment, the population, the level of security, the
pace of events, and the enemy) is the fundamental goal of COIN, a goal that distinguishes
it from peace operations or humanitarian intervention. Within these broad
characteristics, the specific nature of any particular COIN campaign arises from the
complex interaction of three key factors: the characteristics of the environment
(physical, economic, political and human) in which it takes place; the nature of the
insurgent group (or groups); and the nature of the counterinsurgent government
and its security forces.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 13
Different Forms of COIN
• Domestic COIN versus Overseas COIN: A nation faces very significant
conceptual and practical differences between conducting COIN within its own
national boundaries and intervening in a foreign country in support of another
government. Intervention to conduct COIN in a foreign country is often a
discretionary activity whereas internal/domestic COIN is usually not a matter
of choice. Forces operating in another government’s territory are vulnerable
to the insurgents’ “home ground” advantage: the insurgents live in the country
and never plan to leave, whereas the intervening force must eventually plan on
transition and departure. The population knows this and is therefore less likely
to support it. A government conducting COIN in its own territory will generally
have greater strategic patience to stay the course of a protracted struggle.
Another “home ground” advantage is the detailed understanding of the geography,
culture, history, sociology and politics of the affected country which
insurgents will already possess but the intervening country will usually have to
learn.
Since the United States presently faces no credible internal insurgency, all U.S.
COIN campaigns are likely to be external interventions in support of a foreign
government (or in failed/collapsed states). Intervention to support COIN
merits careful consideration of a range of factors that are addressed in detail in
Chapter 4 (Assessment and Planning).
• Bilateral Versus Multilateral COIN: The United States may not be the only
foreign country prepared to assist the affected nation in countering insurgency.
There are significant differences between campaigns supported by a single
intervening power and those involving an intervening coalition or United
Nations force. Coalition COIN will often be seen as a more legitimate endeavor
than a U.S. only intervention, but it requires significant alliance management
and coordination and is inherently less efficient than unilateral COIN. This is
covered in more detail in Chapter 4.
• Different Levels of Consent: Not all COIN interventions will have the full
consent of the affected government. There will be major differences between
campaigns conducted with full consent, partial consent, or where there is no
effective government. A final variation (recognized as especially difficult) is
where an insurgency follows a conventional war in which an invading power or
coalition overthrows the existing government, then builds a new government
from scratch (or radically reforms an existing structure) while increasingly
being opposed by insurgents. In this scenario, the challenges of conducting
COIN may not have been fully anticipated or considered during the original
decision to invade. However, by the time the insurgent threat is manifested,
intervening governments may have little choice but to remain committed to
a protracted and costly COIN campaign. It is important to recognize that the
14 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
decisions to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq were not taken as decisions to
undertake COIN campaigns. The strategic drivers and the factors considered
were very different. Use of these examples in the study of COIN intervention
could therefore be misleading and policy makers should exercise caution in
drawing parallels.
Purpose
COIN differs from other civil-military operations both in the methods employed
and in the purpose of the undertaking. The purpose of COIN is to build popular
support for a government while suppressing or co-opting insurgent movements.
Approaches
COIN is a response to a specific set of insurgent threats and requires in-depth
assessment of that threat matrix, based on solid understanding of the relevant
social, cultural, economic, political and security conditions, along with detailed
knowledge of insurgent motivations, goals, organization, and methods. Central to
gaining the confidence and support of the population is to improve the quality of
governance through political reform, strengthening the rule of law and conducting
economic development as appropriate. Simultaneously, a mix of diplomacy and
negotiation, police methods, intelligence work, military combat and non-combat
activities should be used to destroy, contain, marginalize or co-opt the insurgents.
Effective COIN therefore involves a careful balance between constructive dimensions
(building effective and legitimate government) and destructive dimensions
(destroying the insurgent movements). As noted, there are two basic approaches to
COIN strategy:
• The enemy-centric approach conceptualizes COIN as a contest with an organized
enemy, and focuses COIN activity on the insurgent organizations. This
approach emphasizes defeat of the enemy as its primary task and other activities
as supporting efforts. There are many variants within this approach, including
“soft” vs. “hard,” direct vs. indirect, violent vs. non-violent, and decapitation
vs. marginalization strategies. This approach can be summarized as “first
defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.”
• The population-centric approach shifts the focus of COIN from defeating
the insurgent organization to maintaining or recovering the support of the
population. While direct military action against the insurgent organization will
definitely be required, it is not the main effort; this approach assumes that the
center of gravity is the government’s relationship with and support among the
population. It can be summarized as “first protect and support the population,
and all else will follow.”
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 15
A purely enemy-centric approach might work against incipient insurgencies that
are led or centrally controlled by a particularly charismatic or powerful individual.
However, historical experience has shown that against mature insurgencies and
complex, non-hierarchical insurgencies, population-centric approaches have a
higher likelihood of success.
In reality, COIN campaigns will rarely be purely enemy-centric or populationcentric,
but will generally include elements of both, with the relative balance changing
over time. Winning the support of the population for the legitimate government
will often entail a breaking of the ideological, financial or intimidation linkages
between insurgent leaders and their supporters, perhaps one family grouping or
village at a time. Counterinsurgents should always be looking for potential fracture
lines where the coincidence of interests between the ideological leadership and a
particular part of the insurgent network is weakest. A wedge may then be created
through the use of carrot (political, economic & development benefits) and stick
(detention & disruption) operations. Key ‘bridging’ individuals (insurgents, who by
personal connections link whole tribes or other groupings to the insurgent leadership)
should be a priority for reconciliation or detention, but to achieve this, a deep
understanding of regional sociology and relative motivations is critical. This could
be viewed as an enemy centric approach, since it focuses on the insurgent network,
but its ultimate objective is to win over whole sectors of population to the government
cause.
Primacy of Non-Military Means
While the provision of security is a necessary activity in COIN, it will not defeat
an insurgency on its own. When possible, civilian and military measures should be
applied simultaneously to achieve success in an integrated strategy that delegitimizes
and undermines the insurgency, builds government control and strengthens
popular support. In counterinsurgency, military forces are, in a sense, an enabling
system for civil administration; their role is to afford sufficient protection and
stability to allow the government to work safely with its population, for economic
revival, political reconciliation and external non-government assistance to be
effective.
Unity of Effort
COIN usually involves the efforts of multiple stakeholders. Unity of effort is highly
desirable at the national level (among the various agencies of the affected government)
and at the international level (between the affected nation and all supporting
nations). This is not easily achieved, especially in the context of a coalition intervention
operation. Hence, robust command-and-control (C2) mechanisms, as well
as diplomatic efforts to maintain coalition cohesion and support, are fundamentally
important. They must be considered in detail at the outset of a campaign, and given
adequate resources and attention during it. In more complex coalition scenarios, the
16 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
appointment of a single overall strategic advisor to an affected government (ideally
with the mandate and responsibility to coordinate all international civil and military
assistance) may be the only means to ensure unity of effort.
COIN as a Special Environment
For military forces, COIN often involves a wider range of tasks and capabilities
than are required in conventional conflict. Armed forces that are optimized for
major combat operations will usually require specific training (and perhaps even
structural reorganization) to meet the unique requirements of COIN. For civilian
agencies engaged in diplomatic, development and information activities, COIN
is less about performing a different set of tasks than about operating in a different
kind of environment; often conducting their activities in chaotic, unstable, or
actively hostile environments. Tasks will often need to be carried out in dramatically
different ways, generally requiring specialist training and sometimes requiring
development of new capabilities. However it is achieved, the targeted application
of diplomatic, development and information effects in a conflict situation is fraught
with the risk of unintended consequences and requires a sophisticated understanding
of the local context.
Success in COIN
A COIN effort may be deemed successful when the following conditions are met:
• The affected government is seen as legitimate, controlling social, political,
economic and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, including
adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have fueled support
of the insurgency;
• The insurgent movements and their leaders are co-opted, marginalized, or
separated from the population;
• Armed insurgent forces have dissolved or been demobilized, and/or reintegrated
into the political, economic, and social structures of the country.
It should be noted that it is usually far harder to totally eliminate insurgent activity
than it is to reduce it as a significant threat to the affected government. Insurgents
can become extremely difficult to identify, track and interdict once their manpower
and activity drop below a critical mass. Consequently, low level insurgencies may
persist for many years after the main threat has been broken. International support
in COIN will usually be consensually withdrawn once insurgency can be comfortably
contained by the affected government. The combination of these factors means
that a COIN intervention in an affected country may end several years before the
insurgency there ceases.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 17
CHAPTER TWO:
COMPONENTS OF COIN STRATEGY
CONTROL
ECONOMIC
SECURITY
INFORMATION
POLITICAL
STRATEGY
Control. The Information,
Security and Development
components combine within
the political strategy to enable
the affected government to
control its environment, such
that the population will, in the
long run, support it rather
than the insurgents.
The Information Component.
Information (acquiring knowledge
and exerting influence) is the
base component for all other
activities, providing the linkages
that allow discrete functional
elements to cooperate as an
integrated whole.
The Security Component.
Providing physical security
against insurgent violence,
though often imperative, is only
one step in progressing towards
‘Human Security’ which also
encompasses the maintenance
of laws, human rights, freedom
to conduct economic activity,
public safety and health.
The Economic and Development
Component. This includes immediate
humanitarian relief and the provision
of essential services, as well as
longer-term programs to develop the
infrastructure and capacity for
legitimate agricultural, industrial,
educational, medical, commercial
and governmental activities.
Political strategy. This is the key
function in a COIN effort,
providing a framework of political
reconciliation, genuine reform,
popular mobilization and
governmental capacity-building
around which all other programs
and activities are organized.
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
COUNTERINSURGENCY
Comprehensive Approach
to Counterinsurgency
18 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
To be effective, officials involved in COIN campaigns must address two imperatives
—political action and security operations—with equal urgency, recognizing
that insurgency is fundamentally an armed political competition and that effective
security operations, though unlikely to deliver success by themselves, will almost
always be a prerequisite to political resolution. Security operations, conducted
in support of a political strategy, coordinated with economic development activity
and integrated with an information campaign, will provide human security to
the population and improve the political and economic situation at the local level.
This should increase society’s acceptance of the government and, in turn, popular
support for the COIN campaign. COIN functions therefore include informational,
security, political and economic components, all of which are designed to support
the overall objective of establishing and consolidating control over the environment,
then transferring it to effective and legitimate local authorities.
The diagram on the preceding page is designed to help policy makers visualize the
interaction of COIN components by illustrating the key functions of a comprehensive
COIN framework. This approach builds on classic COIN theory but also incorporates
best practices that have emerged through experience in numerous complex
operations over recent decades.
The diagram is a visualization tool, not a template for action. It is intended to
demonstrate to policy makers and program implementers where their efforts fit into
a COIN strategy or campaign, rather than telling them what to do in a given situation
(it is an aid to collaboration, not an operational plan). The functions are linked
to one another primarily through the information function, which underpins and
integrates the whole effort, and through the common campaign intent embodied in
the control function.
Information
Information is the foundation for all other activities, and provides the linkages that
allow discrete functional elements to cooperate as an integrated whole. The collection,
formulation, storage and dissemination of information are crucial in shaping
perceptions of the conflict by all stakeholders.
In COIN, the information flow can be roughly divided into that information which
we wish to assimilate in order to inform our approach; i.e. knowledge and that
information which we wish to disseminate in order to influence populations. At the
same time, as counterinsurgents we are also interested in impeding the information
flow of insurgent groups; both their intelligence collection and their ability to
influence.
• Knowledge: In COIN, decisions at all levels must be based on a detailed
understanding and awareness of the environment. No COIN strategy can be
better than the degree of understanding on which it is based. The information
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 19
required to engender this understanding encompasses a far broader range of
subjects than would normally fall under the auspices of military intelligence.
In conventional warfare, decision makers mostly require intelligence about the
enemy, but in COIN they primarily need intelligence about the population.
COIN intelligence must therefore incorporate the spectrum of characteristics
of a nation’s system of systems, including political, military, economic, sociocultural,
infrastructural, informational and environmental knowledge.
At the strategic level, understanding is required of the population factors
behind the insurgency, its stage of progression, the reforms required to address
its causes, and the willingness and ability of the affected government to make
those reforms and the implications of foreign intervention.
At the operational level, understanding is required of the strengths and vulnerabilities
of the insurgent strategy, the strengths and weaknesses of the affected
government and the requirements of the population. Continuous feedback on
the degree of success of ongoing COIN efforts is also critical.
At the tactical level, understanding is required of the identity of active insurgents,
their networks, logistics, capabilities and intent. It is also very useful
to understand the views, concerns and sympathies of non-combatant civilians
in order to influence them, gain additional intelligence and further isolate the
insurgents. Almost all forms of intelligence collection have a role in COIN,
but historically, intelligence gathered from human sources (including civilians,
agents and captured/reconciled insurgents) has made the greatest contribution
to success.
One of the most critical yet pervasive shortcomings that interagency operations
face is the failure to manage and share knowledge. This is especially
true during COIN, when a common base of understanding is key to effective
collaboration.
• Influence: Effective COIN requires the shaping of opinions among several
different population groups through messages and actions:
– Affected Nation: The fundamental influence aim in COIN is to build
confidence in the government while diminishing the credibility and
influence of the insurgents. All actions and messages should support
this aim.
– U.S. Population: Where the United States is conducting a direct intervention
in support of an affected nation, the costs involved (financial
and human) will often be high and prolonged. Understanding and
support in the U.S. will be key if the nation is to remain engaged long
enough to achieve decisive effect.
20 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
– Neighboring Countries: Many insurgencies depend on safe havens
in countries adjacent to the affected nation. Sanctuary may be giving
willingly or may be beyond control of the government there. Even in
non-democratic nations and ungoverned spaces, there may be merit in
efforts to influence populations in these areas.
– Coalition Nations: Political resolve will rarely be consistently robust
across a coalition. U.S. policy makers should be cognizant of the
difficulties some coalition members will face in maintaining popular
support for their participation.
– Diaspora Communities: As previously discussed, diaspora communities
can play a significant role in supporting or opposing insurgencies.
Positive influence here can pay dividends.
Clean separation of messages to these various populations is rarely possible
and a high degree of coordination is required to allow messages to be tailored
to different audiences without contradiction.
The influence strategy must cascade down from a set of strategic narratives
from which all messages and actions should be derived. The narratives of the
affected government and supporting nations will be different but complimentary.
Messages and actions must address ideological, social, cultural, political,
and religious motivations that influence or engender a sense of common interest
and identity among the affected population and international stakeholders.
They should also counter insurgents’ ideology in order to undermine their
motivation and deny them popular support and sanctuary (both physical and
virtual). In doing so, counterinsurgents should seek to expose the tensions in
motivation (between different ideologies or between ideology and self-interest)
that exist across insurgent networks.
To enhance the legitimacy of the affected government, messages aimed at their
population should be closely coordinated with and ideally delivered by their
own officials. Themes and messages should be simple and memorable, and
must resonate with the population. This requires detailed understanding of
the COIN environment which must be continually updated. Detailed target
audience analysis is required for each separate population group and reliable
measures of effectiveness must be sought to assess the success of messages
and if necessary recalibrate them.
Messages are delivered partly through media operations, but more prolifically
and often more credibly through the thousands of daily interactions between
the population, the government and the security forces. Every action in COIN
sends a message, which means that words and deeds must be synchronized.
Messages cannot simply be spin, they must be grounded in truth and reflect a
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 21
genuine willingness on the part of the affected government to undertake real
reforms that address its people’s needs. Failure to honor promises is usually
extremely counter-productive, so officials should be cautious in making promises,
and should track any that are made, with the aim of meeting or exceeding
the expectations of the population.
• The Information Contest: The flow of information (intelligence and influence)
is as important to insurgents as it is to counterinsurgents. A COIN
campaign should seek to limit the intelligence available to the insurgents
through use of counterintelligence, deception and where possible their physical
separation from the populace. Similarly, the ability of the insurgents to exert
influence should be restricted by physical separation and by the pre-emption
and timely countering of their messages.
Influence activities (actions and messages) can be proactive or reactive. Being
proactive gives a significant influence advantage, since the first impression or
report of an event that reaches a population will often receive the widest exposure
and will subsequently be most resistant to alternative accounts. The insurgents
that are most effective in this field design whole operations to support
their influence themes. Successful COIN requires an approach to influence
which is similarly proactive, entrepreneurial and prolific in ‘selling’ messages.
That said, the imperative to counter insurgent messages demands a reactive
element to our influence activities. Speed is of the essence. The longer it takes
for a rebuttal, denial or counter-message to be released, the less relevant and
effective it will be. Cumulatively, whichever protagonist (insurgent or counterinsurgent)
is fastest at processing the cycle of messaging will have a significant
advantage in gaining influence. Some of the counterinsurgents’ delay
in response will be derived from the need to investigate events and establish
facts (a constraint from which insurgents are often exempt), though a holding
response is generally preferable to silence. Less justifiable is the delay inherent
in lengthy approvals processes.
The time sensitivity of reactive influence requires counterinsurgents to employ
delegation of authority, universal understanding of the narrative and a degree
of risk-tolerance throughout the command chain. This has strong parallels to
the military concept of the OODA loop (Observe – Orient – Decide – Act) and
the theory of the mission oriented approach.
22 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Security
In COIN scenarios, the term security is frequently used to refer to the degree to
which the government can suppress insurgent activity in an area. However, the
concept of ‘Human Security’ is a more complex metric which can only be measured
through the collation of individual perceptions across a community. The paramount
concern is the absence of physical violence, but other relevant factors include
maintenance of laws, the protection of human rights, freedom to conduct economic
activity, public safety (fire, ambulance, etc.) and public health (safe drinking water,
sanitation, etc.). COIN emphasis on physical security is not necessarily an indicator
that the wider concept of human security is not important, but more a case of imperative
and sequencing. The end state of providing human security should be implicit
in the wider efforts to improve the standard of governance down to the local level.
Physical security efforts must not focus too greatly on strengthening the military
and police forces of the affected nation. Such capacity building should only be part
of a broader process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in which the whole system
is developed, including the civil institutions that oversee the security forces and
intelligence services, the legal framework and the justice institutions (prosecution
services, judiciary and prisons) that implement it. It is particularly important that a
sense of civil ownership and accountability should extend to the local level and that
all elements of the security apparatus should be trusted by the population. Taking
this broader view of security is very useful to countries engaged in counterinsurgency,
since it links the reduction of violence to the improvement of many of the
issues that are most important to a population. Indeed, effective SSR (especially
reform of the justice sector) may address many of the grievances that initially fueled
the insurgency.
Reactive Influence: The Importance of Delegation
Event Occurs
Superior
Measure Cycle
Resonance of
the Message
Design
Message for
Audience
Distribute Message
Control at the highest
level, low tolerance of
risk and a lengthy
approvals process
will slow down this
part of the cycle,
handing an influence
advantage to the
insurgents.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 23
SSR should be conducted in a balanced and carefully sequenced way, or it may have
negative unintended consequences. For example dramatic improvement in police
capability will only cause demoralization if the judicial system remains inherently
corrupt and fails to prosecute those arrested. There may then be a tendency for the
police to take justice into their own hands in the form of ‘extra-judicial killings’.
Similarly, increasing military capacity and competence may risk a coup if the civil
control mechanisms are not in place and the government is seen by the military to
be corrupt or ineffective. Once again, a sound understanding of context is critical.
In many stable democracies, the military forces are primarily responsible for
defense against external threats while the police are responsible for maintaining
internal law and order. However, COIN situations often arise because the police are
incapable of maintaining order (whether through lack of capacity, lack of capability,
corruption or active bias) and so military intervention is often necessary. Maintenance
or prompt restoration of police primacy is highly desirable as it reinforces the
perception of insurgents as ‘criminals’ rather than ‘freedom fighters’ and highlights
the government’s commitment to uphold its peacetime legal framework. It is also
undesirable for the military to take on too great a role in delivery of local civil
services as this may unbalance the distribution of power within government and
increase the risk of a military coup.
The U.S. Government has significant capacity, through the Department of Defense,
to develop the military forces of an affected nation. However, U.S. ability to assist
in other areas of SSR is currently limited by a shortfall of deployable capacity to
assist in law-making, judiciary and policing. Other countries within a coalition may
be able to make a significant contribution in this area.
Unsecured areas provide particular challenges to many of the actors who are best
able to remedy political and developmental deficiencies, but this does not mean
that establishing security must be seen as a necessary precursor to economic and
governance activity: rather, security, economic and political efforts should ideally
be developed simultaneously. The common terminology “clear-hold-build” is very
useful, but is probably interpreted as more of a set sequence than is always necessary
or advantageous.
The Political Strategy
Political strategy is the key function in a COIN effort, because it provides a framework
(of political reconciliation, reform, popular mobilization and governmental
capacity-building) around which all other programs and activities are organized.
In general terms, the progress of a COIN campaign is only as good as the political
strategy it supports. Where the political strategy is vague, unrealistic, or lacking in
support from domestic or international stakeholders, the campaign is unlikely to
succeed, whatever the efficiency of individual programs. An effective political strategy
focuses on strengthening the government’s capability and capacity to respond--
24 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
and be seen to be responding—to the needs of its people. Almost by definition, a
government facing insurgency will require a degree of political “behavior modification”
(substantive political reform, anti-corruption and governance improvement)
in order to successfully address the grievances that gave rise to insurgency in the
first place. Supporting nations may be able to assist in these reforms.
Where the security environment prevents U.S. civilian agencies from operating
freely, the U.S. military may be required to provide extensive support to political,
economic and governance efforts in their stead. This will be the case during
the “establishment of control” phase in every COIN campaign and, in many cases,
throughout the campaign. Given the difference in risk acceptance and the large and
enduring resource imbalance between civilian and military agencies this is simply a
fact of life: officials and policy makers must plan for it accordingly.
The Economic and Development Function
The economic and development function in COIN includes immediate humanitarian
relief and the provision of essential services such as safe water, sanitation,
basic heath care, livelihood assistance, and primary education, as well as longerterm
programs for development of infrastructure to support agricultural, industrial,
educational, medical and commercial activities. It also includes efforts to build
the absorptive capacity of local economies and generate government and societal
revenues from economic activity (much of which may previously have been
illicit or informal). Assistance in effective resource and infrastructure management,
including construction of key infrastructure, may be critically important to COIN
efforts. It must be tailored to the affected government’s willingness to undertake
key reforms, capacity to absorb support, and ability to manage its outcomes.
The first principle for most development agencies is to ensure that their activities
‘do no harm’ and cultivate sustainable benefits in the regions concerned. They seek
to ensure this through an in depth assessment of the background situation followed
by the application of program management tools to give continuous evaluation and
adjustment.
A COIN scenario presents particular challenges for the conduct of economic and
development activity. For example:
• Security: There is often a geographical correlation between areas of highest
threat from insurgents and areas most in need of development. Development
agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs) may be specifically
targeted by insurgents, restricting their ability to operate independently and
generating more reliance on military forces to undertake this role.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 25
• Time-scale: Counterinsurgents often seek to generate a rapid and obvious
improvement in quality of life and economic opportunity in areas where security
operations are suppressing insurgent activity. The aim is for the population
to see clear benefit in government control. However, quick impact projects will
usually lack the depth of assessment that precedes more deliberate programs
and may therefore have a higher risk of unintended consequences. They also
give less sense of long term economic optimism and commitment from both
the affected government and its international supporters.
• Parity: U.S. assistance can sometimes influence a particular local leader or
population element. Giving assistance to any one part of a population however,
may be seen as preferential and discriminatory by other groups and may
actually exacerbate underlying sectarian, regional or tribal tensions. This is
especially so when development has actually been targeted for political effect.
Using development to buy allegiance may be immediately effective in reducing
violence, but in the long term it may foster corruption and reduce the credibility
of the affected government and its international supporters. Development
resources should be allocated in a balanced way and must not be seen to
be given ‘as a reward for bad behavior’.
• Corruption: The requirement in COIN to build the credibility and effectiveness
of the affected government can imply that development resources should
be channeled through its ministries. Governments facing insurgency will often
have endemic corruption and may therefore be deemed unfit to handle U.S.
financial assistance, yet bypassing those ministries might only further enfeeble
them. Corruption prevention measures should be implemented within a wider
program of human capacity development, but will often take a lengthy time
period to become effective. Sensitivity may be necessary in defining “corruption”
in the context of other cultures or established norms. Similarly, the decision
over when or whether to attempt change should be taken carefully, weighing
the impact in terms of potential for success and desired outcome.
• Oversight: NGOs will often undertake a significant proportion of development
activity in COIN scenarios, yet they will not always heed any form of
direction from the affected nation or intervening U.S. officials. This reduces
the ability of the counterinsurgents to anticipate and prevent the unintended
consequences of development activity.
26 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Control
The four functions (information, political, security and economic) contribute to the
overall objective of enabling the affected government to control its environment.
This implies the ability to contain insurgent activity (the tempo of operations, level
and intensity of violence, and degree of instability that it engenders) such that the
population will, in the long run, support the government against the insurgents --
noting that this “balance” can differ from one society to the next. The progress of
control in a successful COIN campaign often develops in three overlapping phases:
establishment, consolidation and transfer (or transition):
• Establishment of control: During the initial phases, a government conducting
COIN seeks to establish control over the environment. This requires controlling
terrain, key infrastructure, economic production assets, population movement,
resources and information flow. In the initial stages there will almost always be
a need to catch up with insurgents who have gained the initiative, made inroads
into popular support and undermined the government. Because the population
is often fearful of the insurgents, the use of force (“kinetic” or lethal security
operations to kill or capture insurgents) is almost always a significant feature of
this phase of a campaign. Typically, only when the population sees insurgents
losing engagements against the government, and sees the death or capture of
insurgent leaders who previously intimidated the population, will its support
begin to swing behind the government. However, establishing control requires
not only the military defeat of insurgents, but also their political marginalization
and the provision of economic and governance benefits to the population
in order to reduce the insurgents’ appeal.
• Consolidation: Once control has been established in one area, the government
seeks to extend and consolidate it (in geographic, demographic and functional
terms). This phase is typically the longest in duration, lasting years or even
decades. In COIN, establishing control over population groups and population
centers is more important than the control of territory. Consolidation involves
replacing insurgent networks with pro-government ones, rooting out insurgent
underground cells and infrastructure, eliminating illicit governance structures
and cleaning up illegal economic activity that supports insurgents.
The key indicator of success is the degree of government control in each
district and not the level of insurgent violence, since the latter tends to be low
in areas that are fully controlled by either side but high in contested areas. This
phase involves substantially less kinetic force than the initial phase, with the
military “holding the ring” while police, intelligence, governance, information
and economic programs assume the lead, and political leaders work to resolve
key grievances and mobilize popular support for ending the insurgency. During
this phase there are often outbreaks of insurgent violence, large-scale provocations
or insurgent atrocities that seek to derail the process of consolidation.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 27
Consequently the entire theater (or parts of it that have already been cleared)
may slip back under insurgent control.
The process of consolidation must be carefully managed to ensure that it does
not progress too slowly (leading to popular frustration and regression to insurgent
control in key areas) nor too quickly (leading to premature fielding of
inadequate local security forces, or premature transition before control is fully
consolidated). In a U.S. intervention, the tendency of officials to seek an early
handover to elected local leaders needs to be balanced against the requirement
to consolidate control, so that those leaders can assume responsibility for a
stable functioning system.
• Transition: ‘Transition’ is used to describe not just the transfer of authority
from an intervening nation to the host nation but also the handover from indigenous
military forces to local civilian authority (an essential step in normalizing
the environment and ending insurgency). Although described last in this
theoretical sequence, transition occurs throughout a campaign, as indigenous
civil structures become sufficiently legitimate, effective and credible to take
the reins. In an intervention, the external force’s “exit strategy” timeline will
depend almost entirely on the rate at which indigenous capacity can be built
and rendered effective and legitimate. This requires considerable time and
resources and must be carefully planned for from the outset. The process, pace
and sequence of the process requires considerable judgment and is one of the
most difficult decisions that officials directing a counterinsurgency campaign
must undertake. Examples abound of COIN campaigns where ill-judged or
hasty transition created opportunities for insurgent comebacks. Conversely, too
slow a transition risks the loss of domestic political support for the campaign,
as tangible signs of progress may be hard to perceive. It also risks creating a
dependency culture in which any appetite for autonomy dwindles.
Relationship Between Functions
Maintaining an agile and flexible balance among the key counterinsurgency
functions is difficult but extremely important. For example, economic assistance
programs with inadequate security presence could simply create an array of soft
targets for the insurgents. Security assistance in the absence of capable political
leadership and oversight could create more—and more capable—armed groups
outside the control of the government. Moreover, while an action may fall within
one function, it often has immediate effects in the other functions. Efforts must be
integrated because effects are impossible to segregate and are often complementary.
Maintaining a balance between functions requires an integrated conflict management
system (which may be based on a joint committee system, an integrated
command model, a consultative alliance process or a combination of measures)
that enacts the overall COIN strategy and coordinates the activities of key agencies
(civil, military, affected nation and external/coalition).
28 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
CHAPTER THREE:
ACTORS
James Kunder (on right), Deputy Administrator of USAID, and Members of a
Provincial Reconstruction Team discuss development issues with an Iraqi Sheikh
(Photo: Staff Sgt. Christian Foster, Defense Department)
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 29
The Affected Government
The government threatened by a nascent or active insurgency is the most important
actor in COIN. However great its know-how and enthusiasm, an outside actor can
never fully compensate for lack of will, incapacity or counter-productive behavior
on the part of the supported government: any COIN campaign is only as good as the
political strategy which the affected nation adopts. The U.S. Government perception
of the role of each actor in a COIN struggle (including its own role) may not
coincide with the perception of other actors or the population. Additionally, the
insurgents may portray the U.S. role as one of foreign aggressor, which may well
resonate with the affected population. That population may or may not support and
appreciate the security provided by an external force, but they will certainly see it as
foreign and temporary; their long-term allegiance will tend to swing toward whichever
local actor (government or insurgent) best aligns with their needs and political
identity, or best provides security. Effective COIN therefore requires that the major
effort is (and is seen by the local population to be) led by the indigenous government.
Under ideal conditions, foreign forces do not operate independently of the
affected government, nor are political, economic or other development assistance
activities undertaken except at the request of the affected government.
But real world conditions are never ideal. Effective, legitimate governments that
meet the needs of their people and are capable of managing internal security threats
are, almost by definition, unlikely to require external COIN assistance. Governments
that do require such assistance almost always need encouragement and assistance
to address governance shortfalls, corruption, and the real or perceived issues which
insurgents use to mobilize the population. Similarly, in cases where an insurgency
develops after forcible regime change, the affected government will be undergoing
significant reform or even institution building from scratch. An intervening nation
or coalition will almost always need to co-opt, persuade or occasionally pressure
the local government to give up counter-productive behaviors, take genuine steps to
reform its actions, win the support of its people and demonstrate effectiveness and
legitimacy. Four traits that can be used to gauge the legitimacy of a state are:
• The degree to which it honors and upholds human rights and
fundamental freedoms;
• The degree to which it responds to the opinions of its citizens;
• Whether it exercises effective sovereignty;
• The degree to which it provides reasonable limits on the power of
government over individual rights.
The affected government may have the desire to do only the minimum necessary to
defeat an insurgency before returning to business as usual. This would bring about
tension between the affected government’s desire and an intervening government’s
30 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
aspiration for wholesale reform and institution building to prevent a recurrence of
unrest. Because leaders in an affected nation almost always emerge through the
same institutional processes that gave rise to the insurgency, they may be unable or
unwilling to undertake reforms; conversely, intervening forces may lack the local
knowledge and situational awareness to judge what reforms are possible and understand
how to undertake them effectively. Cooperation between affected nation and
intervening force, however difficult, is absolutely essential for effective COIN.
Relations between the U.S. Government and the affected nation will be dynamic,
especially when elections or other changes affect the composition of its government.
Any sovereign government may exercise its autonomy in ways that are in
opposition to U.S. interests. A quandary may arise between the U.S.’s desire to
reach the end-state (a fully functional, independent and legitimate nation state) and
its protection of the very U.S. interests which prompted engagement in the first
place.
It is important to recognize the distinction between national level government and
local or provincial government. Provincial governments are usually responsible for
managing resources on behalf of the national government, but some countries that
have fairly competent central governments are still unable to extend their authority
and legitimacy into outlying provinces, especially where those provinces cross
a social, ethnic, religious or economic fault line. In many regions of the world,
the local delivery of administrative services is traditionally far more important
than central government in a distant capital. Local government entities which are
perceived as illegitimate, corrupt, oppressive, or non-inclusive will provide fertile
ground for an insurgency to develop and operate, but are the lowest level through
which the national government can deliver security and other public services. The
perceived capacity of local government to provide for the population is critical to
national government legitimacy.
The U.S. Country Team
All United States Government COIN strategies, plans, programs, and activities are
undertaken in support of the affected government and managed through the U.S.
Mission’s Country Team, led by the Chief of Mission (COM) in coordination with
the Department of State. As the U.S. Ambassador, the Chief of Mission is the President’s
personal representative to the host nation and is responsible for recommending
and implementing U.S. policy regarding that country, as well as overseeing all
executive branch employees there and the activities of such employees with limited
exceptions. Appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Ambassador
has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior U.S. official present
during periods of instability and crises. Where a confirmed ambassador is not present,
the Charge d’Affaires represents the Secretary of State as the senior diplomat
accredited to the foreign government.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 31
The Country Team is the central element of interagency coordination and
execution in the foreign country. When an insurgency can be identified in its
early stages, the Chief of Mission and his or her senior staff may encourage the
affected government to take preventive action through the use of informational,
security, political and economic measures. The Chief of Mission will also bring
the matter to the early attention of decision makers in Washington D.C., his or her
local knowledge and situational awareness often providing the most incisive and
realistic source of advice. In coordination with policy makers in Washington, the
Chief of Mission may also request foreign assistance for the affected nation, help
to mobilize international support, and engage non-governmental organizations. In
the future, the Chief of Mission may be able to call upon elements of the Civilian
Response Corps, which is currently being developed within the Department of State
and which aims to provide a pool of civilian specialists and experts in reconstruction
and stabilization able to respond rapidly to countries in crisis. These actions
may help to address the causes of unrest before the crisis escalates and limits political
alternatives to the use of force.
The applicable U.S. geographic Combatant Commander, a four star general or
admiral, will be in contact with the Chief of Mission and will be able to assist
in pre-empting nascent insurgencies by providing military advice and supporting
security enhancement programs. If the United States decides to deploy U.S. combat
forces to assist an affected government, the Combatant Commander will be tasked
to plan and execute the military aspects of that support.
U.S. efforts must be designed and executed in such manner to increase both the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the threatened government in the eyes of its population.
COIN strategy requires a tailored approach that captures and integrates the
range of U.S. Government agency and department capabilities. The U.S. Government
may also elect to provide operational assistance to indigenous forces; such
assistance will be the product of deliberate foreign policy decisions taken in Washington
D.C., and will be subject to the oversight of the Chief of Mission. Representative
capabilities of U.S. Government agencies relevant to COIN are listed in
Appendix A.
The International Community
Considerable attention should be paid to the role of the international community in
the development of a COIN strategy. The formation of a sanctioned multinational
mission offers four principal areas of advantage to a COIN campaign:
• Legitimacy: When actions taken in support of a COIN campaign are consistent
with applicable international law and are supported by international entities
(which simultaneously condemn the insurgents) it will bolster support
for intervention in the affected nation, the U.S. and the wider international
community.
32 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
• Capacity: A multinational coalition will be able to call on a larger number of
troops and more financial resources than the U.S. can muster on its own. This
may have a positive effect on U.S. popular support for the campaign when U.S.
taxpayers see other countries participating in and funding part of the counterinsurgency
effort. The troops of other nations may be limited in capability or by
political restrictions, but by undertaking suitable tasking they will still free up
U.S. troops for missions in which they have a comparative advantage.
• Specialist Capabilities: Many U.S. allies and coalition partners have a
comparative advantage in deployable capabilities relevant to COIN, such
as developing national police forces, promoting economic growth or developing
the administrative capacity of local officials in high threat or remote
environments.
• Regional Effects: Regional partners can help prevent the establishment of
external sanctuaries, prevent or slow the spread of the conflict to other areas,
and provide local expertise, basing, and possibly even security assistance.
As well as these advantages, coalition operations bring many additional challenges
such as differences in goals, training, capabilities, equipment, logistics, culture,
doctrine, intelligence and language. They require early and close coordination
of effort to best integrate their capabilities and expertise in the achievement of
common political, economic, security and informational objectives. However, the
importance of international solidarity and legitimacy means that coalition operations
will remain the preferred path for U.S. COIN engagements in the foreseeable
future.
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO)
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), formed when two or more national
governments sign a multilateral treaty to form such a body and finance its operations,
possess legal personality in international law and their staffs enjoy diplomatic
status. Most IGOs are regionally focused, and as such when IGO member states
could be adversely affected by an insurgency in their region, the organization may
act collectively to deny legitimacy, sanctuary, and support to insurgents. IGOs can
also play an important role in humanitarian assistance and development.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)
NGOs are private, self-governing, non-profit organizations. Their activities (a direct
function of the interests of their donors) are very diverse, but include interests such
as education, health care, environmental protection, human rights, conflict resolution
and similar issues. Some NGOs are implementing partners for U.S. foreign
assistance, but these are a special case and will be discussed separately. Since their
aims are often complimentary to the COIN effort in meeting the needs of a local
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 33
population, they should, as far as possible, be consulted to minimize duplication
or gaps in assistance. However, in order to secure freedom of movement, including
access to semi-permissive environments, NGOs generally strive to be independent,
politically neutral, needs-driven organizations. Consequently, they often
try to minimize contact with uniformed military personnel or other governmental
actors, seeking ‘humanitarian space’ in which to operate. In an attempt to address
this difficult dynamic, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) has created a set of guidelines
(referenced in Appendix C) for relations between U.S. armed forces and nongovernmental
humanitarian organizations. This requirement for separation is not
absolute: despite their best efforts, NGOs will not be seen as neutral by some insurgents
and where security is problematic, NGOs may rely on government resources
– military and otherwise—for transportation and protection. COIN planning should
take NGO activities into account, although it is unwise to rely on NGOs to provide
key elements of any plan due to their independent status.
Some NGOs may actually promote aims which conflict with or are counter to the
COIN strategy and COIN planners should take care to establish their motivations
and activities before engagement. NGOs that oppose the affected government or
actively forge links with insurgents will create security problems and risks, but they
may also provide opportunities to open channels for negotiation or mediation with
insurgents. Criticism by NGOs can be useful in drawing attention to those issues
where reform actions are necessary. Finally, as an independent and often credible
source of ‘ground truth’ about the areas in which they work, they will be an important
source of information to many interested parties.
Diaspora Groups
Exile or diaspora groups from the affected nation, whether relocated in the U.S. or
elsewhere, will sometimes attempt to influence insurgency situations. They may
sympathize with the insurgents and therefore oppose any intervention on behalf
of the affected nation, or they may offer assistance to the intervention; looking to
play a role in the planning or implementation of a COIN strategy. If they succeed in
having any influence over the situation then it is important for COIN practitioners
to have an accurate picture of their motives, capabilities and relationship with the
affected government, since these are often misunderstood or misrepresented.
Media
Media is a key actor in a successful information strategy in any COIN campaign. The
U.S. Government is accustomed to interaction with western media groups, but there
is often a weakness in the relationship with regional media in overseas insurgency
situations. This can result in missed opportunities to influence key stakeholders.
34 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
The Private Sector
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
Multinational Corporations usually become involved in counterinsurgency when
their corporate interests (financial interests, foreign based personnel, or infrastructure,
etc.) are threatened, or when a financial advantage is perceived. COIN planners
will not always have the ability to influence the activities of multi-national
corporations in an affected country, but may find that their interests complement the
COIN effort. In particular, firms in extractive sectors (oil, mining, etc.) have large
initial investment and long production cycles, which mean that withdrawal from a
country could result in significant financial cost. For such companies, investment in
local stabilization activities (from micro-loans to security sector reform activities)
makes economic sense.
CONTRACTORS
Contractors are frequently used by the affected nation and supporting countries to
provide a wide range of functions of which security is only one. Policy makers
should be aware that the dynamics of contracting arrangements often lead to
“contractor mission creep” over time, resulting in expanded costs and responsibilities
for contractor personnel. Policy makers should also be cognizant of the fact
that U.S. hired contractors, especially security contractors, are often viewed by the
local population as U.S. Government representatives and any negative behavior or
interaction with the local population can have an adverse impact on COIN efforts.
They should therefore ensure that armed contractors (including security personnel,
facility guards, trainers and advisers) are subject to robust, well-designed rules for
the use of force, and that their relationship with the affected government is ethical
and transparent. Despite these concerns, contractors (across all functions) are now
so essential to U.S. Government overseas operations that large scale COIN intervention
is probably inconceivable without them.
GRANTEES
The U.S. Government generally delivers development assistance through grants to
non-governmental organizations and private individuals or through contracts. U.S.
Government grant managers oversee the activities of grantees to ensure that funds
are used for the intended purpose. Generally, they can only change the nature of the
grant once it has been authorized if the grant is written to provide for termination
or modification in the event of changed circumstances. Grantees are often subject
to the same ‘humanitarian space’ considerations as NGOs and frequently prefer to
be separated from military activity. COIN planners must therefore maintain awareness
of U.S. Government-funded grantee activities in order to protect U.S. investment,
avoid duplication of effort, and prevent military compromise of their status.
Grantees may require armed security personnel who would be subject to the same
concerns as armed security contractors.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 35
CHAPTER FOUR:
ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING
A USAID officer works with her Afghan counterparts
(Photo: Michelle Parker, USAID)
36 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Involvement in countering an insurgency overseas is not an endeavor that the
U.S. Government should embark on lightly. As this guide has illustrated thus far;
insurgencies often arise from a deep rooted social grievance which the affected
government may be reluctant or unable to address. Moreover, COIN campaigns are
generally protracted affairs entailing significant costs in lives and resources. U.S.
decision making on whether and how to assist a country affected by insurgency
should follow the sequence below:
• Assessment of the situation
• Formulation of policy
• Development of strategy
• Integrated planning
• Implementation
• Continuous monitoring, evaluation and assessment
This Guide is aimed at U.S. Government policy makers and will therefore give
greatest emphasis to their role in the ‘formulation of policy’ stage, in particular
determining whether the U.S. should become engaged in a COIN campaign overseas
and if so how.
Assessing The Situation
A whole-of-government approach to a COIN engagement begins with a strategiclevel
interagency analysis of the conflict. This should be conducted by an interagency
team comprised of all relevant agencies with core competencies needed to
counter the insurgency. As much as possible within release constraints, the relevant
knowledge and understanding of the affected state and strategic environment
should be shared across all participating agencies. The effort may be conducted
at the direction of the National Security Council (though it may be recommended
by the Chief of Mission or the State Department regional Assistant Secretary) and
will usually be led by the U.S. Agency for International Development or by the
Department of State. It may involve extensive field evaluation activities conducted
through the U.S. Embassy in the affected country, or it may be conducted entirely
through remote assessment methods.
Insurgencies are frequently described in terms of sources and root causes, parties
and actors, and drivers and triggers. The sources and root causes of insurgency
can be described in terms of the stakeholders’ frustrated needs and grievances. The
drivers of insurgency can be expressed in terms of the dynamics among the stakeholders;
in particular the way in which dissatisfaction is harnessed, channeled and
directed by opinion leaders. To fully understand these factors may require detailed
analysis of regional history, ethnicity, culture, politics and religion.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 37
The interagency assessment process should yield a comprehensive picture of the
environment and a common understanding of the nature of the problem. It will
provide the first step towards developing a whole-of-government COIN strategy
and supporting plans.
At the strategic level, analytical tools such as the Interagency Methodology for
Analyzing Instability and Conflict, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
(ICAF), and the Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability (the last
from the Political Instability Task Force, a U.S. Government-sponsored grouping
of researchers and scholars from a number of American universities) may be useful
aids to the development of situation-specific information for policy-level strategic
planning. The ICAF, the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework, and similar
modeling tools can be used to inform programmatic, operational and tactical level
plans. Use of these frameworks, must incorporate (or at least consider) any preexisting
analysis and data, especially that which has been used in support of previous
country plans. A deliberate analysis undertaken carefully will be of enduring
utility in providing deep understanding. See Appendix B for web links to these and
other assessment and modeling tools.
Forming U.S. Government Policy
The assessment phase described above lays the foundation for the formulation of
U.S. Government policy; most critically whether the U.S. should engage with the
affected government, and if so, what form that engagement should take. Only with
a full understanding of the causes, nature and maturity of the insurgency, along
with knowledge of the applicable international and domestic legal frameworks, can
policy makers balance U.S. interests against likely costs and risks of becoming
involved in what could prove to be a prolonged and expensive conflict.
Deciding Whet her To Engage
It is folly to become engaged with counterinsurgency in a foreign country unless
there is a reasonable likelihood that the affected government will introduce necessary
reforms and will demonstrate adequate willpower and capacity to defeat insurgents
(or at least be willing to accept advice as well as assistance). Before deciding
to provide overseas COIN assistance, U.S. officials must determine how likely it is
that the local government will cooperate and how willing it is to undertake necessary
reforms. For this reason, the following key characteristics of the affected nation
must be examined in depth during the assessment phase:
• Character of the affected government: Supporting an oppressive, authoritarian
or abusive government against an insurgency is highly problematic, not
only from an ethical standpoint but also in terms of the practical likelihood of
success. Such a government is unlikely to develop the necessary legitimacy to
succeed in COIN. At the same time, the credibility and moral authority of the
United States may be tarnished or compromised by too close a relationship
38 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
with such a regime. In deciding whether or not to become engaged in a given
circumstance, policy makers must consider the degree to which the insurgency
derives from feckless administration on the part of the affected government,
and therefore the degree to which the insurgents represent legitimate grievances.
A government that lacks capacity and capabilities for COIN but is open
to international community assistance and has a fundamentally democratic and
responsible character is more likely to benefit from assistance than a government
whose political or moral character is fundamentally unsound. The latter
type of government is rarely a good candidate for engagement, regardless of its
perceived geo-strategic importance.
• Government bias: Insurgencies that occur along ethnic or sectarian lines
frequently derive from genuine sectarian or ethnic bias in the government’s
administration of its population (though this is often manipulated by extremist
groups from outside the affected society). Such biased governments may
require wholesale reform, including changes in the demographic recruiting
base for soldiers, police and civil service, and changes in the political orientation
of key leaders. This is a costly, time-consuming and often politically
controversial process. Planners must assess the likelihood that the government
can be sufficiently reformed to meet the needs and address the legal and human
rights of its entire population. They should conduct a detailed assessment of
requirements for reform, and seek a firm commitment to specific reforms from
the affected government. Continued leverage may be necessary to maintain
that commitment, so policy makers may decide to tie continued assistance to
measured progress in meeting reform benchmarks. Without effective reform,
intervention may stabilize the government in the short term, but may simply
enable continued behavior by officials that renders long-term success unlikely.
• Rule of law: Most countries affected by insurgency do not have robust, transparent
and effective rule of law systems. Indeed, read or perceived inequalities
in the administration of the law and injustices are often triggers for insurgency.
Consequently, building the government’s legitimacy and effectiveness often
requires the wholesale reform of rule of law systems. Planners must make a
judgment about how eroded or ineffective those systems are, including judiciary
and legislative processes, court and prison systems, police, prosecutors,
defense attorneys and legal record-keeping systems. This will indicate the
amount of effort required to assist and the likely degree of success.
• Level of Corruption: Many countries affected by insurgency exhibit pervasive
problem of government and security force corruption. This creates grievances
which insurgents exploit, and places great friction and cost on international
assistance. In some cases this may simply be a factor for planners to take
into account, but in others policy makers may decide to seek a commitment to
specific anti-corruption programs as a prerequisite for assistance. In judging
the importance of corruption, planners should note that the forms of corrupU.
S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 39
tion that are most relevant in an insurgency scenario are those that alienate the
people from the government or that lead to waste and inefficiency in government
programs.
• Civil-military relations: Many insurgency affected governments have weak
institutions, including military and police forces and civil administration. In
deciding to become involved, U.S. planners must consider whether assistance
to the military and police is likely to alter the balance between military and
civilian power in the country. Large-scale assistance to militaries in the absence
of matching assistance to civil administration (or without military leaders
making firm commitments to civilian control and democracy) may increase the
risk of a coup d’état in the affected country, either during or after the phase of
international assistance. Such an outcome would ultimately harm the affected
country and would undermine the moral authority of the international community.
Policy makers need to be encouraged to plan for civil-military relations
as an integral part of security sector reform, establishing safeguards to mitigate
the risk of coups.
• Economic viability: Many insurgent fighters at the local level, regardless of
rhetoric, are motivated by economic factors: youth unemployment and lack
of economic opportunity. Insurgents often pay local fighters (or allow them
access to profits from illegal activities) to gain their support. Planners must
therefore judge the likelihood that key economic infrastructure and systems
can be put in place to generate alternative livelihoods and make the affected
country economically viable over the long term.
• Presence of terrorist or transnational criminal groups: The presence of
adversaries to the global interests of the United States, such as international
terrorist or transnational organized crime groups, is a significant but complex
consideration. Where terrorist groups are present, policy makers may be highly
motivated to engage, in order to prevent the emergence of transnational threats
from under-governed or insurgent-controlled areas. However, large-scale or
clumsy intervention in such areas may actually lead to a backlash from local
people who are alienated by increased government presence. International
involvement in a conflict that does not currently include a transnational element
may give a foothold to extremists from outside the affected country to exploit,
internationalizing the conflict from both the government and insurgent sides.
Policy makers should be very cautious about such escalation and should seek
to assist in the lightest and least intrusive manner possible, working by, with
and through the local government wherever possible. If this is not feasible due
to the scale of the problem, policy makers should carefully weigh the risks of
inaction against the costs and benefits of involvement.
• Border security/ungoverned spaces: An affected government that cannot
control its borders, has large areas of ungoverned space near its frontiers, or
faces an active insurgent sanctuary in a neighboring country will be particu40
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
larly challenged in conducting COIN. Policy makers must judge the likelihood
that areas of ungoverned space can be brought under government control. They
must also take a regional view, considering whether neighboring countries
can be persuaded to play a constructive role (or at least be dissuaded from
undermining the affected government). Assisting an affected country without
an effective strategy for border security, reduction of ungoverned space and
denial of cross-border insurgent sanctuaries is highly unlikely to succeed over
the long term.
Clearly, a country that scores well on each of the factors listed above, and is
therefore a good candidate for assistance, is by definition unlikely to need that
assistance in the first place. Countries that are candidates for U.S. engagement
in the real world therefore usually score badly on several of these considerations.
Hence, for each factor listed here, planners and policy makers should
not necessarily expect to find a good current situation, but rather should consider
the potential long-term viability. An affected country with sound political,
economic and social fundamentals but poor current conditions is much more
likely to respond well to assistance than one where fundamentals are poor,
even if current conditions are not so bad.
Unfortunately, there will inevitably be occasions when the assessment of the
insurgency situation will weigh heavily against U.S. involvement, but specific
U.S. national interests will drive policymakers towards engagement. However,
this does not negate the value of thorough assessment. On the contrary; it
means that the decision will have been made with a good understanding of the
inherent risks and the challenges that will need to be overcome. It may also
prompt caution over the form of engagement to be used, perhaps encouraging
a more limited involvement from which a subsequent exit can be made with
less political consequence.
DECIDING HOW TO ENGAGE
Depending upon the strength, legitimacy and effectiveness of tools available to the
affected government, the U.S. Government may play a subtle role in countering
an incipient insurgency or may intervene more forcefully. For reasons of cost, to
minimize any backlash from the population against foreign presence, and to protect
the sovereignty of the affected government, policy makers should select the most
appropriate, most indirect and least intrusive form of intervention that will still have
a high probability of achieving the necessary effect. Counter-intuitively for some
planners, it is often the case that the less intrusive and more indirect the approach
selected, the more likely it is to succeed, though this may be dependent on the
maturity of the insurgency.
Insurgencies evolve in stages, and the nature of the U.S. response will often be
dependent on the stage of development of the insurgency at the point when the U.S.
decides to engage. There is a significant difference between responding to an incipiU.
S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 41
ent insurgency and responding to a full-blown insurrection where a well-developed
(though not necessarily effective) counterinsurgency program is being implemented
by the host nation government. An incipient insurgency can often be more easily
addressed by a small scale U.S. response than a well developed one. However, most
affected nations will only seek U.S. assistance when the insurgency has developed
sufficient maturity to pose a real threat, by which time the smaller scale response
options may no longer be effective.
From least to most intrusive, forms of intervention include:
• Mission Augmentation: The mission augmentation approach involves the
deployment of a specialist team to augment the U.S. Embassy in the affected
country and/or the U.S. Consulate in an affected region of the country. An
example of this approach was the Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT)
deployed to reinforce U.S. Mission Iraq at the start of 2007. Further examples
are the State Department’s Foreign Emergency Response Team (FEST) that
can deploy to support embassies experiencing an emergency situation and the
intelligence community’s Rapid Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response
(RASER) teams. The augmentation team may operate on a temporary duty
basis, or may be assigned directly to the embassy staff. It includes a team
leader well versed in all civil and military aspects of COIN, and team members
selected in consultation with the embassy for specialist skills relevant to the
needs of the affected government. The team should be as small as possible and
would have minimal direct interaction with the affected government or population.
Instead, it performs its function by training, advising, supporting and
assisting the U.S. Country Team in its role of providing advice and support to
the Ambassador. Assistance to the affected government is then carried out by
The Difficulty in Addressing Incipient Insurgencies
Affected
Government
Reluctance to
Accept
Assistance
Reluctant
Accepting
Incipient Developed
High/Long
Low/Short
Scale and
Duration of
COIN Effort
Required
Threshold
for Outside
Assistance
Stage of Insurgency (Theater Maturity)
42 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
the Country Team in the normal manner. This is a low cost, low profile, small
footprint approach which is appropriate early in the development of an insurgency,
or as a short term surge at other stages in a campaign. It is sustainable
over very long periods due to its low cost. It may also be the chosen approach
in situations when U.S. intervention would be extremely politically sensitive.
• Single Expert Advisor: The single expert advisor approach involves the
seconding of one advisor, who may be either a civilian or a military officer,
directly onto the staff of the affected government. The advisor should be placed,
in close consultation with the affected government, in a position to advise, train
and assist its elected leaders and officials in dealing with the insurgency. He
or she assesses the situation, develops plans and capabilities in support of the
affected government, and advises on the placement and tasking of additional
U.S. assets if deployed. They will usually maintain a close relationship with
the U.S. Ambassador and Country Team and may be supported by an embassy
augmentation team or by specialist capabilities that can be called forward as
needed. In order to achieve the necessary influence, the advisor must have
appropriate rank, status and freedom of action as well as a diplomatic approach
to his or her work. The advisor should take a low key, backstage role and
support the affected government as its leads the COIN effort, and avoid even
the appearance of taking on the lead. This approach is relatively low profile,
low cost and sustainable yet it has historically been extremely effective. It is
most successful when the selected advisor possesses cultural and language
skills appropriate to the affected nation, is paired with an effective indigenous
leadership team, and deploys for a long duration.
• Civil-Military Assistance: The civil-military assistance approach involves
the deployment of a specialist team, potentially operating as a Joint Interagency
Task Force (JIATF), to work with civilian and military agencies of
the affected government. Team members or detachments may be embedded in
key positions in the affected government to provide support, advice, technical
assistance, education and training. Team members do not normally engage
in direct activity against the insurgency. Through the civil-military assistance
program they may help develop an Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)
strategy in consultation with the affected government, and become a conduit
for international community assistance. The team operates as a separate entity
from the U.S. Mission, but normally works under Chief of Mission authority.
If a military Joint Task Force is deployed, or if the security threat is especially
high, the team may operate under military authority (as Provincial Reconstruction
Teams do in Afghanistan). However, unlike Foreign Internal Defense, it
remains civilian-led and military-supported. This approach is relatively lowcost
and sustainable over the long term, but has a higher profile than the two
previous methods discussed above. The size of the civil-military assistance
team should be kept as small as possible, and the duration of deployment rotations
as long as possible, to increase its cost-effectiveness.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 43
• Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Foreign internal defense is defined as the
participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the
action programs taken by another government or other designated organization,
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
The FID approach involves the deployment of military teams, often originating
from the U.S. Special Operations Command, to support the affected government.
It differs from civil-military assistance in that it is normally militaryled,
but still includes very substantial interagency input and support. FID is
described in detail in U.S. Army Field Manual 31-20-3 and in Joint Publication
3-07.1. It varies in scope, cost and intrusiveness depending on the nature of the
insurgency and the capabilities of the affected government, but is usually more
intrusive than the models discussed above (though significantly less intrusive
than direct COIN intervention).
• Direct COIN Intervention: Direct intervention in a COIN campaign may
follow previous attempts to handle an insurgency using the approaches
discussed above, or it may be the initial engagement. The current campaigns in
Iraq and Afghanistan are not standard examples of direct COIN intervention,
since troops were initially deployed to bring about regime change. The military
role in direct COIN intervention is described in detail in Army Field Manual
3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 and in the Defense Department’s
forthcoming Joint Publication on Counterinsurgency 3-24, as well as
being discussed elsewhere in this Guide.
Forms of Assistance that USG Can Provide to an Affected Nation
Scale/Cost
of Effort
Direct
Intervention
Foreign
Internal
Defense
Civil-
Military
Assistance
Single
Expert
Advisor
Mission
Augmentation
Form of
Assistance
Profile/Risk
These two categories
could vary significantly
in scale and profile
44 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
When considering options, it must be remembered that every insurgency is different
and will require a carefully tailored response. The approaches outlined above
should therefore be seen as broad categories and not specific models.
It should be noted that there is a tendency for assistance to creep incrementally from
small scale and less intrusive forms to ever larger and more obvious assistance. This
is clearly illustrated by the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The danger of
this type of escalation is that the in-depth assessment and policy evaluation that
occurred for the initial decision to assist may not necessarily be repeated for every
increment and the government may find itself enmeshed in a scale of effort which
was not reached by logical deliberation.
The risk of escalatory involvement should be considered during the formulation of
policy. If the assessment of the situation is thorough enough and accurate, then the
level of engagement chosen should be sufficient to address the problem. However,
most countries significantly underestimate the scale of effort required to defeat an
insurgency. If escalation of involvement does occur, then a full reappraisal of the
situation and policy response should be conducted prior to each and every increment
of involvement.
Developing a Strategy
Regardless of the model of engagement selected, the policy decision to engage
requires the development of a detailed framework. The more detailed framework
for the U.S. response, in which objectives are determined and resources matched
to their achievement, is achieved through strategy development. The components
of a COIN strategy have already been outlined in detail during Chapter 2. Ideally,
the overall COIN strategy should be devised by the affected nation, as their understanding
of it and their commitment to it will be key to success. If possible, the role
of the U.S. should therefore be one of advising and assisting the affected nation to
improve its strategy (if it already has one) or to help it write one from scratch (if it
does not). If the latter is the case, the U.S. should also strive to build up the strategy
development capacity of the affected government.
As previously discussed, the affected government may not be particularly eager to
address some of the underlying causes of insurgency and so may find U.S. suggestions
unpalatable. If so, the U.S. will need to work with the affected government to
encourage it to take the necessary steps.
Once the affected nation has a viable COIN strategy, the U.S. should determine
where its own resources and actions can best be applied to contribute to the affected
nation’s strategy.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 45
Integrated Planning
The planning process to put a COIN strategy into effect will seldom be simple. To
be effective, it must be integrated in two dimensions: internationally and between
U.S. Government agencies.
• International Integration: By the very fact that the U.S. is assisting another
nation to conduct COIN, the planning process must be at least bilateral. If the
U.S. is involved as part of a coalition, then planning will require a multinational
approach if the capabilities of other nations are to be integrated to best
effect and the gains in legitimacy are to be preserved. In such a coalition, the
degree of influence should be proportional to the degree of investment that
each nation is willing to make in support of the affected nation.
As with the strategy, the plan should ideally be devised and owned by the affected
government whose legitimacy and credibility are central to the campaign. If
its competency and capacity to conduct COIN is limited, then initial planning
will require a greater proportion of outside assistance, but supporting nations
should recognize (indeed welcome) the increasing autonomy of the affected
government in planning and conducting COIN as it grows in competence,
capacity and confidence. While such independence may create conflicts of
interest with the supporting nations, it represents progress towards the desired
end-state.
• Interagency Integration: COIN planning by the affected nation should integrate
civilian and military capabilities across each of the four COIN strategy
functions of security, politics, economics and information. This requires the
affected nation to conduct ‘whole-of-government’ planning to synchronize and
sequence each department’s activities towards achieving the objectives of the
COIN strategy. The synergies achieved will be key to exercising control over
the environment through the strengthening of legitimate and effective government
institutions.
The U.S. Government also needs to take a ‘whole-of-government’ approach
to its support of the affected nation. It must employ a tailored approach that
captures and integrates the range of capabilities that U.S. Government departments
and agencies offer, so as to best support the affected government.
A whole-of-government plan should specify:
– The over-arching goal to be achieved;
– Critical facts and assumptions about the environment;
– Critical facts and assumptions about cause and effect;
– Major mission elements necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal;
46 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
– Essential task areas within each major mission element (tailored to the
unique context and with possible consequences weighed against the
desired end-state);
– Sequencing of essential tasks;
– Resources available to support the plan (skilled people, relationships,
expert knowledge, money, materials, and time);
– Metrics to assess progress towards the overarching goal and major
mission elements;
– The applicable international and domestic legal constraints;
– The structure and business rules for contributing, storing and sharing all
relevant information.
The outputs of whole-of-government assessment and planning should include
detailed descriptions of:
– Dynamics driving the conflict, including those that create and support
the insurgency, and those that might mitigate the conflict and defuse the
insurgency;
– Primary actors and factors, including opinion leaders and identity
groups (legitimate government leaders and their constituencies, insurgent
groups and their supporters,), identity issues around which the
actors coalesce (ideologies or other organizing principles), the degree
to which the insurgency has subverted or penetrated the legitimate
government, indigenous and external support to the insurgency, and
vulnerabilities of the insurgent movement;
– Purpose of engagement (the “what” or mission statement for the COIN
campaign);
– Major mission elements and essential tasks (the “how” for COIN
operations);
– Resources required; detailed description of how the programs will be
funded and managed by each U.S. Government department and agency;
and resource shortfalls;
– Measures of effectiveness and performance indicators for each component
of the plan and for the overall strategy;
– Key legal requirements, constraints and redlines;
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 47
– Coordination and synchronization mechanisms—“business rules” for
integration of activities across departments and agencies, including
clear lines of authority, command, and communication;
– Incorporation, where appropriate and possible, of other national, IGO,
and NGO capabilities into plans and operations.
In summary, the success of the USG in helping other nations to defeat insurgencies
will often be dependent on its proficiency at coordinating all committed agencies
and resources (including its own, those of the affected nation, and those of international
partners) towards a common objective. The first requirement for the U.S. is
that it must synchronize its own agencies in a ‘whole-of-government’ understanding
and approach. The second requirement is that it exercise sufficient diplomatic skill
to coax, guide and assist the affected nation through the necessary steps of planning
and execution to regain legitimacy and control. In situations where other coalition
partners are involved, that diplomatic acumen must extend to maintaining the coalition
and ensuring that partner efforts are woven as effectively as possible into the
overall COIN strategy.
The ‘Principles of the U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction,
Stabilization and Conflict Transformation’ document can be a useful tool for strategy
development and planning. See Appendix C for web links to this and other
planning tools.
Implementation
The requirement for integration does not end with planning; but should carry over
into the execution of the plan. Unity of command may seldom be achievable, but a
common sense of purpose and teamwork (between U.S. agencies, with the affected
government and with other coalition players) will greatly increase the probability
of success.
Continuous Monitoring, Evaluation and Assessment
Counterinsurgency situations are typically dynamic; insurgencies evolve and
mature, affected governments (especially democratic ones) will alter in composition,
competency and stance and the opinions held by populations will change.
Concurrently both insurgents and counterinsurgents will evolve and adapt their
strategies and tactics in a Darwinian struggle to outmaneuver each other. Under
such dynamic conditions, it is not sufficient for assessment and planning to occur
once, when the decision to become involved is taken. Planning should be adaptive
and flexible, though for unity of effort and continuity the main themes should be
maintained wherever possible. The situation should be continuously reassessed and
the relative success of insurgent and counterinsurgent should be evaluated. Humanitarian
and development activities should be monitored and evaluated according to
48 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
international standards and best practices. Evaluations are often best achieved by
an independent team of experts reporting directly to the senior U.S. official. The
U.S. military frequently applies this concept, using retired military commanders
and diplomats. The views of the local population and non-U.S. Government entities
should always be sought. Where the situation has changed significantly, the counterinsurgents
(the affected nation, the U.S. and partners) must be prepared to review
the strategy to determine whether it is still valid.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 49
CONCLUSION
Afghan women waiting in line to vote at their local polling place
(Photo: USAID)
50 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Effective counterinsurgency requires multi-faceted and integrated operations that
apply civilian and military capabilities across information, security, political and
economic functional areas. The goal of intervention in a COIN campaign is to help
an affected government achieve control over its sovereign territory by establishing,
developing, and consolidating legitimate, effective government institutions.
The U.S. can assist an affected government with strategies that combine information,
security, political and economic elements. Before committing to engagement,
careful consideration must be given to the affected government’s legitimacy, its
willingness to reform and its general political and economic viability. Approaches
ranging from augmentation teams, through advisory support, civil-military assistance,
Foreign Internal Defense and direct COIN intervention are available and
historically proven. Diplomatic efforts in COIN, which shape the international environment
as well as helping the affected government to reform, mobilize support,
marginalize insurgents and extend its control throughout its territory, are led by the
Department of State. Development efforts help the affected government to meet
essential needs, develop infrastructure and build economic capacity and are led by
the U.S. Agency for International Development. Both diplomacy and development
are enabled by and contribute to security activities, which are led by the Department
of Defense. The complex nature of insurgency also requires the integration of capabilities
extant in a number of other U.S. Government agencies and departments, as
well as those of other partner nations, inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations, and the private sector.
Insurgencies, and thus COIN strategies, can vary significantly from one situation
to another. COIN efforts succeed if they result in a political resolution acceptable
to the parties involved. Diplomacy, development and defense are interdependent at
every level of a COIN effort, and civil-military integration is required at the strategic,
theater/operational and local/tactical levels. Most successful COIN campaigns
have achieved this unity of effort through unified authority.
This Guide serves to synthesize counterinsurgency theory with the recent experience
of officials across U.S. Government departments and agencies working in this
field. It deliberately focuses at the broad national level so as to develop civilian
literature on counterinsurgency to complement existing military doctrine. As the
first serious U.S. effort at creating a national counterinsurgency framework in over
40 years, this Guide is intended to provide the basis for continued discussion among
and feedback from practitioners. The ultimate intent of this effort is to develop
our national capability to support the counterinsurgency efforts of legitimate and
responsible governments that respond to the needs of their people.
Contact information for the authors and contributors is listed in Appendix E by U.S.
government department or agency.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 51
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: U.S. GOVERNMENT ROLES IN COIN
National Security Council
The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum for consultation
with senior advisors and cabinet officials on national security and foreign
policy matters. The NSC staff provides advice to the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies and manages the processes
through which the President’s polices are coordinated and implemented. Due to
COIN’s inherent requirement for a whole of government approach, the NSC is
uniquely positioned to guide COIN policy development and implementation.
Intelligence Community
Intelligence is central to any COIN campaign; it is the basis upon which a precise
and deep understanding of the nature of insurgency, its context, and its remedies
are based. The U.S. and international intelligence communities are indispensable
contributors, providing intelligence support to policy makers, including indications
and warning; conflict assessment tools; deployable support, including Rapid
Analytic Support and Expeditionary Response (RASER) teams; collaborative tools;
and dedicated support to planning staffs.
Department of State
The Department of State, through its bureaus, offices, and missions overseas, leads
and oversees U.S. Government support to COIN efforts. The relevant regional
bureau will normally direct primary policy regarding U.S. engagement in or operations
in support of other governments. Several functional bureaus and offices,
including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, the Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
and the Legal Adviser’s Office will have substantive roles in the development and
execution of COIN strategy. The functional bureaus within State have the capability
to design and execute full-spectrum assistance programs in the security sector
to include counter-narcotics, anti-corruption, and police and non-military security
forces. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has been
tasked to develop a Civilian Response Corps, to provide a pool of civilian expertise
52 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
in reconstruction and stabilization able to respond rapidly to countries in crisis.
Chiefs of U.S. Missions will oversee official U.S. Government operations in the
countries to which they are accredited.
Department of Defense
The Department of Defense and U.S. military forces provide a broad range of capabilities
to support an integrated U.S. counterinsurgency effort. These may include
advising and training foreign military, internal security, and police units; planning
and conducting security operations in support of indigenous security forces; intelligence,
communications, and logistical support; public affairs and military information
operations; medical assistance; civil affairs support; and infrastructure repair
and construction. Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, and U.S. military joint doctrine describe U.S. military
COIN capabilities and operations in detail.
U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID can assist U.S. COIN efforts by fostering economic growth, promoting
human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance and enhancing
democracy in developing countries. This is achieved through a spectrum of actions
from policy reform to community level programs. USAID has extensive experience
in developing and implementing programs with national governments and
has field offices in 100 developing countries, working in close partnership with
private voluntary organizations, indigenous groups, universities, American businesses,
international organizations, other governments, trade and professional associations,
faith-based organizations, and other U.S. government agencies. USAID
programs are designed to enhance institutional capacity and ameliorate the root
causes of conflict; community-level programs in particular have a good track record
in addressing the grievances that fuel insurgency. The large numbers of foreign
service nationals that make up the professional cadre of field staff provide a unique
understanding of the local situation, while the range of sectors and levels of activity
allow USAID great operational flexibility and agility to both implement and track
the effectiveness of COIN operations.
Department of Justice
The Department of Justice, through its constituent agencies (the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service,
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives) and components,
works with other nations to combat transnational crime and international terrorist
activities, including financial and operational support that may buttress insurgency
operations. Justice also has offices devoted exclusively to providing overseas
technical assistance that are highly relevant to COIN: the International Criminal
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 53
Investigative Training Assistance Program, which develops police and corrections
institutions; and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and
Training, which develops prosecutorial and judicial institutions.
Department of the Treasury
The Department of Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
(TFI) plays an important role within the U.S. Government with the twin aims of
safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations,
terrorism facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money
launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats by disrupting and
dismantling terrorist and insurgent financial networks as well as building partner
nation capacity. Both of these aims are highly relevant to COIN. TFI’s components
include the Offices of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, Intelligence and
Analysis, Foreign Assets Control, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
The Office of International Affairs, through its Office of Technical Assistance,
works directly with foreign governments to support their efforts to improve their
financial systems.
Department of Homeland Security
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed by merging 22 separate
and distinct federal agencies. The Department’s overarching purpose is to govern
domestic security operations; however, several component agencies and offices
operate overseas, interacting and cooperating with host nation government agencies.
A significant by-product of that interaction and cooperation is improved U.S.
and host government capabilities to provide security and safety for their populations.
DHS component agencies and offices with capabilities most relevant to COIN
are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
U.S. Secret Service, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office of International
Affairs, and the Office of Operations Coordination.
Department of Agriculture
Many insurgencies occur in countries where the majority of the population is dependent
upon agriculture, and where unemployed or underemployed rural youth are
considered prime candidates for recruitment. Development of the agricultural sector
and its institutions helps facilitate trade and increase incomes, reducing recruitment
and support for insurgency. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) executes the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) international programs, including market
development, trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and analysis of
statistics and market information. The FAS delivers training and technical assis54
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
tance, and collaborates with developing and transitional countries to facilitate trade
and promote food security. The goals of USDA’s international work are to help
ensure that countries critical to U.S. national security strengthen their institutions,
policies, and market-based agricultural systems, thereby contributing to long-term
economic and political stability; adopt regulations consistent with international
standards to increase trade, resulting in economic growth and stability; and employ
agricultural practices that will reduce instability, increase regional cooperation, and
ensure an adequate resource base for future generations.
Department of Transportation
Transportation infrastructure (roads, rail, ports, air and pipeline) is a critical component
of the economic health and development of countries, factors that mitigate
conditions that encourage insurgency. All facets of commerce, trade, travel, and
quality of life depend on mobility. Transportation facilitates a government’s ability
to provide its population with basic services and security, thereby reducing the
appeal of insurgency within the most likely populations of potential recruits. Transportation
can support COIN efforts by helping countries to strengthen their institutions,
policies, and intermodal transportation systems, contributing to long-term
economic and political stability; adopt regulations consistent with international
standards to increase trade and safety, resulting in economic growth and stability;
and adopt transportation practices that promote infrastructure development for
local, regional and international movement of people and commerce.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 55
APPENDIX B: WEBSITE LINKS TO ASSESSMENT &
MODELING TOOLS
1. Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/PITFglobal.pdf
2. USAID—Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy
and Program Development
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
publications/docs/CMM_ConflAssessFrmwrk_May_05.pdf
3. USAID Conflict Mitigation and Management Policy
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
publications/docs/USAID_Conflict_MM_Policy.pdf
4. USAID Community-Based Development in Conflict-Affected Areas
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/
publications/docs/CMM_CBD_Guide_May_2007.pdf
5. Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization
and Conflict Transformation
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.
display&shortcut=49Q9
6. Graphical Overview of Whole-of-Government Planning Framework and
Process for Reconstruction and Stabilization
http://www.crs.state.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.
display&shortcut=49QF
7. S/CRS Triggering Mechanisms for “Whole-of-Government” Planning for
Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation
www.crs.state.gov
8. S/CRS Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and S
tabilization
www.crs.state.gov
9. OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (SSR)
(includes a framework for SSR assessment)
http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict/if-ssr
56 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
APPENDIX C: USEFUL REFERENCES
Baker, Jim Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies Parameters Winter 2006-
07: 26-43.
Baltazar, Thomas and Elisabeth Kvitashvili “Combating Terrorism: The Role of
USAID and Development Assistance” Marine Corps Gazette Web Article Apr
2007.
Blaufarb, Douglas S. and George K Tanham Fourteen Points: A Framework for
the Analysis of Counterinsurgency Washington: BDM, 1984.
Cassidy, Robert M. “Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Vietnam and Other Small Wars” Parameters Summer 2004: 73-83.
Cassidy, Robert M. “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency”
Summer 2006.
Childress, Michael. The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense
and Development: The Cases of El Salvador and Honduras Santa Monica:
RAND, 1995.
Cohen, Eliot, et al. “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency”
Military Review March-April 2006: 49-53.
Bensahel, Nora “Preventing Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations”
Defense Studies Vol. 6, No. 3 Sep 2006: 278-291.
Byman, Daniel Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency,
and the War on Terrorism Carlisle: SSI, 2005.
Echevarria, Antulio J. II. Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths. Carlisle: SSI,
2005.
Galula, David Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger,
1964.
Gompert, David C. “Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency”
RAND Occasional Paper, 2007.
Grdovic, Mark. “Understanding Counterinsurgency” Special Warfare, Dec 2004:
5-8.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 57
Hammes, T.X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola:
Zenith Press, 2004.
Hoffman, Bruce “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” RAND Occasional
Paper, 2004.
Hoffman, Bruce “From the War on Terror to Global Counterinsurgency” Dec
2006.
Jureidini, Paul A. et al. Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: 23
Summary Accounts. Washington: SORO, 1962.
Kilcullen, David. “Countering Global Insurgency” 2004.
Killebrew, Robert, ed. The Country Team in American Strategy. 2006.
Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-
GVN Performance in Vietnam. Washington: RAND, 1972.
Kiszely, John. “Learning About Counter-Insurgency”. RUSI Journal Dec 2006:
16-21.
Ladwig, Walter C., III. “Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya”.
Military Review May-June 2007: 56-66.
Lawrence, T.E. “The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence”. The Arab Bulletin Aug. 20,
1917.
Long, Austin On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency
Research. Santa Monica: RAND, 2006.
Marks, Thomas A. “Insurgency in a Time of Terrorism” JCOA-LL Bulletin Vol. II,
No. 4, Sep 2005: 33-43.
Metz, Steven Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy. Carlisle:
SSI, 2007.
Muckian, Martin “Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting
to the New Adversary” Parameters Winter 2006-07: 14-25.
Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons
from Malaya and Vietnam Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
Record, Jeffrey “External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success” Parameters
Autumn 2006: 36-49.
Record, Jeffrey “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful
Counterinsurgency” 2006.
58 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
Rosenau, William “Subversion and Insurgency” RAND Occasional Paper, 2007.
Schwarz, Benjamin C. American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador:
The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building. Santa
Monica: RAND, 1991.
Sepp, Kalev I. “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency”. Military Review May-June
2005: 8-12.
Stewart, Richard W. “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency
Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification” National War College
Research Paper, 1 May 2006.
Ucko, David “Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights
from Malaya 1948-1960” The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 30, No. 1, Feb
2007: 47-72.
United States Departments of the Army and Navy Field Manual 3-24/ Marine
Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency. 2006.
United States Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations.
2008.
United States Department of Defense DOD Directive 3000.5 Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 2005.
United States Department of State Lessons Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization
and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations--
Guide for U.S. Government Planners.
United States Institute for Peace Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed
Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or
Potentially Hostile Environments. 2008.
United States Institute for Peace Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and
Relief Operations.
United States White House United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy. 1962.
United States White House NSPD-44 Management of Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. 2005.
U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009 59
APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
CAF Conflict Assessment Framework, USAID
CCDR Combatant Commander, DOD
COCOM Combatant Command
COIN Counterinsurgency
COM Chief of Mission, State
DOD Department of Defense
Justice Department of Justice
State Department of State
FAS Foreign Agricultural Service, USDA
FM Field Manual, DOD
IGO Inter-Governmental Organization
MCWP Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, DOD
MNC Multinational Corporation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NSC National Security Council
U.S. United States
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USG United States Government
60 U.S. Government counterinsurgency guide • JANUARY 2009
APPENDIX E: CONTACT INFORMATION
Department of State
Ms. Donna Hopkins 202-647-0792 hopkinsdl@state.gov
Mr. Thomas Cooney 202-647-7031 cooneytf@state.gov
U.S. Agency for International Development
Ms. Elisabeth Kvitashvili 202-712-0197 ekvitashvili@usaid.gov
Ms. Alexa Courtney 202-712-5181 alcourtney@usaid.gov
Department of Defense
CAPT Steven Camacho 703-697-5401 stephen.camacho@osd.mil
Mr. Scott Buchanan 703-697-5641 scott.buchanan@osd.mil
Office of the Director for National Intelligence
Mr. Jonathan Wohlman 202-201-1304 jonathanmw@dni.gov
Mr. Guy White 202-201-1345 elmergw@dni.gov
Department of Justice
Mr. Joseph Jones 202-514-8881 joseph.jones@usdoj.gov
Ms. Barbara Berman 202-616-0808 barbara.berman@usdoj.gov
Department of Treasury
Mr. Rami Shy 202-622-2867 rami.shy@do.treas.gov
Mr. Kevin McCormick 202-622-7789 kevin.mccormick@do.treas.gov
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Lawrence Barbieri 202-720-9459 lawrence.barbieri@fas.usda.gov
Ms. Amy Freitas 202-251-1150 amy.freitas@fas.usda.gov
Department of Transportation
Mr. Peter McHugh 202-366-6525 peter.mchugh@dot.gov
Mr. Joseph Traini 202-366-0603 joseph.traini@dot.gov
Department of Homeland Security
Mr. Eric Wardlow 202-282-8785/ eric.wardlow@dhs.gov
9140
www.state.gov
www.usaid.gov
www.defenselink.mil
www.usdoj.gov
www.ustreas.gov
www.usda.gov
www.dot.gov
www.dni.gov
www.dhs.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDE
Electronic version can be found at:
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt
uscoinguide119629_1.pdf
File Size: 2546 kb
File Type: pdf
Download File

 
 
First draft

 

Kasalukuyang Sitwasyon sa Bansa

at Ang Ating mga Tungkulin

 

 

     Sa pagtatapos ng unang dekada ng ikatlong milenyo, ang buong daigdig at sa gayon ang Pilipinas ay binabayo ng matinding krisis. Inilalantad ng krisis ang kabulukan ng imperyalistang sistemang sumasaklot sa daigdig, gayundin ang pagkabangkarote ng neokolonyal, malapyudal na kaayusang nIlikha nito sa Pilipinas.  Ang pinaunlad na mga produktibong pwersa na nasa komand ng pribadong capital - makina, mga capital goods at paggawa (labor) ay araw-araw na nilulustay ng krisis.  Samantala’y malawakang winawaldas ng mga imperyalista at papet na estado ang tipong panlipunang yaman sa anyo ng pampublikong pondo upang suhayan at isalba ang dambuhalang pribadong pandaigdigang capital.  Sa kabilang banda’y   malawakan namang winawasak ng imperyalismo ang kabuhayan at mga karapatan ng masang proletaryo at iba pang mamamayan ng buong daigdig.  

 

   Lalong tumalim ang mga saligang kontradiksyon ng kapitalismo sa kasalukuyang krisis ng rurok nito, ng imperyalismo.  Litaw ang marahas at mapangwasak na saligang katangian ng pribadong kontrol sa tipong panlipunang yaman.  Sa kasalukuyang sitwasyon, lalung tumatampok ang pangangailangan para sa pagsusulong ng pandaigdigang rebolusyong proletaryo. Pinatayampok ng krisis ang mga katangiang—bulok, dekadente at parasitiko ng kapitalismo sa monopolyong yugto nito.  

 

                    Nagpapatuloy na krisis ng pandaigdigang kapitalismo

 

    Taong 2009 ganap na sinaklot  ang daigdig  ng bagong  palo ng pangkalahatang krisis ng imperyalismo. Unang kwarto pa lang, naging ganap na ang resesyon sa pandaigdigang ekonomya.   Nagsipag-atrasan kundiman bumara at bumagal ang produksyon sa iba’t ibang bayan. Tumigil ang mga makina at paggawa.  Kaakibat nitong tumumal ang kalakalan at pamilihan.  Nayanig ang pamumuhay ng milyon-milyong mamamayan  – nawawalan ng tahanan, natatanggal sa trabaho, dumaranas ng gutom.

 

    Taong 2008 pa lang, nagkukumahog na ang pinakamalalaking pandaigdigang kapital at kanilang mga gubyerno sa pag-aapuhap ng pang-ampat sa krisis. Gamit ang kapangyarihang pang-estado, winaldas nila ang bilyon-bilyong dolyar ng salaping publiko para suportahan ang pinakamalalaking kapital sa pinansya sa daigdig sa dinaraanang proseso ng panibagong mga lamunan at pagsasanib (mergers) na lohikal na hinahahanggahan kapag may matinding krisis.  Ngunit kahit ito ay di nakasapat.  Ang bilyon-bilyon ay naging trilyon-trilyon nitong taong 2009.  Ngunit ang krisis ay nagpapatuloy.

 

   Mula ikalawang kwarto, ang mga burges na ekonomista ay nag-iilusyon na ng “pagbawi”.  Bawat maliit na pag-usad sa isang aspeto ng ekonomya – panandaliang pagsigla ng pamimili, panandaliang pagbuti ng export, panandaliang paglaki ng produksyon - ay pinalalaki bilang senyales ng “pagbawi”.  Ngunit ang mga ipinagpapalagay na “senyales” ng pagbawi, na kalakha’y bunga ng malakihang paggastos at pangungutang ng mga gubyerno,  ay pinawawalang-saysay ng patuloy na tanggalan sa trabaho, ng papaliit na kakayahang mamili ng mga tao,  at ng nakaambang krisis bunga ng mga nagsilobong publikong utang (public debt) laluna ng mga kapitalistang estado/gubyerno tulad ng US, Japan at mga bansang EU.  Ang pansamantalang pag-ampat sa isang bahagi, tulad ng pagkita ng sinalbang pinakamalalaking bangko at institusyon sa pinansya, ay kinukutkot naman ng nagbabantang pagsabog sa iba pang bahagi at sa kabuua’y nagpapakita sa pagugumiit ng pangkalahatang krisis na pumalo.   Nariyan ang banta ng pagsabog ng krisis sa komersyal na real estate (bienes), ang pagpalya ng malalaking pandaigdigang mangungutang (tulad ng Dubai World), ang pinangangambahang pagpalya ng mga gubyerno sa kanilang pagkakautang,  ang mabilis na debalwasyon ng US dollar at nililikha nitong kaguluhan sa pandaigdigang sistema ng pananalapi at kalakalan.    

 

                        Pagdausdos sa katayuan ng US bilang nag-iisang

                                   imperyalistang superpower

 

   Pinakamatinding tinamaan ng krisis ang ekonomya ng nag-iisang imperyalistang superpower, ang US.  Umatras na ang kabuuang GDP nito ng 2.61% [mula  13,321.1 (Q3, 2007) tungong 12,973.0B (3Q, 2009)] buhat noong mag-umpisa ang resesyon. (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce). Pinakamabilis ang naging pagliit sa konstruksyon, pagmamanupaktura at sa information technology.

 

  Higit pang lumaki ang depisitong piskal (fiscal deficit) o taunang pananalapi ng gubyernong pederal ng US. Umabot na ito sa $1.4 trilyon sa piskal na taong Setyembre 2008-Setyembre 2009. Katumbas ito ng halos 13.1% ng GDP o kabuuang halaga ng produkto at serbisyo.  Itinulak ang paglaki ng depisito ng paggastos ng pondong publiko para isalba ang mga pinakamalalakng institusyon sa pinansya tulad ng Goldman-Sachs, Citibank, JP Morgan, gayundin ng eskalasyon pa ng gyera ng pananalakay sa Afghanistan at pagmantine ng mga tropang Kano sa Iraq.  Ayon sa inspector-general ng TARP, abot na ng $23.7T ang nailaan ng gubyerno sa anyo ng mga perang ipinamigay, pautang, garantiya sa utang at iba pang mga subsidyo sa mga higanteng institusyon sa pinansya samantalang $30B naman kada taon ang ginagastos para sa gyera sa Afghanistan.

 

   Upang tustusan ang depisito, ibayong pangungutang ang naging pantugon ng gubyernong US. Lumubo na ang utang nito sa mahigit $12 trilyon noong Oktubre 2009 mula sa $10 trilyon noong Setyembre 2008. (Financial Times, November 2009).  Upang di tumigil ang operasyon, hihilingin ng gubyernong Obama sa Kongreso ang pagtataas ng takdang maksimum na limit sa pwedeng utangin lampas sa $12.1T na itinakda noong maagang bahagi ng 2009.

 

    Papabigat ang pasaning bayad-utang (debt servicing).  Noong Setyember 2008 – Setyembre 2009, umabot na sa $383B ang binayaran ng US sa interes pa lang ng kanyang mga utang.  Sa ganitong tantos, 40 cents sa bawat 1 dolyar ng singil na buwis mula sa mga mamamayan ang pumupunta sa bayad-interes. At sapagkat kasama sa pangungutang ang pag-iimprenta ng bagong salapi, mabilis na dumadausdos ang halaga ng dolyar sa palitan nito sa ibang salapi. (Mula 1971, bumaba na ang halaga ng dolyar ng 2757% relatibo sa ginto. Ang halaga ng 1 onsa ng ginto noong 1971 ay $35 kumpara ngayon na pumapatak sa $1000 ang isang onsa ng ginto.)  Walang puknat na ang paghamon dito, sa pangunguna ng China, bilang siyang pandaigdigang salapi sa kalakalan.  Sa proseso’y nadede-istabilisa ang kabuuang pandaigdigang sistema ng pananalapi, pautang at kalakalan.  Si Obama na mismo, sa kanyang pagbisita sa China, ang nagsabing kapag di makontrol ang lumalaking depisito sa badyet (at kaakibat nitong pangungutang), may peligrong tumungo ang ekonomya ng US sa panibagong pagbagsak na tinawag niyang “double dip recession”.

 

     Lumilitaw din ang banta ng double dip recession mula pang-iipit sa pautang ng apat na pinakamalalaking bangkong nakinabang sa stimulus plan – ang Bank of America, JP Morgan, Citigroup at Wells Fargo.  Sa kabila ng mga ulat ng lumaking kita at pagbibigay sa mga opisyal nila ng mga mga compensation at bonuses na abot sa $150 B, sa katunaya’y lumiit pa ng 15% ang kanilang pautang sa nakaraang anim na buwan.  Abot sa $1.1T ng inilabas na pondong publiko ang kanilang inirereserba sa tinataya nilang pwersadong pagbura sa talagang di na mababayarang mga pautang.  Ang pagtanggi ng mga malalaking bangkong maglarga ng pautang ay patuloy na umiipit sa mga maliit at katamtamang laking prodyuser at kaakibat nito, ay puimipigil sa paglikha ng mga empleyo.      

     .    Ang proletaryong Amerikano ang bumabata sa tindi ng krisis. Ayon mismo kay Bernanke, mahigit 8M trabaho ang nawala mula Disyembre 2007. Ang tuluy-tuloy na pagtatanggal sa trabaho ay humangga na  noong Oktubre sa 10.2% na tantos ng disempleyo (o kabuuang  15.4M na walang trabaho) sa buong bansa mula sa kulang 5% tantos bago Disyembre 2007. Sa 15 magkakaibang lugar sa US, umaabot sa mahigit sa 15% ang upisyal na tantos ng disempleyo.

         Maraming burges na ekonomista  , tulad ni David Rosenberg, punong ekonomista ng Canadian wealth management firm Gluskin Sheff, na nagsasabing aabot pa ito sa 12% sa pinakamataas.   Dumoble rin ang bilang nyaong mga naghahanap ngunit walang makitang  buong-panahong paggawa (underemployed) at sa gayo’y nagkakasya sa karaniwang 33 oras ng paggawa kada linggo. Batay sa mga datos ng gubyernong US, kapag isasama ang mga napwersa sa maikling oras ng pagtatrabaho (underemployed)  at yaong mga di na naghahanap ng trabaho (2.4M ng“discouraged workers”), ang tunay na tantos ng disempleyo ay aabot sa 17.5% ng lakas paggawa, isang antas na kahalintulad ng depression.

    Halos di gumagalaw ang nominal na pasahod. Noong Nobyembre 2009, 0.1% paglaki lang ang naitalang paglaki.  Sa buong taon, ang karaniwang arawang sahod ay lumaki lang ng 2.2% habang ang karaniwang lingguhang sahod, sapagkat apektado ng nabawasang oras-paggawa, ay lumaki lang ng 1.6%. Kapag susukatin sa aktwal na halaga, dahil sa tumaas ang presyo ng mga bilihin ng 2.8%, ang aktwal na halaga ng sahod ay lumiit pa ng mahigit 1%. Sa pagbaba ng pasahod at sa pagkakarga ng mas maraming trabaho sa mga naiwan pang me empleyo nagmumula ang sinasabi ng Department of Labor na pagtaas ng produktibidad ng 8.1% noong ikatlong kwarto, pinakamataas na tantos na inabot nito sa nakaraang 6 na taon.  Tunay na ang krisis ay naging okasyon para sa pagpapatindi ng pagsasamantala sa masang proletaryong  Amerikano!

      Bunga nito, tampok ang pagbaba ng uri ng pamumuhay ng maraming manggagawang Amerikano.  Abot na noong Setyembre sa 1.09M ang bilang ng pamilyang nawaIan o napipintong mawalan  ng bahay (Office of Thrift Supervision and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Maging yaong mga tinatawag na prime borrowers ay pumapalya na rin sa pagbabayad.   

        Bumagsak na noong Setyembre  ng 13% ang pangungutang gamit ang mga credit card matapos ang 13% ring pagbagsak noong Agosto, patunay ng pagririyenda sa pamimili ng maraming pamilyang Amerikano. Sa kabila nito, nanatiling $889.4 billion ang kabuuang utang ng mga mamamayan o $7,537 na karaniwang pagkakautang (indebtedness) ng bawat tahanan ( Federal Reserve, G.19 Release, November 7, 2009). Ayon sa Lowcards.com tumataas rin ang tantos ng palya sa pagbabayad sa mga utang gamit ang credit card.  Tinatayang ___% na ng pamilyang Amerikano ang dumaranas ng matinding kahirapan at may napaliit na kakayahang mamili. At sapagkat ang paggastos ng mga mamamayan ang sumusustento sa 70% ng ekonomya ng US,  tinatayang patuloy pang liliit ang GDP ng US.    

      Kahit mga ekonomistang Amerikano tulad ni Bernanke ay nagsasabi na kung may magaganap man na rekoberi sa maikling panahon, ito  ay  ‘jobless recovery’, o sa madaling sabi, walang idudulot na paghusay sa katayuan ng pamumuhay ng maraming walang empleyo.

      Inilalatag sa panahon ng kasalukuyang  krisis ng kalagayang iiralan ng paggawa makaraan nito. Ayon kay Robert Reich, kalihim sa paggawa sa ilalim ng administrasyong  Clinton, pinabilis ng resesyon ang “istruktural na pagababago” sa ekonomya.   Ipinupwersa ng kapitalistang sistema sa mga manggagawa ang isang rehimen ng ibayong pinababang pasahod at kabawasan sa mga benepisyo.  Sa kondisyong ito itinutuntong ni Obama ang panukalang istratehiya ng muling pagpapalakas sa export ng US, o sa madaling sabi, istratehiya ng ibayong pakikipagkumpetensya upang sikuhin ang mga karibal sa pandaigdigang pamilihan.  Proteksyonismo (para sa Amerikanong capital) ang lohika ng istratehiyang Obama. Permanenteng pagpapababa sa istandard ng pamumuhay ng uring manggagawang Amerikano ang kahulugan nito.        

     Inilantad ng krisis ang saligang karupukan ng ekonomyang US na kinatatampukan ng paghina ng industriyal na produksyon, ng pagdepende sa pampubliko at pribadong pangungutang, at pangingibabaw ng pagkita sa pinansyal na ispekulasyon. At kahit ang humina nang industriyal na kapasidad ay di pa lubusang mamaksimisa para sa higit pang pagpapaunlad ng mga produktibong pwersa, kasama na ang paggawa ng manggagawa.   Malaking bahagi (35%) ng produktibong pwersa ay nilulustay ng kapitalistang ekonomya.

     Ang krisis sa US ay sumalamin lang at naghudyat ng palo ng krisis ng buong kapitalistang sistema na hanggang sa kasalukuya’y bumabayo pa sa kabuuan ng pandaigdigang ekonomya.  Binabago nito ang konfigurasyon ng imperyalistang daigdig. Dumadausdos ang US sa katayuan bilang nag-iisang imperyalistang superpower, ibayo pang pinahihina ang katayuan ng UK, habang nagpapalitan ang China, Germany at Japan sa kanilang mga katayuan.

                 Tumitindi rin ang krisis sa iba pang kapitalistang bayan

    Nagpapatuloy at tumitindi pa ang krisis sa ibang imperyalistang bayan. 

    Nananatili ang krisis pinansyal sa Britanya. Kamakailan lang, ipinatupad ng gubyerno ang pinakamalaking pagsagip sa isang bangko.  Naglaan ng £25.5B na karagdagan sa dati nang nailargang £26 B para sagipin ang Royal Bank of Scotland at ng karagdagang £6B na pwede nitong muling kunin kapag kailangan.  Naglaan din ng £5.7B para naman saluhin ang Lloyds Banking Group na nauna nang lumamon sa bumagsak na Halifax/Bank of Scotland (HBOS). Itong  pinakahuling pag-bail out, na umabot sa £37B, para lang i-istabilisa ang mga mga bangko ay patunay ng tindi pa ng krisis. Laluna’t bago matapos ang Nobyembre, muling  niyanig ang mga pinansyal na institusyon ng Britanya ng pagdeklara ng Dubai World ng “pagtigil ng pagbabayad-utang sa susunod na di kukulangin sa anim na buwan”. Sa loob lang ng isang araw, £44B ang nawala sa halaga ng mga sapi sa stock market sa London.  Pinakamatinding tinamaan ang mga bangkong nakapagpautang nang malaki sa Dubai World at mga subsidiaryo nito – HSBC($17B) at Standard Chartered, Citigroup UK, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland.

   Ang panibagong paglalarga ng pondong publiko para sa pagsalba sa naturang mga bangko ay ginawa sa kabila ng malaking depisito sa badyet na umaabot na sa 6.8% ng GDP. Ayon sa IMF, ang malaking depisitong ito ang naghahanay sa UK  bilang isa sa mga pinakabulnerable sa tinatayang magiging pagtaas ng interes sa pautang. Nakaamba na ang malamang na pag-downgrade sa credit rating ng GB mula AAA.      

  Halos di gumagalaw ang GDP ng eurozone.  Lumiit ito ng 0.2% ng ikalawang kwarto bagama’t lumaki ng 0.4% ng ikatlong kwarto.  Mas paggamit ng pondong publiko (sa bawat bansa at sa antas ng eurozone)  para sa pagsalba sa mga institusyon sa pinansya at sa pagtitiyak ng pautang ang nagdala ng ganitong pananatiling nakalutang pa ng ekonomya sa eurozone. Bahagyang umusad ang Germany at France noong ikatlong kwarto, ngunit tulad sa US, ito’y tulak ng malakihang paggaqstos ng gubyerno (France 30 million euros); Germany 85 billion euros).  Ang iba pang mga ekonomya (Italy, Spain, ___) ay patuloy na lumiliit sa kabila ng buhos ng pondong publiko. 

       Ngunti ang mga stimulus plans ay magwawakas na.  Samantala’y nagpapatuloy ang paglaki ng disempleyo.  Ang paglakas ng euro mismo ay pagmumulan ng problema sa mga industriyalisadong ekonomyang naka-angkla nang malaki sa export ng produkto at kapital sa isang pandaigdigang pamilihang katatampukan ng pukpukang kumpetisyon sa hinaharap. Ang Germany, kung saan ang ekonomya ay ___% nakadepende sa export, binabagabag na ng malaking pagliit nito.  %1.17 B

     Ang Japan ang isa sa mga ekonomyang talagang barado.  Di pa man ito ganap na nakakabawi sa mahabang pagkakabara ng ekonomya sa halos kabuuan ng 1990s.  Baon ang gubyerno sa utang (180% ng GDP ang kabuuang utang) nililimitahan nito ang kakayahan ng gubyerno sa pag-bak-ap a pribadong capital.

    Sa China tumatanaw ang imperyalistang daigdig para sa pagbawi.  Naglaan ang gubyerno ng China ng $586 billion ng pondong publiko para bigyang sigla ang kapitalistang ekonomya – para sa impraistruktura, at para pangsagip sa mga bangko at paglikha ng trabaho. Tulad din sa ibang kapitalistang bansa, may ibinigay ang sinasabing stimulus plan na bahagyang sikad sa ekonomya.  Noong ikatlong kwarto, lumaki ang GDP ng 8.9% at tinatayang aabot ng 8.3% ang magiging paglaki sa buong taon.   Gayundin, ang mga murang produktong pang-export ng China ay umambag upang malampasan nito ang Germany bilang siyang pangunahing exporter ng daigdig. Tumuntong ang export nito sa $1.2 T, lampas sa tinatayang %1.17 T na exdport ng Germany sa nakaraang taon. Patuloy na ineengganyo ang mga mamamayan na gumastos upang malikha ang lokal na pamilihan, kahit man lang para sa  sa edukasyon at kalusugan.

      Ngunit ang China ay binabagabag ng malaking pagliit ng tantos ng paglaki ng kanyang GDP (mula sa  11.6% noong 2006, 13.0% noong 2007 at 9.8% noong 2008) , ng mababa pang karaniwang kita ($6,000 noong 2008) at lumalaking disparidad sa kita(gross inequity in income), ng napaka-tagibang na pag-unlad sa pagitanng iilang sentrong ng industriya at malawak na atrasadong kanayunan, ng malakingbilang ng walang trabaho kapwa sa kanayunan at kalunsuran,  at ng mabilis na lumalaking  nakatatandang populasyon (aging population) at maliit na nakababatang pwersa sa paggawa. . Masahol pa, ito’y mahigpit na nakadepende sa pandaigdigang kapitalistang pamilihan para sa kanyang pagsusustini ng pag-unlad.   Wala sa pusisyon ang China na isalba ang pandaigidigang kapitalista nang hindi niliilikha ang panloob na batayan sa sariling malalaking panloob na kaguluhan. 

     Ang pangkalahatang krisis ngayon ng kapitalismo, na ayon sa maraming ekonomista ay nagbabantang tumungo sa depresyon, ay bunga ng pagtalim ng mga kontradiksyon ng imperyalistang sistema.  Inilitaw nito ang pinakamasahol na katangian ng imperyalismo – ang mapangwasak na katangian nito. Kagutuman, kawalang tahanan, kawalang-trabaho para sa milyun-milyong mamamayan sa lahat ng sulok ng daigdig  sa isang banda,  at sa kabilang banda, nakatiwangwang na mga produktibong pwersa  - makina, hilaw na material, at lakas-paggawa at mga produkto ng sosyalisadong paggawa.  Isang kabalintunaang hatid ng monopolyong control sa pandaigdigang yaman ng iilang dambuhalang pandaigdigang kapitalista.   Ang pandaigdigang krisis na ito  ang  pangunahing kondisyong nakakaimpluwensya sa katayuan/kalagayan sa ekonomya at pulitika ng mga bansa sa daigdig, maging sa Pilipinas.

 

                    Matinding krisis sa ekonomya at pulitika sa Pilipinas

 

   Sabayang pumapalo ang tuminding krisis ng bangkaroteng import-dependent, export-oriented na ekonomya ng Pilipinas at ang pagsagad ng krisis ng anti-demokratiko, reaksyunaryong sistemang   pulitikal.  Matinding kahirapan, kaapihan  at desperasyon ang hatid nito sa mamamayan.   

 

                         Higit pang lumalalang krisis sa ekonomya

 

  Ang ilusyon ng rehimeng GMA na makakaiwas sa krisis ang Pilipinas ay parang bulang pumutok sa harap ng kalagayan ng lalong paghihirap ng mamamayan at pagdausdos ng kabuuang pambansang ekonomya.

 

  Ang kabuuang GDP mula Enero hanggang Setyembre ay lumaki lang ng 0.7%.   Taliwas sa inaasahan, 0.8% lang ang naging paglaki ng GDP noong ikatlong kwarto (Q3). Ito’y matapos ang pagliit noong unang kwarto at 0.8% lang na paglaki noong ikalawang kwarto.  Serbisyo pa ang nagdala ng paglaki nito (4%), bahagya lang ang naging paggalaw ng agrikultura (1.6%) habang lumiit nang malaki ang industriya (-4.4%). (PDI, 27 November). Sa panukat ng Value of Production Index (VaPI), ang manupaktura ay nagrehistro ng 15.2% pagliit mula Agosto 2008 hanggang Agosto 2009. Ang siyam na mayor na sector na nagrehistro ng malalaking pag-atras ay : produktong petrolyo (-53.3%); muebles at kahalintulad (-39.2%); produktong katad (-34.2%), mga inumin (-25.2%), batayang metal (-23.7%), electrical na makinarya (-21.3%), kasuotang paa at iba pang kasuotan (-18.7%); papel at produktong papel (-17.9%) at kahoy at produktong kahoy (-10.7%) (Monthly Integrated Survey of Selected Industries, NSO) .  Mapapansing ang kalakhan  ay yaong may kaugnayan sa produksyon at yaong mga di esensyal na pangangailangan, kapwa nagpapakita sa pagtumal ng produksyon at gayundin ng pagtitipid ng mga mamimili.  

 

    Ang kabuuang tuwirang dayuhang puhunan noong ikatlong kwarto na dumaan sa Board of Investments (BOI), Clark Development Corporation (CDC), Philippine Economic Zone Authority(PEZA) at sa Subic Bay Metropolitan Area ay bumagsak ng 84.4% sa  PhP10.4B mula sa PhP66.7B noong parehong kwarto ng nakaraang taon.  Ito ang pang-apat ng kwarto ng tuluy-tuloy na pagliit sa aprobadong tuwirang dayuhang pamumuhuna, at pinakamalaking pagliit  sa nakaraang 3 kwarto.

 

    Tuluy-tuloy ang pagbagsak ng kita sa export, laluna ng electronics. Sa unang pitong buwan ng 2009, $10 bilyon ang iniulat na pagliit ng kita bunga ng tuluy-tuloy na pag-atras ng export. (Business section, Phil. Star, 09/21/09).) Samantala’y mabilis ding lumiliit ang kabuuang  importasyon. (give data)Ang lumiliit na importasyon ay nagbabadya ng higit pang papaliit na produksyon.

 

  Umabot ang depisito sa badyet sa P266.1B noong Oktubre, lampas-lampas na sa kabuuang target na P250B para sa buong taon.  Bunga ito ng lumiit na koleksyon ng BIR at BoC,  maliban pa sa lumaking gastos ng gubyerno para sa panakip-butas na mga “remedyo” sa krisis at pagtugon sa kalamidad.  Tinatayang  aabot ang depisito sa   P324B sa buong taon ng 2009 (PDI, November___;

 

  Inilulubog ng papalaking depisito sa badyet ang Pilipinas sa higit pang pagkakautang. Sa taong 2009, karagdagang $3.25 B (please countercheck) ang inutang mula sa labas ng bansa ($1.5 B noong Enero; $750B noong _____;  $1B noong  Oktubre).  Ang kabuuang pambayad-utang (debt servicing) ngayong 2009 ay aabot sa P698.5B – P309.7 B  sa interes at P388.8 B sa principal – na 8.7% mas malaki kaysa sa nakaraang taon. Tinatayang  higit na hihirit ang pambayad-utang sa susunod na taon bunga ng interes sa mga bagong inutang; (PDI, 27 November)

 

   Higit pang lumalaki ang disempleyo. Di sinasalamin ng upisyal na datos (Hulyo’09 : 7.6% na disempleyo;  19.8% na kulang sa empleyo, BLES: Labstat Updates, Sept. 2009) ang aktwal na kalagayan sa empleyo sa Pilipinas. Sa katunayan, ang malaking paglobo ng na-e-“empleyo” sa serbisyo ay resulta ng karagdagang para-paraang pagkita upang maitawid ng mga nawalan ng empleyo ang kanilang mga pamilya sa gutom. Kapag susukatin yaong mga napilitan nang pumunta sa serbisyo bunga ng pagkakatanggal sa trabaho, at yaong mga tumigil nang maghanap ng trabaho, ang aktwal na tantos ng walang empleyo ay aabot ng 40.3% ng lakas-paggawa.

 

 Ang export-oriented, import dependent na produksyon, at kaakibat nitong pagkabansot ng produksyon para sa lokal na pangangailangan, ay lumulustay ng produktibong kakayahan ng masang anak-pawis at nagtutulak sa kanila na magkasya sa pagbibigay-serbisyo.  Sa nakaraang sampung taon, mabilis na lumaki ang bahagi ng serbisyo sa kabuuang paggawa.  (provide data) Kalakhan dito ay nasa para-paraang pagkita tulad ng iba’t ibang anyo ng transportasyon, paglalako, pagbibigay ng personal na serbisyo, at iba pa.  Maging ang itinutulak ng rehimen na diumano’y mga”sunshine  industries” ay nasa serbisyo –  BPOs tulad ng call centers at medical transcriptions, at turismo.    Sa pagliit ng pamilihan para sa produktong export bunga ng palo ng pandaigdigang krisis, talagang  lalung tatampok ang serbisyo bilang siyang natitirang pupuntahan ng lakas-paggawang Pilipino.

 

 Sa loob ng lumiliit na kabuuang importasyon, ang  mabilis na  lumalaki ay ang importasyon ng mga pinakabatayang pangangailangan.  Lumaki ang netong importasyon ng bigas mula __M metriko tonelada noong 1998 tungong ___milyong  metriko tonelada noong nakaraang taon.  Tinatayang higit pang malaki ang aangkatin para sa 2010.

 

Ang importasyon ng karne ay lumaki ng ____%, ng gulay ng ___%, ng isda ng ___%; ng gatas ng ___% at ng asukal ng ___%.

 

Isinapeligro ng disenyong export-oriented, import dependent ng ekonomya ang seguridad sa pagkain ng bansa.  Ang paglobo ng presyo ng bigas noong nakaraang taon (kung kalian umabot sa P49 kada kilo ng bigas)  ay bunga ng pagbansot sa lokal na produksyon ng naturang disenyo.

 

Sa kabila ng ipinangangalandakang mababang tantos ng inplasyon, sa katunaya’y mabilis ang naging pagtaas ng mga saligang pangangailangan – ang karneng baboy na dati’y P135 kada kilo ay 160 – 175 na ngayon; ang karneng manok na dating P90 – 100 ay P125 na ngayon, ang asukal na dating P34 kada kilo ay P37 na ngayon; ang mantika na dating P  kada litro ay ___ na ngayon.  At ito’y sa kabila ng lumiit na kita bunga ng pagkatanggal sa trabaho, o pagbabawas ng araw ng pagtatrabaho o ng pagkakapako ng kita. 

 

Ang paparaming peti-burges ay napoproletaryanisa ng kawalan ng mapapasukang hanap-buhay.  Kahit ang peti-burges na pamumuhay ng mga pamilya ng dating mga OFW ay umatras bunga ng krisis.

 

Gipit ang pagnenegosyo, produksyon man o komersyo,  ng pangkalahatang pagtumal ng pamilihan bunga ng krisis.       

 

Mabilis na lumalaki ang bilang ng itinuturing na naghihirap.   Noong ____ tinatayang 35% ng pamilyang Pilipino ang maituturing na naghihirap. 

 

 

                       Kitang migrante ang sumusuhay sa ekonomya

 

 Ang pagluluwas ng lakas-paggawa sa pandaigdigang pamilihan ang naging pantakip sa kakapusan sa trabaho at mababang produksyon ng labis na halaga.  Kalakhan ng export na paggawa ay nasa gawaing serbisyo rin – domestic helpers, caregivers. Nitong nakaraang tatlong taon, mabilis na dumagdag dito ang mga propesyunal – narses, doctor at guro.  Lalo namang pinalaki nito ang kakapusan ng naturang mga serbisyo sa bansa.

 

 Malaon nang ang remittances ng mga migranteng Filipino ang nagsusustini sa ekonomya ng bansa. Noong 2008, ang $16.4B remittances ang nag-ambag para makamit ang 3.5% paglaking GNP.  Hanggang Hunyo, umabot na ang remittances sa $8.5B at tinatayang sa buong 2009 ay lalampas sa $16.4B na inabot noong 2008, (PhilStar, 08/18/09) laluna  nagpipilit ang mga Pilipino sa ibayong dagat na higit na magtipid upang makapagpadala ng mas malaki sa mga kamag-anak na pininsala ng magkakasunod na bagyo. 

 

  Ngunit kahit ito ay apektado ngayon ng palo ng pandaigdigang krisis.   Kapuna-puna ang pagliit ng karaniwang padalang pera ng bawat migranteng Pilipino. Ganoong mabilis na lumalaki ang bilang ng migrante at contract workers, di kasimbilis ang paglaki ng kabuuang remittances. Nooong 2008, lumaki ng __ ang bilang ng OFW ngunit lumaki lang ng ___% ang kabuuang remittances.    

 

 

             Lalung pinalalala ng mga kalamidad ang kahirapan ng mamamayan

 

     Higit pang pinalala ang kahirapan ng mga mamamayan ng palo ng mga kalamidad na dumadalas at higit na nagiging mapaminsala.  Ngayong taong ito, umabot sa ___ ang kabuuang bilang ng bagyong dumaan sa Pilipinas. Pinabaha nito ang __ na lugar sa Pilipinas at lumikha ng mga pagguho sa maraming lugar.

 

       Pinakamapaminsala ang magkasunod na bagyong  Ondoy at Pepeng. Di kukulangin sa 625 ang namatay sa gitna ng kalamidad.  Abot sa _____ ang kabuuang bilang ng tirahan na nasira.  Di kukulangin sa ___ ektarya ng taniman at ___ ektarya ng palaisdaan ang nawasak at tinatayang kabuuang P10B ng dapat ani ang nawala. Maraming maliliit at katamtamang laki na  produksyon (yaring kamay, pagkain, maliliit na pabrika), komersyal na establisemyento (mula sa pwesto sa palengke, maliliit na tindahan hanggang mga bazaar at mall), at iba pang hanap-buhay (traysikel, jeep, taxi)ang napinsalaan ng puhunan at pansamantalang tumigil. Di bababa sa P15B ng pribadong ari-arian ang nasira.  Tinatayang nagdagdag pa ang mga kalamidad ng humigit-kumulang sa 300,000 taong naghihirap sa dati nang tinatayang 35% naghihirap na pamilyang Pilipino.  

 

       Ang pananalasa, kagyat na pinsala at kasunod pang mga pinsala bunga ng bahang dala ng bagyong Ondoy at Pepeng ay pangmatagalan ang epekto sa kabuhayan ng mamamayan.  

 

   Muling inilantad ng kalamidad ang labis na kakapusan hanggang kawalang-kakayahan ng reaksyunaryong estado sa pagtugon sa mga sitwasyon ng kalamidad. Umabot ng tatlong araw bago nailikas ang lahat ng mga apektado ng kalamidad.  Kalakhan ay nakalikas bunga ng tulong ng kanilang mga kaibigan at kamag-anak.   Masikip at kapos sa pasilidad sa mga pinaglikasan, dahilan upang magkanya-kanyang paraan ang maraming biktima ng kalamidad. At nangyari ang kinatatakutan. Sumabog ang problema sa leptospirosis sa hanay ng mga biktima.  Umabot sa mahigit 2,000 ang tinamaan ng sakit, mahigit 200 ang tuluyang binawian ng buhay.  Sa kasagsagan ng problema, ni pangsuri sa sakit ay di sapat na matugunan ng gubyerno.  

 

     At kahit sa gitna ng kalamidad, di naglubay ang katiwalian/korupsyon sa paggamit ng kaban at rekurso ng bayan. Litaw na nga ang mga kakapusan bunga ng walang humpay na katiwalian, maging ang mga nakalaang relief goods ay inipit pa.  Nalantad ito sa pagkadiskubre ng mga itinabing relief goods sa bodega ng DSWD.

 

     Masahol pa,  kahit sa kabila ng matitinding pagbaha at pagguho (landslides) nitong nakaraang sampung taon  hatid ng pagkasira ng kalikasan,  walang tugot  ang reaksyunaryong estado sa pagtutulak ng pagmimina gayundin sa pang-eengganyo ng dayuhang puhunan para sa mga plantasyon ng African oil palm, jetropa, at iba pang produktong panluwas tulad ng saging, pinya, at abaca. (  ___ pang konsesyon sa pagmimina ang inilabas noong 2008 at 2009.  ___ ektarya pa ng bulubunduking lupaing publiko ang sinaklaw ng mga bagong plantasyon.) Kalakhan nito’y  naghahawan ng mga bulubunduking lupain. Nagpapatuloy din ang real-estate development maging sa naisapribadong mga palispisan ng bundok. Ang diumano’y komitment para sa pagpigil sa global warming ay nanatiling hanggang salita lamang sa harap ng patuloy na pagpapangibabaw sa interes ng malaking kapital para sa gamit ng lupain.

 

    Ipinailalim ng pinakamapaminsalang disenyong neoliberalismo ang buhay at kabuhayan ng mamamayan sa pinakamatinding pagsasamantala at kagipitan.  Nililikha rin nito ang pinalalang bulnerabilidad ng buhay, kabuhayan at komunidad nila sa mga kalamidad.

 

                             Matinding pampulitikang pagkakahiwalay ni GMA at

                      pagsagad ng kabulukan ng reaksyonaryong sistemang pulitikal

 

Sa sagad-saring pangunguyupapa sa imperyalistang interes, at sa garapalang pagpapairal ng sariling makitid na personal at paksyunal na interes, inaani ng paksyong GMA ang malawakang pagkamuhi ng mamamayan. Ang halos pitong taong tuluy-tuloy na negatibong pagtanggap dito ng mamamayan ay patunay sa inabot nitong pampulitikang pagkakahiwalay.  At kung ang natatanging papel ni Marcos sa reaksyonaryong pulitika sa bansa ay ang pagpapairal ng hayagang teroristang paghahari ng isang paksyon, na nagpulitisa sa mga upisyal-militar,  natatangi namang papel ni GMA ang pag-aalis ng lahat ng balat-kayo sa sinasabing mga “demokratikong” proseso. Nailantad ni GMA sa kasagaran ang katangian ng rekasyonaryong pulitika na pinangingibabawan ng mga monopolistang nagmamaniobra para sa sariling interes.    

 

Sa panahon ni GMA nalikha ang klima ng walang-pakundangan, sagad-sarang pagpapairal ng kapangyarihan nang walang iniindang anumang pananagutan sa mamamayan at maging sa mga naitakda nang pampulitikang proseso (climate of impunity).  Sa nalantad na sunud-sunod na mga  pandaraya sa eleksyon (election 2004 at election 2007), magkakasunod na mga pagnanakaw sa kabang-yaman (Lorenzo, Bolante, Abalos, at iba pang alipures nito),  paglabag sa mga demokratikong karapatan,  malaganap at walang pakundangang pagpatay  ni Palparan at mga katulad niya, mga garapalang maniobra sa Kongreso para ilusot ang charter Change at upang harangan ang mga impeachment proceedings laban kay GMA,  ipinakitang makalulusot, at nailulusot ng rehimeng GMA ang sarili at mga kaalyado nito, sa pananagutan sa mga tiwali, at ilegal na mga  gawi at  hakbang. Inilantad nito ang kahungkagan ng sinasabing mga “demokratikong proseo” – diumano’y eleksyong sumasalamin sa pampulitikang kapasyahan ng mamamayan, paggalang sa mga karapatan, pantay na pananagutan sa batas, atbp. 

 

Sa pagmamaniobra ng sariling interes, nabuo ni GMA ang paksyong nakasabwat sa maraming krimen laban sa bayan – mga heneral/retiradong heneral, mga burukrata sa gubyerno, mga tiwali at bayarang  upisyal sa Kongreso at lokal na gubyerno, at maging sa mga korte.  Napaboran sila sa pakikipagsabwatan kay GMA, at tinamasa ang proteksyon ng kapangyarihang nakaluklok sa Malacanang.   Kayat’ di katakataka na umabot ang ganitong klima sa pinakahuling masahol na pagpapakita nito – sa ginawang maramihan at walang-pakundangang pagpaslan

g ng mga kaalyado at kaibigan nitong pamilyang Ampatuan sa kanilang mga karibal sa pulitika.  

 

      Dito, sa walang pakundangan at garapalang pagpapairal ng kapangyarihan para sa sariling interes,  tumutuntong  ang matinding pagkamuhi ng mamamayan kay GMA.  Ito rin ang nagpalalim sa bitak sa hanay ng reaksyon at mga haligi nito. Dahil dito kung bakit matindi ang pampulitikang pagkakahiwalay ng rehimeng GMA. 

 

     Naging okasyon para sa pagpapakita ng ganitong pagkamuhi ang pagkamatay ni Cory Aquino at ang burol at libing nito.  Daan-daang libo ang lumabas sa kalsada upang buhayin ang panawagan para sa pagbabago.  Higit pa itong pinaypayan ng mass media na naging kritikal na sa rehimeng GMA.Lumitaw din sa naturang okasyon ang bitak sa hanay mismo ng pamunuang militar gayundin sa hanay ng malaking negosyo at simbahan, kung saan ang malaking seksyon ay tumututol na sa rehimeng GMA.   Ipinihit ng pagbulwak ng anti-GMA na sentimyento ng mamamayan ang takbo ng pulitika sa bansa. 

 

     Binigyang tulak nito ang eleksyon bilang daan sa pagresolba sa krisis ng paggugubyerno at pagtatanggal sa kinamumuhiang gubyerno. Nalikha ang isang kilusan, pangunahin ng mga petiburges, para itambol ang panawagan para sa “pagbabago”. Inilagay ng naturang kilusan ang anak ni Ninoy at Cory na  si Noynoy Aquino  sa sentro ng elektoral na labanan upang diumano’y katawanin ang pagnanais ng mamamayan sa pagbabago.

 

    Mas mapagpasya, iginuhit na ng US ang panuntunan nito sa pagpapalit ng rehimen, Idiniin mismo ni US President Obama na dapat matuloy ang eleksyong 2010. Ganito rin ang tindig ng malakign bahagi ng pamunuan ng simbahan at big business.

 

        Ang magkatuwang na paglakas ng kilusan para sa “malinis, matapat at mapayapang eleksyon” at ang pagkatig ng imperyalismong US at iba pang seksyon ng halgii ng reaksyon dito, ay kagyat na nagpakitid sa mga maniobra kapwa ni GMA sa pagharang dito , at gayundin, sa mga maniobra ng mga pwersang kontra-GMA para sa extra-konstiyunal na mga hakbang.  Kumakasa ang lahat, maging ang paksyong GMA, sa labanang electoral.

 

          Ngunit di binubura ng lumakas na tunguhing electoral ang pagnanais at pagsisikap ni GMA para sa pagpapalawig ng kanyang poder. Ididiskarte at ididiskarte nito ang sariling ambisyon.

 

          Ang pagtakbo ni GMA para maging kongresista ay pinaniniwalaang sa layuning makapangibabaw sa Kongreso at gawing daan ito upang itulak ang pagbabago sa  porma ng gubyerno tungong parlamentaryo na nilalayong kanyang mapangingibababawan. 

 

          Gayundin, sinasamantala ni GMA ang nalikhang kaguluhan ng kasuklam-suklam na pagmasaker ng kaalyadong pamilyang Ampatuan sa mga karibal sa pulitika upang subukan ang pagpapairal ng batas-militar. Gayung idineklara lang para sa Maguindanao, di malayong tumatanaw ito sa deklarasyon ng martial law sa iba pang panig ng bansa kapag mailulusot bilang “makatwiran at kinakailangan”.

 

          Ang pinakahuling desisyon ng Korte Suprema na nagpapahintulot ng pananatili sa poder ng mga kumakandidato ay pumapabor din sa pagpapakana ni GMA.  Pinahihintulutan nito si GMA na manatiling pangulo hanggang June 30 kahit pa kumakandidato para sa Kongreso at sa gayo’y nasa  katayuang mangasiwa sa isang posibleng lumitaw na sitwasyon ng pagkabigo ng eleksyon (failure of elections) ibunga man ito ng pinag-ibayong karahasan (tulad ng ginawa ng mga alyado nitong Ampatuan) o ng pagpalya ng sistemang automation.

 

          Tunay na di magtutugot ang pagpapakana ni GMA na patuloy na mahawakan ang poder.  Sa tagumpay ng kanyang pakana naka-angkla ang kanyang paglusot sa maraming pananagutang krimen laban sa mamamayan at lipunan.  Isa itong desperadong pagsisikap na pipinsala sa mamamayan gayundin sa reaksyunaryong pampulitkang sistema. Itinulak na nito ang krisis sa paggugubyerno sa loob ng reaksyunaryong pulitka.  Nilikha na rin nito ang mga kondisyong naghatid sa reaksyunaryong sistemang pampulitika sa kasalukuyang krisis.  

 

          Pagtatapos ng panunungkulan ng halos lahat ng “halal” na upisyal maliban sa 12 senador. Eleksyong gagawin sa isang paraan (automation) na di pa nasubok sa nakaraan. Sagad-sarang  karahasan at pandarayang nalikha ng klima ng walang-pakundangang paggamit ng kapangyarihan.    Bitak na mga haligi ng reaksyon – military, simbahan, malaking negosyo. At kinamumuhiang rehimen na nagmamaniobra para igiit ang sariling kontrol sa poder.   Gayundi’y mga mamamayang nagnanais na ng pagpapalit ng rehimen sa kapangyarihan.  Ito ang kumbinasyon ng mga kalagayan at salik na nagtatakda ng pluwid na katayuan ng reaksyonaryong sistemang pulitikal at ng potensyal ng pag-iibayo pa ng krisis nito.        

      

                               Nag-iibayong pakiki-alam ng imperyalistang US sa bansa

 

          Sa gitna ng krisis, at sa mga pagsisikap nitong kumawala dito, asahang mag-iibayo ang pakikialam ng imperyalismong US sa Pilipinas.  Ang imperyalistang US pa rin ang dominadong imperyalistang kapangyarihan sa Pilipinas.  Itinakda ito ng pagkasaysaynbg naging lugar nito sa debelopment ng Pilipinas at ng naitatag nitong malalaking interes sa bansa.  Sa gitna ng kumpetisyon ng mga imperyalistang kapangyarihan, asahang guguwardyahan nito, ipagtatanggol at gagamitin ang naturang dominansya.

 

Sa nakaraang taon at hanggang sa kasalukuyan, pinakalitaw ang pakikiaalam na ito sa Mindanao at usapin ng Mindanao.  Maliban sa istratehikong lugar ng Pilipinas sa geo-politics at miltiar sa Asya, istratehiko ang lguar ng Mindanao at populasyong Muslim ditto sa interbensyon ng US sa Timog Silangang Asya.  Tuwirang ginagamit ng US ang mga tropang militar nito, gayundin ang iba’t ibang ahensya, tulad ng USAID, at kontroladong institusyon tulip ng USIP, sa ganitong pakikialam.  Kahima’t nauntol ang pinakana nitong BJE noong nakaraan,   di nagtutugot ang US sa pagsisikap na ipwesto ang MILF sa isang resolusyon sa problem sa Mindanao. Tuluy-tuloy ang ugnayan nito at ng mga lider ng MILF upang mailusot ang sa balita’y pinasaklaw pang tipong BJE na kaayusan.

 

Mahigpit na nakasubaybay ang US sa magiging pansamantalang resolusyon sa kasalukuyang krisis sa paggugubyerno.  Isang higit na mapayapa, di mapangwasak na resolusyon, tulad ng katanggap-tanggap na eleksyon,  ang ninanais nito - isang resolusyong magpapaluwag sa paglulusot sa mga panukalang pagbabago sa Saligang Batas. Makaraan ang eleksyon, ang usapin ng charter-change ang isang malaking usaping sasangkutan ng US, di lamang dahil sa mga probisyong ekonomikal na hinahabol nito para sa kanyang interes kundi higit pa, sa mga pampulitikang probisyon na krusyal para sa muling mas mahigpit, mas matibay  na pagpwesto nito sa bansa.  

 

 

                                 “Tuyong-tuyo ang kaparangan”                         

 

           Sa gitna ng pinag-ibayong pagsasamantala, kahirapan at kaapihan, na hatid ng tuminding krisis sa ekonomya at pulitika ng sistema, umiiral ang tila di maipaliwanag na “kalmadong” kalagayan.  Wala ang malaganap na mga protesta.  Ang tampok ay ang paglaganap ng pangingibang-bayan, na tagos na hanggang sa mga panggitnang pwersa,  at ang  lumalalang  kriminalidad.

 

          Ngunit ang “kalma” at “katahimikan” ay mapanlinlang (deceptive).  Nasa likod nito ang nagpupuyos na damdamin ng mamamayan.  Sa kasalukuyan, ang ekspresyon nito ay makikita sa pag-aasam ng pagbabago, na sa marami ay iniaangkla pa sa pagpapalit ng rehimen. Kaya nga lumalaganap ang boluntarismo para sa “malaya, matapat at mapayapang” halalan.

 

          Ngunit ang likas na kabulukan ng sistema ay naggugumiit.  Habang nagpipilit makalampas sa pangkalahatang  krisis ng imperyalismo ang mga higanteng pandaigdigang kapital,  higit pang titindi ang pananalasa nito sa buhay at kabuhayan ng mga mamamayan – sa mga industriyalisadong bansa at gayundin  sa mga neokolonya. Ang mag-iibayong kumpetisyon sa pagitan ng mga dambuhalang kapital, na sinusuhayan ng kani-kanilang mga gubyerno, ay sasalin sa higit pang masahol na kondisyon ng masang proletaryo at iba pang masang anak-pawis ng daigdig. 

 

          Araw-araw, sa iba’t ibang panig ng daigdig, namumuo ang iba’t ibang protesta.  Protesta ng mga pinapalayas sa kanilang mga tahanan, protesta ng mga binabawasan ng kita, protesta ng mga nawawalan ng trabaho at tipong salapi, protesta ng mga kabataang napagkakaitan ng akses sa edukasyon.  Mula sa kalat-kalat na protesta na ito, muling malilikha ang klima ng paglaban na hahamon sa dominasyon ng imperyalismo sa daigdig.

 

          Sa Pilipinas, ang pangako ng pagbabago, na nakahain sa darating na eleksyon, aktwal mang maganap ito, ay di magaganap.  Lilimitahan ng nagpapatuloy na krisis ng pandaigdigang sistemang kapitalista, at ng mga maniobra at kumpetisyon ng pandaigdigang dambuhalang kapital, gayundin ng mga paglulustay na ginawa ng rehimeng GMA, ang anumang repormang maipatutupad ng alinmang gubyernong papalit.  Ang kondisyon ng matinding kahirapan, at kaakibat na sagasa sa mga karapatan, ay patuloy na “tumutuyo sa kaparangan”.  Nasa mga rebolusyonaryong proletaryo ang tungkuling likhain ang apoy na magpapasiklab sa naturan.

 

                                  Ang Ating mga Tungkulin

 

          Tungkulin ng bawat rebolusyonaryong proletaryo na ilantad ang imperyalismo bilang siyang salot na pumipinsala sa buhay at kabuhayan ng mga mamamayan ng daigdig, at sagka sa pag-unlad ng sangkatauhan gayundi’y siyang pangunahing pwersang nagtatakda ng atrasadong katayuan ng buhay ng masang anak-pawis na Pilipino. Kaalinsabay na ilantad ang mga lokal na monopolistang pwersang  kasabwat nito sa pandarambong sa Pilipinas at mamamayan dito. Tutuntungan ng paglalantad ang kasalukuyang krisis ng imperyalistang sistema, at ang sanlaksa’t isang mga kaganapan sa Pilipinas at daigdig, at sa buhay ng bawat pamilyang Pilipino,  upang gawin ito. Gayundin ang inaasahang mag-iibayong maniobra ng US ng pakikialam sa panllob na pulitika ng bansa.  Sa proseso, malilikha ang matibay na anti-imperyalistang pwersa na tumatanaw sa lohikal na kapalit ng imperyalismo – ang sosyalismo – bilang siyang maningning na bukas para sa mamamayan.  

           

          Pangunahing target ng pagmumulat yaong mga umiinda ng pinakamatinding pagsasamantala at panggigipit sa ilalim ng noekolonyal at malapyudal na sistema at siyang higit na pinipinsala ng palo ng pandaigdigang krisis ng imperyalismo  – ang masang proletaryo, malaproletaryo, maralitang magsasaka at mangingisda, at ang proletaryo sa hinaharap – ang mga kabataan-estudyante.  Tanging sa kanilang paglaban sa kasalukuyang kaayusan may tatanawin silang magandang bukas.

 

          Kumbinasyunan ang malaganap na prop-ed sa krisis ng mga kilos/pakikibakang masa upang mapakitunguhan ang impak nito sa kanilang buhay. Bawat sektoral na kilusan ay magbibigay pansin sa pagpapatampok sa mga problema ng kani-kanilang sector at sa pagbubuo ng mga taktikal na kilusan para sa pakikitungo sa mga ito.   Kabisahin ang buhay ng mga itinakdang target sa bawat area ng gawaing masa at sapulin ang impak ng krisis sa buhay nilang ito.  Matiyagang ipaliwanag sa kanila ang krisis at ugat ng kanilang kahirapan at tipunin ang mga pinakaabante sa hanay nila upang makatulong sa pagbubuo ng pakikiisa ng masa sa pagharap at pakikitungo sa mga kongkretong problemang matutukoy. 

 

Sa pakikitungo, magsimula sa mga kakayaning pangmasang kilos hanggang abutin ang lakas para sa puspusang pakikibaka. Sa proseso ng gulong, pakitunguhan maging ang mga pampulitikang patakaran at hakbang na umaapekto sa buhay at pakikibaka ng masa.

 

Partikular na usaping susubaybayan ang mga pampulitikang maniobra/pakikialam  ng US. Dapat itong ilantad sa bawat galaw nito at hubaran ng mga mapagkunwaring bihis. 

 

Sa pagsusulong ng anti-imperyalistang kilusan, maasahang makakabig na alyado ang peti burges at iba pang panggitnang saray.  Di sila ligtas sa palo ng krisis. Inu-uk-ok ng krisis ang kanilang inabot na istandard ng pamumuhay  at ang kanilang mga pagsisikap na paunlarin pa ito.   Gayundi’y sensitibo sila sa mga usapin ng mga demokratikong karapatan, soberanya at patrimonya - mga likas na burges na konsepto.

 

Partikular na pokus ay sa nakararaming seksyon ng petiburgesya – mga guro, mga kawani ng gubyerno at mga pribadong korporasyon, at gayundin ang mga abugado at taong simbahan.

 

Dama ng mga guro at kawani ang epekto ng krisis sa iba’t ibang anyo ng palo nito – presyo ng mga bilihin, patakarang piskal, hanggang pagkakapako ng sweldo at mga benepisyo.  Habang nagsisikap na itagos sa kanila ang kampanyang ed-prop kaugnay ng imepryalistang krisis, kailanma’t maabot, dapat pakitunguhan ang mga epekto ng krisis sa buhay nila upang tuntungan ng pagpapalalim ng kanilang anti-imperyalsitang tindig.  Ngunit sa lahat ng pagkakataon, dapat pagsikapang maipaunawa ang kongkretong ugnayan ng krisis at imperyalsimo  sa mga problemang kanilang kinakaharap.     

 

Ngunit higit pa, sikaping abutin sila ng kampanyang prop-ed kaugnay ng iba’t ibang usaping pulitikal na lumilitaw.  Gayundi’y ipaunawa sa kanila ang pagiging makatarungan at makatwiran ng mga pakikibakang isinusulong ng batayang masa. Ang lahatang pampulitikang paglalantad ay nakatutulong upang makalampas sila sa makikitid nilang interes bilang mga panggitnang saray at naglalapit sa kanila sa linya ng rebolusyonaryong proletaryo.

 

Ang mga abugado at taong simbahan at iba pang propesyunal ay nahihila ng malalaking usaping panlipunan, lalu’t higit ng malalaking usaping pulitikal sa lipunan at mga usaping panlipunang may kagyat na humanitarian na kabuluhan. At sapagkat malalaking usaping pulitikal ang tatampok sa gitna ng sabayang palo ng krisis sa ekonomya at pulitika, mahusay ang kondisyon upang abutin, pukawin at sikaping makaisa sila.   

 

Ang prosesong electoral (kampanya hanggang botohan), gayung may tendensyang maglihis ng pansin sa krisis, ay magagamit bilang dagdag na larangan sa pagsusulong ng mga interes ng masa.  Iguguhit ng mga interes at isyu ng nakararaming masa ang mga demokratikong usaping dapat pinakikitunguhan ng pulitika sa lipunan.

 

     Kamtin ang malaking lundag sa pulitika, organisasyon at ideolohiya

    

Ang kabuuan ng obhetibong sitwasyon ay nagbibigay oportunidad para sa pagpapataas ng antas sa pulitika ng mga pwersang abot ng mga rebolusyonaryong proletaryo.  Sa puspusang pagsisikap, mabubuo sa proseso ng pagpapatupad sa mga pampulitikang tungkulin ang isang kilusang malalim ang pagkakaunawa sa imperyalismo at lipunang Pilipino, isang kilusang balon na hahanguan ng mga karagdagang proletaryong rebolusyonaryo.

 

Upang matugunan ito, bawat yunit ng Partido ay magsikap na buuin ang matibay na kapasyahan na suungin ang landas ng mabilis na pagsulong at kumumpas alinsunod dito.  Pagbutihin ang pag-aaral sa sitwasyon at sa larangang kinikilusan,  kabisahin ang mga usaping panlipunan, buuin at balangkasin ang wastong rebolusyonaryong proletaryong tindig sa bawat usapin at kalagayang kakaharapin, pahigpitin ang ugnay at pakikiisa sa masa at matiyaga at wastong gumabay sa proseso ng kanilang pagsulong -  sa ganito tunay na maitatatag ang rebolusyonaryong proletaryong Partido sa unahan ng pakikbaka ng masang anak-pawis. 

 

Mahalagang armasan ng mga rebolusyonaryong prolertaryo ang sarili ng proletaryong rebolusyonaryong teorya, laluna ng teorya sa ekonomyang pampulitika, na mahalagang armas sa pag-unawa sa imperyalismo, sa lipunang Pilipino at sa kasalukuyang krisis na dinaraanan nito.  Mulat ding gamitin ang dayalektikong materyalismo sa bawat praktikal na pag-aaral na gagawin upang  matumbok ang mga wastong pagsusuri at hakbang.  

 

Sa masinop na pag-aaral at puspusang paggawa, makatatanaw ang Partido sa higit na malalaking pagsulong sa darating na taon.

 

PEC-NPC

Enero 2010

 

  

 

(kalakip ang hiwalay na papel hinggil sa ating pakikutngo sa eleksyon)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                 Ang Ating Pakikitungo sa Eleksyon

 

Ang mga eleksyon sa Pilipinas, kailanma’t ginaganap, ay nagiging isang pansamantalang pre-okupasyon ng mamamayan.   Una,  sapagkat ang kalakhan ay bahagi ng isang angkan o pamilya na isinasangkot ng mga naglalabanang pulitiko sa kanilang ribalan. Di nga ba’t ang pulitka sa Pilipinas ay tumutuntong sa sistema ng pyudal na patronahe na naglilinang ng angkan-angkan na suporta sa bawat kandidato/prospektibong upisyal ng gubyerno? Pangalawa, sapagkat ang eleksyon sa Pilipinas, ay knatatampukan ng malaking paggastos ng pera at sa gayo’y lumilikha ng pagkakakitaan sa maraming mamamayan – taga-kampanya, tagagawa ng poster at iba pang campaign paraphernalia, tagapag-dikit ng mga poster at tagapamahagi ng mga campaign materials, pagluluto para sa mga kampanyador, pagbibigay ng aliw, at samut-saring okupasyon sa kondisyon ng maraming taong gumagalaw.                     

 

          Ngunit  may particular na kabuluhan sa maraming mamamayan ang darating na eleksyon.  Ang kanilang pagkasuklam sa rehimeng GMA at sa garapalang mga maniobra nito para makapanatili sa poder,  ay sumasalin sa pagnanais nilang matuloy ang eleksyon at maganap ito nang “malaya, mapayapa, at matapat”.  Dito nagmumula ang bolunterismo kaugnay ng eleksyon.  Makikita ito sa mga sensitibo-sa- pulitika na propesyunal gayundin sa maraming kabataang nag-rerehistro sa iba’t ibang kilusang may kaugnayan sa eleksyon.

 

          Lehitimong pagtatakwil sa rehimeng GMA at paghahangad ng demokrasya ang tinutuntungan ng bolunterismo. Isa itong positibong debelopment.  Ngunit sapagkat di tumutuntong sa malalim na pagkilala sa katangian ng pulitika sa bansa, bulnerable ito sa paggamit para sa makikitid na interes ng mga pulitiko, at kapag di wastong napamunuan, ay maaring magbunga ng pagka-unsyami.

 

          Sapagkat kahit ang pangakong pagbabago, na mangyari pa’y hanggang reporma lamang,  ay di maibibigay ng alinmang papalit na rehimen.  Ang mga suliranin ng bayan na pinatampok ng krisis, ay mag-iibayo pa, habang nagpapatuloy ang krisis,   nagmamaniobra ang iba’t ibang dambuhalang kapital at imperyalistang kapangyarihan na kumawala dito, at tumitindi ang kanilang kumpetensya para sa pagbawi.  Ang bagong rehimen ng pinaigting na pagsasamantala sa masang anak-pawis na pinorpodyek sa buong daigdig ay  iiral sa neokolonyal, malapyudal  na Pilipinas.  Lalu pa nga itong paiigtingin ng kinasadlakan ng Pilipinas sa ilalim ng walang pakundangang pagnanakaw, pangungutang at paglulustay ng rehimeng GMA.

    

          Ngunit  matutuntungan ang kasalukuyang electoral na proseso (kampanya at botohan)  at particular na interes dito ng malaking seksyon ng mamamayan upang buhayin at pasiglahin ang mga talakayan at pag-aaral sa demokrasya, at sa paglalantad sa saliga’y anti-demokratikong katangian ng reaksyunaryong pulitika sa bansa.  Ang mga interes at pakikibaka ng nakararaming mamamayan, laluna yaong isinusulong kaugnay ng krisis,  ay mga usapin sa demokrasya – demokrasya sa ekonomya, pulitika at kultura -  at  maigigiit maging sa loob ng proseso ng electoral na kampanya. 

 

Mahalagang abutin ang mga bagong napupulitisang mga  pwersa, laluna ang mga kabataan, upang ang kanilang karanasan sa pagsangkot sa eleksyon ay mabilis na makapagturo sa kanila sa pangangailangang itaguyod ang demokrasya lampas sa paglahok sa reaksyunaryong eleksyon.

 

           May mga progresibong gagamit ng puwang na binubuksan ng eleksyon upang makapwesto sa iba’t ibang institusyon/yunit ng gubyerno.   Maari at dapat silang suportahan, laluna laban sa mga despotikong karibal. Tutukuyin ng kinauukulang mga yunit ang mga ito.    

 

Sa pagsuporta, di kinakailangang itaya ang mga organisasyong napamumunuan ng Partido.  Ang suporta ay maaring sa pamamagitan ng pagpapagulong sa hanay   ng ating mga organisadong pwersa at kanilang abot,  ng positibong pagkilala natin sa progresibong katangian ng mga ito, aty bentahe ng may mga progresibong nakapwesto.

 

Kapag talagang kinakailangan, at kapag kakayanin, maaring magtalaga ng mga pwersang papaloob sa electoral na makinarya ng mga sususportahang kandidato. Ito’y dapat piling-pili, at gagawin kapag malilinaw ang pakinabang sa pultika sa proseso pa lang ng kampanya.  Mangyari pa’y di ito dapat makapaglihis ng pansin ng mga yunit ng Partido sa pangunahing pampultiiakgn tungkulin sa kasalukuyan.

 

Ang kondisyon ng eleksyon ay kondisyon din ng paglalarga ng salapi ng mga pulitiko.  Magagamit ang kondisyong ito para sa pagpapalitaw ng pinansya para sa kilusan.  Gayunman, tulad sa iba pang mga gawain, dapat tiyakin ang pagpapangibabaw sa mga pampulitikang layunin, at gawin ito alinsunod sa natipong lakas at sa gayo’y nang may pagtitimpi.

 

 

         

         

           

 

 

 

           

 

 

         

 

    

 

 

 

}  Mayroong partikular na kabuluhan ang eleksyong 2010 sa punto na nagdudulot ito ng pagkakataon na muling buhayin sa hanay ng mamamayan ang pag-asa ng pagbabago.  Ang hangarin sa pagbabago na pangunahing itinataguyod ng pulitikalisadong seksyon, laluna ng peti-burgesya (middle class), ay lampas sa simpleng pagpapalit ng tao at labanan ng mga personalidad.

 

Ang ganitong pag-asa ay sumibol sa pagkamatay ni Cory Aquino. Ang paglalamay at, laluna, ang paglilibing sa kanya ay naging okasyon sa pagpapamalas ng mamamayan ng pagkamuhi at protesta sa rehimeng GMA. Si Cory ay ginawang simbolo ng galit at paglaban ng mamamayan sa rehimen.

 

Nag-aanyo ito ngayon sa nauna nang kampanya na itinutulak ng 2 pinakamalaking radio-tv media network at ng Simbahan para sa malinis at matapat na eleksyon at responsableng pagboto.  

 

Makabuluhang maituturing din ang nadedebelop na kilusan ng mga First Time Voters o mga kabataang bagong botante. Gayung makitid sa mga panawagang “bantay boto” at “malinis at tapat na eleksyon,positibo na itong panimula ng kanilang pagsangkot sa mga usaping lampas sa campus para tumungo sa pagkakaroon ng kamalayang panlipunan at pampulitika.

 

Sa kabila nito ay nangingibabaw ang makitid na pananaw at linya ng paglalabanan ng mga personalidad at karakter. Malaking halimbawa nito ang paghahambing kina Cory at Gloria na nauwi sa paghahambing ng mga ugali at personal na mga katangian.  Ang ganitong manipestasyon ng tradisyunal na pulitika ng mga patron (patronage politics) ay malakas na dinadala ng karamihan sa mga nagnanais na kumandidato sa iba’t ibang antas.

 

Madiing nagmamarka ang pulitika ng mga patron (patronage politics) na siyang katangian ng reaksyunaryong pulitika sa Pilipinas.

 

}  Marami kumpara sa 2004 ang nais tumakbo bilang presidente. Hindi nagkakaisa ang reaksyunaryong oposisyon gayundin ang naghaharing koalisyon.  Hindi mapuspos ang pagsasanib ng Lakas-CMD at KAMPI at nagsimula na ring magpakita ang lamat sa loob ng kabinete ni GMA. Ang deklarasyon ni DFA secretary Romulo ng suporta kay Noynoy Aquino at gayundin nina Bello at Jacob ay patunay dito.

 

Ipinapahayag nito ang isang katangian ng pulitika ng mga patron at ng mga angkan (clan) kung saan ang mga personal na interes, personal na ugnayan at katapatan ang nagpapasya at hindi ang interes ng partido at lalong hindi ang interes ng malawak na masa ng mamamayan.

 

Maliit at mahina pa ang pwersang nagdadala ng bagong pulitika na nakasalalay sa malawak na masa ng mamamayan at sa pagtataguyod ng kanilang interes. 

 

 

 

  1. Rumerehistro ngayon sa pulitika ng bansa ang kagyat at matagalang mga interes at disenyo ng imperyalistang US sa Pilipinas. Lumulutang ang isyu ng pananatili ng mga pwersang militar ng US sa usapin sa pagpapatuloy o pagwakas ng Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) sa pagitan ng US at RP. Sa harap ng lumalakas na panawagan para sa pagpapawalang-bisa sa VFA, iginigiit at ipinagtatanggol ng rehimeng GMA ang diumanong mga positibong dulot ng VFA. Maging ang paglahok ng mga sundalong Kano sa mga rescue and relief operation ay ginagamit para bigyang katwiran ang pananatili ng mga pwersang militar ng US sa Pilipinas.
 

 

Ang Ating mga Tungkulin

 

  1. Ang kalagayan ng nagpapatuloy na matinding krisis na lalong pinatitindi ng mga kalamidad ay humahagupit at malalim na lumalatay sa mamamayan. Ito ay kondisyon at batayan para iguhit at isulong ang mga pundamanetal at kagyat na mga isyu at pakikibaka ng malawak na masa ng mamamayan at buuin bilang agenda ng mamamayan para sa makabuluhang pagbabago.
 

  1. Maitatampok ang mga isyu at pakikibaka para sa tunay na reporma sa lupa at repormang agraryo; laban sa kontraktuwalisasyon ng paggawa lalo’t sa harap ng panukala sa Senado at kongreso para sa Seguridad sa Empleyo na mahigpit na tinutulan ng mga korporasyong multi-national at ng mga dayuhang chambers of commerce.
 

  1. Ang malawak na pagbaha ay nagpapatampok sa pundamental na mga isyu at kahilingan kaugnay sa ma usapin sa lupa, kabuhayan at pabahay.  
 

 

 

 
 
 
pangibabawan_ang_kalamidad.ppt
File Size: 4020 kb
File Type: ppt
Download File

This is your new blog post. Click here and start typing, or drag in elements from the top bar.
 
 
(Unang Borador)

Modyul para sa Pagtalakay sa Global Warming at Climate Change

(December 2009)

 

Introduksyon

 

          Ang Global Warming at dulot nitong Climate Change ang isa sa pinakamalaking usapin ngayon na kinakaharap ng mamamayan ng daigdig.  Isang usaping nangangailangan ng kagyatan at pangmatagalang solusyon sa pinakamaagang panahon. 

 

          Milyun-milyong mamamayan na sa daigdig ang matinding dumaranas ng epekto ng climate change dulot ng global warming -- pagkawala ng buhay at kabuhayan; pagkawala ng seguridad sa pagkain at mapagkukunan ng ligtas na tubig; pagkasira di lang ng mga bahayan at istruktura kundi ng buo-buong nasyon, laluna sa mga rehiyon ng Africa, Arctic, Asya at mga maliliit na islang-nasyon sa Pasipiko.

 

          Patuloy pa rin sa pagtaas ang greenhouse gas emissions na siyang salarin sa global warming at patuloy sa paglaki ang konsentrasyon ng greenhouse gases na ito sa kalawakan. Nagpapatuloy ang banta ng panganib na maaari pang idulot ng pagkasira ng ozone; pag-init ng mundo; pagkatunaw ng glaciers, ice sheets at sea ice; pagtaas ng tubig-dagat at iba pang kaganapan sa kalikasan na di pa nasaksihan sa kasalukuyang panahon.

 

          Mahalaga na maintindihan natin kung ano itong global warming at ang resulta nitong climate change para maipaliwanag ang mga kaganapang may kinalaman sa kapaligiran at kalikasan;  ang dalas at tindi ng mga sakuna dulot ng kalamidad at ang laki at lawak ng epekto nito.  Higit dito,  dapat nating tuntunin kung paano umabot sa kasalukuyang proporsyon ang greenhouse gases sa kalawakan ng mundo (earth’s atmosphere) na nagresulta sa kasalukuyang global warming at climate change; kailan ito nagsimula at patuloy na lumala sa kasaysayan;  ano ang mga pangunahing dahilan o salik nito; at, sino ang may malaking pananagutan.  At sa dulo, makita ang mga tunay na solusyon at wastong pagharap o pakikitungo sa usapin.

 

Lalamanin ng modyul na ito ang sumusunod:

 

I.             Ang Global Warming at Climate Change

i.             Ang Global Warming

ii.           Ang Greenhouse Effect at Epekto Nito sa Global Warming

iii.         Ang Climate Change

iv.          Mga Umaapekto sa Pagbabago ng Klima – Mga Natural na Salik  at Gawa ng Tao

v.            Mga Implikasyon ng Global Warming at Climate Change

 

II.    Sino ang May Pananagutan at Dapat Singilin sa Kasalukuyang Global Warming at Climate Change?

 

III.  Iba’t ibang Pagtugon sa Usapin ng Global Warming at Climate Change

          i.   Ang UNFCCC at Kyoto Protocol

          ii.  Mga Maling Solusyon mula sa North

 

IV.          Ang Ating mga Panawagan at Tungkulin        

           Ÿ   Panlipunang Hustisya at Pagbabago ng Sistema ang Tunay na Solusyon                                                       

I.             Ang Global Warming at Climate Change

          i.  Ang Global Warming

Mas higit na masaklaw ang usapin ng “global warming” kaysa pagkatunaw ng Antarctic ice sheets at pagtaas ng lebel ng tubig-dagat (sea-level rise).  Ang “global warming” ay kinatatangian ng pagtaas ng karaniwang temperatura ng mundo kaya’t nagdudulot ng pangkalahatang pag-init ng kalawakan, ng kalupaan at karagatan  (global heating of the atmosphere, land and oceans).  Pinatutungkulan din nito ang mga usapin ng:

Ÿ   malakihan o ganap na pagbabago sa klima o panahon sa mga lugar sa daigdig (global climate change)

Ÿ  di makalkula o paiba-ibang klima o panahon (global climate variation)

Ÿ  matitinding mga kaganapang may kinalaman sa weather patterns sa iba’t ibang panig ng daigdig (tsunami, hurricane, atbp)

Ÿ  global ocean acidification[1]

Ÿ  pagkasira ng ozone layer ng mundo

Iniulat naman ng United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ang mga panganib na kaakibat ng  climate change:

Ÿ   pagkasira ng kalupaan

Ÿ   kasalatan sa tubig at pagbaba ng kalidad ng tubig

Ÿ   suliranin sa suplay ng pagkain at malaganap na kagutuman

Ÿ  pagkalat ng mga sakit at pangkalahatang pagbagsak ng antas ng kalusugan ng tao

 

Nuong 2001, naiulat na ng IPCC na tumaas ng 0.6 degrees Celsius ang temperatura ng mundo (global average surface temperature)  sa buong panahon ng ika-dalawampung siglo (twentieth century). Ang 1990’s ang naitalang pinakamainit na dekada na dinanas ng mundo sa loob ng sampung libong taon. Sa pagpasok ng panibagong siglo,  ang mga senyales ng global warming ay damang-dama at malawakan na.  Ang sampung (10) pinakamaiinit na taon ay naitala lahat sa panahon mula 1990 – 1998 bilang pinakamainit, sumunod ang  2002, 2003, 2001 at 1997. Tinataya ng IPCC na maaari pang tumaas ng nasa pagitan ng 1.4 hanggang 5.8 degrees Celsius ang temperatura ng mundo pagdating ng 2100. 

          ii.  Ang Greenhouse Effect at Global Warming

          Sa syentipikong pag-unawa,  ang global warming ay resulta ng malakihang konsentrasyon o bolyum ng greenhouse gases (GHG) sa kalawakan.  Ang greenhouse gases ang bumubuo sa 1% ng kalawakan ng daigdig (earth’s atmosphere).  Sinasalo at Ikinukulong nito ang infrared radiation mula sa init ng araw habang tinitiyak na may sapat at katamtamang init na pumapasok at namamantini sa daigdig para magpatuloy ang buhay dito. Ang penomenong ito ang tinatawag na ‘greenhouse effect’.

Kahit may malaking papel ang greenhouse gases sa greenhouse effect, na mahalagang rekisitos sa pagkakaroon at pagpapatuloy ng buhay sa daigdig,  ang konsentrasyon nito sa kalawakan ay mapanganib.  Kapag nagkaroon ng malakihang bolyum ng GHG sa kalawakan ng daigdig, mangangahulugan ito na mas maraming infrared radiation ang makukulong at mananatili sa daigdig, na syang nagiging sanhi ng pagtaas ng temperatura dito at resulta nitong pag-init.

 

Mayroong tatlumpu’t anim (36) na elementong nabibilang sa greenhouse gases – ilan dito ay water vapor, carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hexaflourocarbons (HFCs), perflourocarbon (PFC), sulfur hexaflouride (SF6).  Sa malakihang bolyum nito, ang maituturing na pinakamapanganib ay ang CO2.

          Sa kasalukuyan, ang CO2 ang may kinalaman sa 60% ng paglala ng  greenhouse effect na dinaranas natin dulot ng pagdami ng GHG sa kalawakan. Ang konsentrasyon ng CO2 sa kalawakan ay tumaas ng 30% mula pagsisimula ng industrial age,  mula sa bolyum na 280 parts per million (ppm) tungo sa 367 ppm pagdating ng taong 1998. 

          Sa pinakahuling pagsukat (Setyembre 2009), nasa 384.78 ppm na ito o 2 ppm pagtaas kada taon.  Ang maituturing na  nasa “safe level” pa ng CO2 sa kalawakan ay  350 ppm o mas mababa dito.


Kontribusyon ng GHG sa Greenhouse Effect (2004)

          Ang kalakhan ng GHG emissions na nagpalala sa greenhouse effect, laluna mula sa pagsisimula ng rebolusyong industriyal, ay dulot ng mga aktibidad na gawa ng tao.  Ang pangunahing dahilan dito ay ang emisyon ng CO2 mula sa fossil fuel combustion o proseso ng pagsunog ng fossil fuels gaya ng uling (coal), langis (oil) at natural gas.  Laluna sa pagpasok ng daigdig sa yugto ng imperyalismo,  ang kapasidad ng tao (malalaking industriyalisadong mga bansa) na magsunog at gumamit ng fossil fuels ay lumaki sa gahiganteng proporsyon.  Ito ang sisira sa natural na balanse ng carbon cycle.

Ang labis-labis na emisyon ng CO2 ang sinasabing pangunahing salarin sa global warming.  Ang global warming ay tumungo na sa pagbabago sa klima ng mundo o climate change.

          iii.  Climate Change

 

Ang klima o climate ay pumapatungkol sa panahon o weather na karaniwang kondisyon (average weather) sa isang lugar sa mas mahaba-habang saklaw na panahon.  Sa karaniwan ay tatlumpung (30) taon o mas matagal pa. 

 

Pinatutungkulan din ng klima ang istatistika ng temperatura, humidity, atmospheric pressure, hangin, bolyum ng tubig-ulan, atmospheric particle count, at iba pang meteorological elements sa isang tiyak na rehiyon sa mahaba-habang panahon.

 

Ang klima sa isang lokasyon ay naaapektuhan din ng tereyn, taas ng lugar, ice o snow cover, at gayundin, ng karatig na mga katubigan at ang kanilang pagdaloy (currents).

 

Ang panahon (weather) ay ang kasalukuyang kondisyon ng mga kaparehong elemento sa loob ng maikli-ikling panahon – isang araw hanggang dalawang linggo.

Sa madaling pag-intindi,  kapag sinabing climate change, ito ay pumapatungkol sa pagbabago sa klima ng mundo at ng mga lugar sa mundo. Dahil ang pinag-uusapan ay klima at hindi simpleng panahon o weather lang, ito ay kapwa malawakan (large-scale) at matagalan (long-term).  Kinatatangian ito ng pangkalahatan at matagalang pagbabago o pag-iiba sa weather patterns sa lokal, rehiyunal at pandaigdigang antas.

          Ayon naman sa depinisyon ng United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ito ay “ang pagbabago sa klima na iniresulta ng mga aktibidad ng tao (direkta o di direkta) na nakapagdudulot ng pagbabago sa komposisyon ng  kalawakan (global atmosphere), na kasama ng mga natural na dahilan (natural climate variability), ay naobserbahan sa paglipas ng maraming taon”[2].

          iv.  Mga Umaapekto sa Pagbabago ng Klima – Mga Natural na Salik  at Gawa ng      Tao

 

          Sa tulong ng paglalapat ng syensya sa pagsusuri sa mga ice cores sa northern hemisphere,  natunton ng mga syentista ang temperatura ng mundo at komposisyong kemikal ng kalawakan sa nakalipas na 650,000 taon.  Nasuri nila na ang mga sinaunang pagbabago sa klima (climate change) na naganap sa kasaysayan ng mundo ay dulot pangunahin ng mga natural na salik, gaya ng:

·         plate tectonics[3] (paggalaw ng tinatawag na tectonic plates na nagpapabago sa pusisyon ng kalupaan at mga erya ng katubigan na syang nagreresulta sa topograpiya ng daigdig)

·         orbital at solar variations[4] (pagbabago sa pag-ikot ng mundo na nakaaapekto sa layo at lapit nito sa araw)

·         volcanism[5] (natural na proseso kung saan ang mga elemento mula sa crust o mantle ng mundo ay ibinubuga palabas gaya ng pagputok ng mga bulkan, paglitaw ng geysers, hot springs, atbp)

·         ocean variability[6]

Sa loob ng nakalipas na 1,300 taon (humigit-kumulang),  naganap sa kasaysayan ng mundo ang mga pagbabago sa klima o climate changes gaya ng Medieval Warm Period at ang Little Ice Age (100 taon ang nakaraan) kung saan hindi naranasan ng buong Europa ang tag-init o summertime. Gayundin, sinabi ng mga syentista na kalakhan sa mga ito ay dulot ng mga natural na salik. 

Ngunit sa pagpasok ng industrial age hanggang sa abutin nito ang yugto ng imperyalismo, 150 taon mula sa kasalukuyan,  naobserbahan ang mabilis na pagtaas sa temperatura ng mundo na hindi pa nangyari sa nakalipas. Mula 1850,  tumaas na ng 1 degree Celsius ang temperatura ng daigdig.  Ito ay nagresulta sa pag-init ng mundo maging ng kalawakan nito.  May mga scientific evidences na nagpapakita na kaakibat ng pagtaas ng temperatura sa kalawakan,  nagkakaroon din ng pag-init ng karagatan, nagsisipagtunaw ang glaciers, ice sheets at sea ice, at resulta nito’y  tumataas ang lebel ng tubig-dagat.  Nagpapatuloy ang ganitong kondisyon sa kasalukuyan, na siya natin ngayong tinatawag na global warming.

 

Nagsisipagtunaw ang malalaking tipak ng yelo sa Greenland at Antarctica ice sheets. Nasa mahigit sa 2 trilyong tonelada na ng yelo ang natunaw sa mga lugar na ito, kasama ang Alaska, mula 2003.  Nuong 1980,  nasa 7 milyon sq. kms. (kilometro kwadrado) ang sukat ng Summer Arctic sea ice.  Nuong 2006,  nasa kulang 5 milyon sq. kms. na lamang ito.  Ang pagkatunaw ng yelo ang maituturing na pangunahing dahilan ng pagtaas ng lebel ng tubig-dagat (sea-level rise).  Mula 1880, ang sukat ng sea-level rise ay umabot na sa 20 cms. 

Sinasabi ng mga syentista na, kaiba sa mga climate changes na naganap sa sinaunang panahon (gaya ng pagkakaroon ng ice ages) na mga natural na salik ang pangunahing dahilan,  ang kasalukuyang global warming at climate change ay dulot pangunahin ng tinatawag na mga anthropogenic factors[7]o mga aktibidad na gawa tao.  Ilan sa mga halimbawa at pinagmumulan nito ay:

 

Ÿ  Industriya - polusyon sa hangin at katubigan mula sa ibinubugang             usok nito;

                      - hindi tamang pagtatapon ng mga basura nito (waste                   disposal practices);

Ÿ  Agrikultura – kumbersyon ng mga kakahuyan para maging kaparangan                 at pastulan at ang paggamit ng slash and burn technique o                 pagkakaingin;

                      -  polusyon sa kalupaan at katubigan dahil sa malawakang                        paggamit ng kemikal sa abono’t pestisidyo;

                 Ÿ   Pagmimina – pagkawala ng topsoil;

                                      - polusyon sa tubig dulot ng mine tailings;

                 Ÿ  Konstruksyon – pagkasira ng natural o likas na panirahan dahil sa                                                        konstruksyon ng mga gusali at iba pang imprastruktura; 

                                      - reklamasyon

Ÿ  Panirahan – konsentrasyon ng basura sa mga lugar ng panirahan;

                      - pagkasaid ng groundwater

 

Sa mga nabanggit na anthropogenic factors, ang pinakagrabeng umaambag sa pagtaas ng lebel ng CO2 sa kalawakan ay ang mga emisyon mula sa fossil fuel combustion o pagsusunog ng uling at langis.   Sa kasalukuyang (2008) kontribusyon ng CO2 sa GHG  na 76.7%,  ang 56.6% nito ay mula sa paggamit ng fossil fuel. Ang iba pa ay: deforestation (17.3%) at biomass decay (2.8%),

 

Tumindi ang konsentrasyon ng CO2 sa kalawakan nang ang tao ay magsimulang magsunog ng fossil fuel para sa pangangailangan nito sa enerhiya at pagpapatakbo ng mga industriya.  Ngayon ay dinaranas natin ang tindi ng epekto nito – sa pagkasira ng mundo at pagkawala ng buhay at kabuhayan ng tao.

 

v.            Mga Epekto at Implikasyon ng Global Warming at Climate Change

 

          Nakaaalarma na ang mga epekto na dinaranas ngayon dahil sa global warming at climate change.  Mayor na manipestasyon nito ang dalas at tindi (frequency at intensity) ng mga kalamidad gaya ng supertyphoons at hurricanes, matindi at malawakang pagbaha, tsunami, malalakas na lindol, heatwaves, matinding tagtuyot (drought) at iba pa. Habang nagpapatuloy at bumibilis ang climate change,  patuloy din ang pagtaas ng risgo ng pagkasira di lang ng kapaligiran sa mga partikular na lugar kundi ng buong mundo.  Ilan sa malalaking epekto/implikasyon nito ay ang sumusunod:

 

a.   Kalamidad o Natural Disasters

 

               Magiging matindi (intensed) at malawakan ang mararanasang mga kalamidad.  Ang mga bansang nabibilang sa Global South o developing countries ang magiging pinakabulnerable sa epekto ng climate change dahil sa geographic (lokasyon), social at economic factors.

 

     Ang mga maliliit na islang-nasyon at maraming komunidad sa Asya at Pasipiko ang dumadanas ngayon ng matinding epekto ng pagtaas ng tubig-dagat.  Tataas pa ito lalo’t sa pagtaya ng mga syentista ay magiging ‘ice-free’ na o ganap na matutunaw na ang yelo ng Summer Artic sea sa pagitan ng mga taong 2015 at 2030. Ang katumbas nito ay sea-level rise ng hanggang 0.9 metro pagdating ng taong 2100 (datos ng IPCC).  Tinatayang nasa pagitan ng 70-200 milyon katao ang maapektuhan ng matindi at malawakang pagbaha kapag inabot ang ganitong lebel ng pagtaas ng tubig-dagat. 

 

              Ang kahirapan at kawalan o kakapusan ng serbisyo-sosyal laluna sa pabahay ay nagtutulak din sa marami na manirahan sa itinuturing na mga risk prone areas (tabing-ilog o dagat, gilid ng bundok).  Ang bulnerabilidad ng paninirahan sa mga lugar na nabanggit  ang isa sa mayor na dahilan sa pagdami ng biktima at laki ng pinsala dulot ng mga kalamidad.

 

              Ayon sa datos ng United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  ang bilang ng mga mayor na kalamidad ay tumaas ng apat na beses sa nakalipas na apat na dekada. Sa Asya naganap ang apatnapung porsyento (40%) ng mga kalamidad na ito at pitumpung porsyento (70%) ng kabuuang bilang ng mga nabiktima, sa huling dekada ng ika-20 siglo (1990’s).

2.   Implikasyon sa Seguridad sa Pagkain

                             Ang mga pagbabagong nagaganap sa kapaligiran ay matinding umaapekto sa mamamayang pangunahing umaaasa dito para sa ikabubuhay.  Sa Asya,  nabibilang dito ang 60-80% ng populasyon nito, na ang ikinabubuhay ay maliitang agrikultura – pagtatanim, pagsasaka, pangingisda, pangangahoy, atbp.

 

                             Sa datos ng United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,  tinatayang nasa  90% ng labinlimang milyon (15M) kataong ang ikinabubuhay ay sa coastal waters ay mga maliliit na mangingisda (small-scale fishers).  Ayon naman sa ulat ng World Bank (WB),  tinatayang nasa 90% ng 1.1 bilyong nabibilang sa mahihirap na mamamayan ng daigdig ay umaasa sa kagubatan at kabundukan para sa kanilang ikabubuhay.

 

                             Sa pagkain,  ang bigas ang mayor na kinokonsumo ng mamamayan ng daigdig.  Ito ang pangunahing kinakain ng higit sa kalahati ng populasyon ng daigdig laluna sa Asya kung saan dalawang bilyong (2B) mamamayan ang dito umaasa para sa kinakailangang arawang sustansya sa katawan.  Nasa Asya din ang 90% ng pandaigdigang produksyon nito pangunahin sa China (40%) at India (21%).  Ang Asya ang tinatayang isa sa pinakabulnerable sa mga epekto ng climate change at mga kalamidad na resulta nito.  Sa mga taong 2000 hanggang 2003,  naobserbahan na patuloy sa pagbaba ang produksyon ng bigas at pagliit ng pandaigdigang imbak dito.  Nangahulugan ito ng 93 milyong toneladang kakapusan sa produksyon kumpara sa konsumo ng mamamayan (2003).

 

                                    Sa tinatayang pag-init pa ng temperatura at pagtaas ng tubig-dagat,  inaasahan ang pagkawala ng malaking tipak ng mga lupaing agrikultural na malaking aapekto sa produksyon at sa ultimo, seguridad sa pagkain.  Ang pagtaas sa lebel ng tubig-dagat ng hanggang 1 metro ay tiyak na magpapalubog sa mga lupaing agrikultural laluna sa mababang mga lugar ng China, India, Vietnam, Bangladesh at Cambodia na siyang pinakamalalaking taga-suplay ng bigas sa daigdig.

                  Gayundin,  ang El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) na nagdudulot naman ng maagang tagtuyot, ay pangunahin ding tatama sa mga rehiyong sakop ng equatorial belt.  Dito din nabibilang ang maraming mga lugar sa Asya. Tinatayang nasa 50% ang maaaring ibagsak sa produksyon sa maraming lugar na ang agrikultura ay umaasa sa tubig-ulan (rain-fed) pagdating ng 2020.  

                            Matindi ring maaapektuhan ang mga lugar-pangisdaan at iba pang  coastal communities.  Ang pangingisda  ay malaki ring umaambag sa seguridad sa pagkain.  Tatlong bilyong (3B) mamamayan ang dumedepende sa nutrisyon mula sa isda.  Ang mga komunidad sa kahabaan ng Mekong river na may produksyon ng higit dalawang milyong (2M) tonelada ng isda kada taon ay dadanas ng matataas na lebel ng pagbaha at gayundin, ng pagpasok ng tubig-alat (saltwater intrusion). 

3.   Epekto sa Suplay at Kalidad ng Tubig

             Malaganap na ang nararanasang kakapusan o kasalatan sa tubig (water scarcity. Maraming mga lugar sa China, U.S., India, at Africa ang dumaranas na ngayon ng krisis sa tubig.  Ang mga manipestasyon nito ay: ·         Kakulangan sa ligtas at malinis na tubig na maiinom ng may 884 milyong mamamayan;

·         Kakapusan sa tubig para sa sanitasyon  ng may 2.5 milyon katao;

·         Pagkasaid ng groundwater dahil sa overpumping;

·         Sobra at walang pakundangang paggamit ng tubig (overuse) at polusyon sa katubigan na nakaaapekto sa biodiversity;

·         Mga lokal hanggang panrehiyong sigalot dulot ng agawan sa papaliit na mapagkukunan ng tubig

                  Ang kawalan ng akses sa ligtas at malinis na tubig ay isa sa mga pangunahing dahilan ng kamatayan sa maraming lugar sa daigdig.  Ayon sa World Bank, 88% ng maraming sakit ay dulot ng hindi ligtas at maruming tubig at kawalan o mababang antas ng sanitasyon.

4.   Panlipunang Dislokasyon (Social Dislocation)

              Sinasabi ng mga islang-nasyon, na kapag tumaas pa ang temperatura ng mundo sa 1.5 degrees Celsius, na may katumbas na 0.9 metrong pagtaas sa lebel ng tubig-dagat, ay lulubog ang maraming nasyong tulad nila at iba pang mabababang lugar laluna sa Asya at Pasipiko. Nanganganib na maging climate refugees ang buo-buong populasyon ng mga islang-nasyon gaya ng Maldives, Vanuatu at Tuvalu.  Magaganap ang malakihang migrasyon dahil sa pagbaha, matinding tagtuyot at mga kalamidad.  

              Papatong pa dito ang dislokasyong dulot naman ng mga so-called “development projects” na lumilikha naman ng mga “development refugees”, gayundin sa mga internal na dislokasyon dulot ng armed conflict.

6.  Paglaganap ng mga Sakit

                            Ang climate change at malawakan at malakihang migrasyon dahil sa epekto nito ay malaki ang kontribusyon sa paglaganap ng mga sakit laluna ang may kinalaman sa pagdami ng peste, insekto at mga sakit na air at water-borne.

                             Patuloy sa pagtaas ang porsyento ng nagkakasakit ng malaria, dengue at yellow fever sa buong daigdig, laluna sa Africa.   Hindi lang ang pagdami ng lamok na nagdadala nito kundi ang paggalaw ng mga populasyon o  migrasyon ang itinuturong dahilan ng paglaganap. 

                                    Testigo tayo sa paglaganap ng sakit dulot ng mga sakuna’t kalamidad nang, matapos ang hagupit ni Ondoy, ay lumaganap at marami ang nangamatay sa sakit na leptospirosis (rat-borne disease) sa kamaynilaan. 

II.           Sino ang May Pananagutan at Dapat Singilin sa Nagaganap na Global Warming at Climate Change?

 

Ang kasalukuyang global warming, climate change at inabot na antas ng pagkasira ng kapaligiran ay nag-uugat sa isang pandaigdigang sistema ng produksyon na ang layunin ay pagkamal ng tubo (profit-driven).  Walang katulad sa kasaysayan ang bilis at tindi ng pagkasira ng kapaligiran nang pumasok ang daigdig sa yugto ng modernong kapitalismo.  Sisirain nito ang natural na balanse ng kapaligiran.  Titindi ang antagonistikong relasyon sa pagitan ng tao at kalikasan, gayundin, ng tao sa tao dahil sa pagkontrol ng iilan sa kalikasan at mga pakinabang dito. Ang pagkakamal ng tubo ang siya nang magiging dahilan ng paggamit sa kalikasan.  Ang sistemang kapitalismo ay kinakailangang patuloy na samantalahin ang kalikasan, likas-yaman at tao, para sa pagpapatuloy ng malakihang produksyon ng mga bagay at serbisyo.

 

Naipakita na ng maraming pag-aaral na naging mabilis ang pagtaas ng emisyon ng CO2 at konsentrasyon ng GHG nang magsimula ang rebolusyong industriyal, at patuloy itong lumala sa panahon ng pagpasok ng kapitalismo sa yugto ng imperyalismo sa huling bahagi ng 1800’s.  Gayundin,  lalo pa itong tumingkad sa huling apat (4) na dekada sa panahon ng pagpapatupad ng globalisasyon, kung saan  ang konsentrasyon ng GHG ay tumaas ng 70% (1970-2004)[8].



 

 

Ang mga pinaka-industriyalisadong bansa ang mayor na may sala sa bulto ng mga emisyon at konsentrasyon ng GHG, laluna ng CO2 sa kalawakan.  Sila ang may pangunahing pananagutan (historikal at sa kasalukuyan) sa global warming at climate change.  Sa mga bansang ito na tinatawag din na Northern Countries, ang U.S.  ang may pangunahing historical na pananagutan bilang numero unong tagabuga (emitter) ng CO2 sa kasaysayan (ang China ang nangunguna sa kasalukuyan, pumapangalawa ang US).  Ang U.S., na bumubuo sa 14% populasyon ng daigdig, ang salarin sa kulang kalahati (40%) ng emisyon ng CO2.Ang mga bansa sa industriyalisadong “North” ay nasa 20% lamang ng kabuuang populasyon ng daigdig, ngunit, sila ang may kontrol sa paggamit ng 80% ng rekurso ng daigdig.

 

Ang mga mahihirap na bansa o Global South, ay pinagmumulan din ng mga emisyon ngunit ito’y nasa maliit na porsyento lamang kumpara sa ibinubuga ng mayayamang mga bansa.  Gayunpaman, ang mamamayan ng Global South ang pinakamalaking tinatamaan at sumasalo sa mga epekto ng climate change. 

 

Ang bulnerabilidad ng mahihirap na bansa sa climate change ay pinalalala pa ng mga bangkaroteng sistemang pang-ekonomiya na hindi nagreresolba sa kahirapan, bagkus ay pinatitindi pa ito.  Kinatatangian ito ng bansot at atrasadong ekonomiya, malaganap na pagsasamantala sa mamamayan, pagkasira ng kapaligiran at pagkaubos ng likas-yaman na  iniresulta ng mahabang panahong kolonisasyon at pandarambong ng mga bansang mayayaman sa mga bansang mahihirap.

 

          Sa patuloy na pagtutulak ng North sa mga mapanira at maling programang pang-ekonomiya (para sa pansariling interes) gaya ng globalisasyon at iba pang neo-liberal na patakaran at patuloy na pagtupad dito ng mga nadodominahang mga bansa sa South,  magpapatuloy ang maraming inhustisya sa kapaligiran at sa mamamayan; magiging malayo ang pagbawi mula sa krisis at kalamidad;  sisidhi at lalaganap ang kahirapan; at sa di malayong hinaharap, maniningil ang kalikasan. 

       

III.         Iba’t ibang Pagtugon sa Usapin ng Global Warming at Climate Change

 

i.     Ang UNFCCC at Kyoto Protocol

 

          Ang mga nagdaang ilang dekada ay naging panahon ng pagbibigay ng malaking pansin sa mga usaping pangkapaligiran sa gitna ng patuloy na pagkasira nito.  Habang tumataas ang pangamba sa mga panganib na maaaring idulot ng global warming at climate change, tumaas din ang pagpapahalaga para sa paghahanap ng mga solusyon dito.  

          Iniluwal ng 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) ang United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), isang tratado sa pagitan ng mga bansa ng daigdig para harapin ang usapin ng climate change. Dalawang taon ang iginugol para sa negosasyon para dito matapos ang Rio Summit, hanggang sa  ganap itong maratipikahan ng 175 mga bansa nuong Marso 21, 1994. Ang UNFCCC naman ang nagluwal sa Kyoto Protocol, Marrakesh Accord,  Bali Action Plan, atbp.  Ang lahat ng ito ay naglalayon ng pagsasagawa ng mas malalimang pananaliksik at pag-aaral sa global warming at climate change at pagtutukoy ng mga paraan ng pagkontrol sa kontribusyon ng tao sa global warming at pag-iistabilisa ng konsentrasyon ng GHG sa lebel na hindi tutungo sa pagkasira ng mundo at buhay (mitigation)  at gayundin, maghanap ng solusyon para sa pag-angkop ng mga bansa sa patuloy na nagaganap na mga pagbabago (adaptation).

          Dahil sa pagkilala na ang mga industriyalisadong bansa ang mayor na umaambag sa konsentrasyon ng GHG, at laluna, dahil sa lumalaking presyur ng publiko sa kanilang mga gubyerno,  nagkaisa ang mga nasyon na magkaroon ng isang legally binding measure na tinawag na Kyoto Protocol[9].

          Ang Kyoto Protocol, na inaprubahan ng mga bansa nuong Pebrero 16, 2005, ay partikular na nagtatakda ng target para sa pagbabawas ng GHG emissions ng may 37 industriyalisadong mga bansa (main contributors to GHG emissions), na magsisimula sa taong 2008 hanggang 2012.  Ang ispesipikong nilalayon nito ay pagbabawas ng limang porsyento (5%) sa kanilang emisyon mula sa naitalang GHG emissions nuong taong 1990.

Dahil apektado sa pagpapatupad ng mga nilalaman ng Kyoto Protocol ang lahat ng sektor ng ekonomiya,  ito ay kinokonsidera bilang pinakamasaklaw  at maunlad na kasunduang inabot at inaprubahan patungkol sa kapaligiran at sustenableng pag-unlad.  Gayunpaman,  hindi pa rin masasabing isang tagumpay ito dahil marami sa mga bansa ay hindi naabot ang mga pinagkaisahang target.  Higit dito,  ang may pinakamalaking pananagutan sa lahat ng mga industriyalisadong bansa, ang pinakamalaking U.S., ay hindi nagratipika sa nasabing kasunduan.

          Kahit pa nga masasabing maunlad na ang nilalaman ng Kyoto Protocol, mayroon pa rin itong mga kahinaan na sa totoo’y paborable sa mga industriyalisadong bansa gaya ng:

·                     Emissions Trading o pagpapahintulot ng pagbebenta sa sobrang pinahihintulutang emisyon (excess allowable emission) ng carbon dioxide ng isang bansa sa isa pang bansa na nahuhuli sa target nito ng pagbabawas ng GHG emission;

 

·                     Binibigyang-daan nito ang Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) na pinapayagan ang mga industriyalisadong bansa (Annex I countries) na maabot ang kanilang target sa pamamagitan ng pagpapatupad/pagsasagawa ng mga emission-reduction projects  sa mga umuunlad na bansa (Non-Annex I countries).  Ang mga proyektong ito ay magbibigay sa mga bansa sa Annex I ng credit points (credit emission reduction o CER) na maaari nilang maipon kung saan ang isang credit ay may katumbas na 1 toneladang CO2 na maaaring isama sa pagsukat ng target sa Kyoto Protocol.  Sa pamamagitan daw ng CDM, ang mga bansa sa Annex I ay kakayaning abutin ang kanilang target sa pagbabawas ng emisyon habang nakakatulong pa sa mga bansa sa Non-Annex I.  Ang pagpapatupad ng mga proyekto ay maaaring sa paraan ng pagpopondo, inisyatiba sa pagpapagawa o joint implementation.

Ang mga probisyong ito ay nasasamantala ng mga bansang industriyalisado para makasikot at sa ultimo’y makalibre sa pagbabawas ng emisyon.  Sa esensya, nakapagbibigay ang mga probisyong ito sa kanila ng “right to pollute” dahil kahit na di sila magbawas o tumaas pa nga ang kanilang emisyon,  maaari naman itong mabawi (offsetting emissions) sa pamamagitan ng mga mekanismong nabanggit sa itaas.

ii.   Mga Maling Solusyon mula sa North

 

              May mga itinutulak na panukalang solusyon ang mga industriyalisadong bansa na siyang tutugon daw sa kasalukuyang problema ng global warming at climate change.  Naglalagak sila ng malaking pondo para sa pananaliksik, pag-aaral, pagbebenta hanggang pagpapatupad ng samu’t saring proyekto at programa na pumapatungkol dito.  Sa totoo, marami dito, kundi man lahat ay mga paraan lamang para makaiwas sa pagbabawas ng GHG emissions ang mayayamang mga korporasyon at bansa.

 

            1.  NUCLEAR BILANG OPSYON

 

          “New nuclear plants are badly needed to deal with the climate issue”. Ito ang sinabi ni John W. Rowe, chief executive officer ng Exelon (ang pinakamalaking nuke operator ngayon sa U.S.) at chairman ng Nuclear Energy Institute.  Ito rin ang malawakang ipinalalaganap na propaganda para sa pagpapatanggap at pagpapasigla pa ng industriya sa enerhiyang nukleyar. 

 

          Sa G-8 Hokkaido Summit sa Japan nuong July 2008, kinilala ng G-8 ang importansya ng nuclear power bilang solusyon sa climate change. Sinabi mismo ng kinatawan ng Japan na “to accomplish this goal of tackling global warming, increasing dependence on nuclear energy is the best option”. Carbon-free daw ang enerhiyang nukleyar kaya’t environment-friendly.  Kakatwang sa pagsasabi nito,  binabalewala ang mga trahedyang naganap sa kasaysayan ng mga plantang nukleyar na puminsala sa kapaligiran at higit, kumitil sa buhay ng maraming mamamayan dahil sa pagka-expose sa radiation.  Tahimik din ito sa usapin ng dami ng emisyon ng CO2 sa buong proseso ng pagpapatupad sa proyekto ng enerhiyang nukleyar – mula ekstraksyon ng uranium na gagamitin bilang panggatong, konstruksyon ng mga planta,  operasyon ng mga ito, hanggang pagtatapon ng basura o radioactive waste mula sa mga plantang nukleyar.

 

          2.  TRANSISYON SA AGRO-FUELS

 

Ang agro-fuels  ay tipo ng fuel (panggatong para lumikha ng kuryente) na nalilikha mula sa mais, tubo, soy at iba pang tanim gaya ng jathropa at palm. Ang halimbawa nito ay ethanol. Sinasabi ng mga nagtataguyod nito na ito na ang ‘next big thing’ sa usapin ng renewable energy at pagharap sa global warming at climate change.  Ipinalalaganap ang sumusunod na propaganda na ang agro-fuels ay:

 

Ÿ  “Clean and Green”

Ÿ  Hindi magreresulta sa Deforestation

Ÿ  Magdadala ng pag-unlad sa kanayunan

Ÿ  Hindi lilikha ng kagutuman

 

Hindi totoong “clean and green´ang agro-fuels.  Sa totoong bagay nga,  ang mga industrial agro-fuels ay kumakain ng malaking bolyum ng petroleum-based fertilizers,  na dahil sa malawakang paggamit nito na karaniwang umaabot sa 45 milyon tonelada kada taon,  ay nakapagpadoble ng emisyon ng nitrous oxide sa kalawakan. Sa paglikha ng isang litro ng ethanol,  gagamit din ng tatlo hanggang limang (3-5) litro ng tubig, habang labingtatlong (13) litro ng waste water naman ang nalilikha.  Tumataas din ang antas ng pagkakaroon ng erosion sa kultibasyon ng fuel crops gaya ng soy.

 

Gaya ng nukleyar,  ang “mabuting” aspeto lang nito ang ipinapakita, ngunit ikinukubli naman ang malalaki at mapanganib na epekto nito.  Dahil liban sa pagkasira ng balanse ng kapaligiran,  sisirain din nito ang balanse sa sistema ng paglikha ng pagkain.  Imbes na ang silbi ng pagtatanim ng mais at iba pa ay para sa pagkain,  iko-convert ito para maging ethanol.  Malakihang kumbersyon din ng lupaing agrikultural ang ginagawa na ngayon para pagtaniman ng jathropa, palm oil, soy at iba pa.  Ang nakataya ay ang seguridad sa pagkain laluna ng mga bansang mahihirap kung saan malawakang nagaganap ang ganitong proyekto na dominado ng mga transnasyunal at mayayamang bansa gaya ng Tsina.

 

          3. GEO-ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS

 

          Ang geo-engineering ay ang intensyunal, malakihang manipulasyon ng sistema ng klima sa pamamagitan ng artipisyal na pagbabago sa kalikasan ng karagatan, lupa at maging ng kalawakan gaya ng:

 

          a)  solar radiation management (blocking or reflecting sunlight) gaya ng cloud whitening, space sunshades at albedo enhancements[10];

 

          b)  carbon dioxide removal and sequestration gaya ng biochar, genetic engineering of algae, ocean upwelling or downwelling enhancement[11];

 

          c)  weather modification gaya ng cloud seeding at hurricane suppression or redirection

 

          Malaki ang potensyal na makalikha pa ng pagkasira sa kapaligiran ang geo-engineering solutions dahil ang ganitong teknolohiya ay dumadagdag pa sa emisyon ng ghg sa kalawakan, lalong nakapagpapabago sa weather patterns, nakakasira sa ozone layer, nakaaapekto sa biodiversity.  Liban sa mga nabanggit,  ang mas kritikal na usapin dito ay kung sino ang magkakaroon ng kontrol sa manipulasyon ng sistema ng klima?  Sino ang gagawa ng desisyon at magtatakda kung kinakailangan na ang ganitong klaseng interbensyon – kailan at saan isasagawa?  Tiyak na hindi ang mga mahihirap na nasyon at mamamayan na matindi nang dumaranas ng epekto ng climate change. 

 

4.  REDD (Reduction of Emission from Degradation and Deforestation in Developing Countries)

 

          Ang REDD ay isang panukalang ipinipilit ng mga bansa sa North sa mga bansa sa South (developing countries). Ang mga kagubatan (na marami pang natitira sa South) ay malaki ang abilidad na ikulong ang pangunahing ghg, ang carbon dioxide.  Ninanais ng mga bansa sa North na ang REDD ay makapagbigay sa kanila ng oportunidad na mapanatili  ang kasalukuyang lebel o higit pa, ng kanilang emisyon ng ghg.Sa pamamagitan ng REDD,  maaaring mapalaganap ang carbon trade. Ibig sabihin,  bibili ang North ng carbon credits sa South, mula sa pagpopondo sa REDD at iba pang “forest-conservation efforts” kapalit ng karadagang ghg emission allowance.

 

          Hindi solusyon sa global warming at climate change ang carbon credit trade sa pagitan ng North at South.  Ang mga bansang pangunahing ghg emitters ay gagamitin lamang ang kanilang kapangyarihan sa pinansya para makabili ng carbon credits sa mga kagubatang nasa mahihirap na nasyon, nang hindi nasosolusyunan ang aktwal na pagbabawas ng ghg emissions sa kanilang mga bansa.  Ang katumbas ng REDD ay pagbibigay ng higit na pollution rights sa mga mauunlad na bansa.  Kaya naman ang mga pangunahing tagapagtaguyod ng REDD ay ang US at global financial institutions gaya ng World Bank at ADB.  Nakasalang ang REDD sa pag-uusap sa UN climate change negotiations at may mga bansang tumututol sa maling solusyong ito gaya ng Bolivia, Brazil, China, El Salvador, Paraguay, at Tuvalu.

 

          Sa halip na REDD, dapat na ang maging panawagan natin ay GREEN o Genuine Reduction of Emission from the North.

 

IV.        Ang Ating mga Panawagan at Tungkulin

 

Panlipunang Hustisya at Pagbabago ng Sistema ang Tunay na Solusyon

          Hindi sa pamamagitan ng mga paraang ipinapanukala ng mga industriyalisadong bansa at dambuhalang korporasyon – silang mga pangunahing salarin sa pagkasira ng mundo, tunay na masosolusyunan ang global warming at climate change.  Tanging pagtatakip, pagsikot at pag-iwas sa malalaking pananagutan ng North ang layon ng mga solusyong pilit ipinatatanggap sa maliliit at umuunlad na mga bansa sa South.

          Ang pinakawastong mga solusyon ay dapat na magmula sa South - silang pinakaapektadong mga mamamayan at nasyon, pinakadumaranas ng matinding epekto ng global warming at climate change at pinakanaghahangad ng pagbabago.  Kaya ang wastong pagharap sa usapin ay dapat na nakatuntong sa mga usapin ng pagbibigay hustisya at pagbabago sa mga sistemang panlipunan at pang-ekonomya na nagresulta sa malawakang di pagkakapantay-pantay at kahirapan sa maraming mamamayan at nasyon ng daigdig.

          Ang mga sistemang panlipunan at pang-ekonomya sa mahihirap na mga bansa ay itinakda ng pangkasaysayang pagpapailalim sa mga makapangyarihan at kapitalistang mga bansa.  Ito ay sistemang pinaiiral ng mga bansang nagdodomina sa mga bansang dinodominahan na kinatatangian ng:

          a) pangkasaysayan at nagpapatuloy na pandarambong sa likas yaman at  pagsasamantala’t pagsira sa ekolohiya’t  kapaligiran ng mamamayan at nasyon sa South ng mga bansa sa North, mga dambuhalang korporasyong multi-nasyunal at transnasyunal, at mga lokal na elitistang kasabwat nila;

          b) patuloy na pagpapatupad ng maling mga patakaran at polisiyang pang-ekonomya na –

          Ÿ   mapanira sa kapaligiran at ekolohiya;

Ÿ  mapanghimasok sa patrimonya’t soberanya ng mga nasyon;

Ÿ  nagpapalala sa kahirapan ng maraming mamamayan samantalang nagpapasasa ang iilang makapangyarihan sa lipunan; at

Ÿ  nagpapalala sa bulnerabilidad ng mamamayan sa mga krisis at kalamidad

          Ang wastong pagharap sa climate change  ay dapat na magtaguyod ng komitment para sa:

Ÿ  pandaigdigang pagkakapantay-pantay;

Ÿ  makatarungang paghahatian sa yaman ng daigdig;

Ÿ  pagbabahaginan ng teknolohiyang makatutulong sa tunay na rekonstruksyon ng kapaligiran;

Ÿ  pagbabasura sa kasalukuyang mga patakarang neoliberal at export-market-oriented     na patuloy na pinaiiral sa South; at

Ÿ  pagtataguyod sa mga alternatibong paraan at solusyon para kamtin ang sustenableng pag-unlad ng mga bansa sa South na nakabatay sa panlipunang hustisya at soberanya

          Gayundin,  dapat na maging sentro din ng panawagan ang usapin ng paniningil sa North o malalaking kapitalistang mga bansa, mga dambuhalang korporasyon at mga kasabwat nilang lokal na elitista, sa kanilang pangkasaysayan at nagpapatuloy na pananagutan sa climate change at pagkasira ng mundo.  Dapat ipanawagan ang pagtupad sa sumusunod:

1)    Sa usapin ng mitigasyon[12]:

                   Ÿ   aktwal na pagbabawas sa CO2 emissions ng mga bansa sa North (domestic reduction) at  hindi sa pamamagitan ng carbon trading -  mangangahulugan ito ng pagbabago sa kanilang istilo ng pamumuhay  (polluting way of life) at mga patakarang pang-ekonomya na mapanira sa kapaligiran at mapangwasak sa ekonomya ng maliliit na nasyon;

 

                   Ÿ  ang kinakailangang imantini na bolyum ng ghg ay 350 parts per million (ppm) at 1.5”C naman ang lebel ng temperatura upang di na lumala pa ang global warming at climate change at mapigilan ang ganap na pagkawasak ng daigdig

 

          2)  Sa usapin ng adaptasyon[13]:

                   Ÿ  ang mga programa para sa adaptasyon ng South ay dapat na pondohan ng North dahil sa kanilang malaking pananagutan sa climate change;

                  

                   Ÿ  ang pondo para sa adaptasyon ay hindi dapat sa porma ng pautang o aids at dapat na walang katambal na mga kondisyon at imposisyon

 

          3)  Sa usapin ng teknolohiya:

                   Ÿ  ang mga teknolohiyang magagamit para sa pagpapagaan ng impak ng climate change, makatutulong sa mga programa sa adaptasyon at rekonstruksyon ng kapaligiran ay dapat na ibigay ng North sa South;

                   

                   Ÿ   dapat tiyaking ang mga teknolohiyang ito ay totoong malinis (hindi gaya ng mga maling solusyong nauna nang binanggit dito) at dapat tiyakin na ito’y libreng maaakses ng South

 

          4)  Sa usaping ng pinansya:

                   Ÿ  dapat na dumaloy ang pondo mula sa mayayamang mga bansa patungo sa mahihirap at nangangailangang mga bansa;  kailangang maglaan ng pondo, na magmumula sa mayayamang mga bansa, para sa mga programa sa rekonstruksyon at adaptasyon sa mahihirap na mga bansa;

                  

                   Ÿ  hindi dapat magkaroon ng papel ang mga IFI’s gaya ng World Bank at Asian Development Bank sa global climate fund  and adaptation programs sa climate change

Ang Ating Mga Partikular na Panawagan:

Kapitalismo – Salarin sa Krisis at Climate Change! Wakasan Na! Baguhin ang Sistema!

Moratorium sa Pagbabayad Utang! Pondo para sa Adaptasyon at Tunay na Rekonstruksyon!

Ibasura ang Patakarang Export-Dependent at Import-Oriented! 

World Bank and ADB, Out  of Climate Fund!

No to False Solutions to Climate Change! No to Nuke, Coal and REDD!

Scrap REDD! Go GREEN (Genuine Reduction of Emmission from the North)!

 

########

 

·                     Ang modyul na ito ay inihanda ng Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya (KPD) para magamit bilang gabay sa pagpapalaganap at pagpaparami ng mga diskusyon at pag-aaral  hinggil sa climate change.

 

 

 

 

[1] Ang karagatan ay nagsisilbing  ‘giant carbon sink’ sa pagsipsip nito sa 1/3 hanggang kalahati ng carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions mula sa tao o mga aktibidad na gawa ng tao.  Pero ang labis-labis na CO2 ay umaapekto sa balanse ng dagat at nagreresulta sa pagtaas ng lebel ng acidity nito.  Ayon sa mga ginawang pananaliksik,  marami sa mga lamang-dagat (marine species) ang hindi kayang mabuhay sa kondisyon ng mataas na lebel ng acidity ng dagat.

 

 

[2] “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to the natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”

[3]  Sa loob ng mahabang panahon ng pag-iral ng mundo, nagpabagu-bago ang topograpiya nito dahil sa tinatawag na plate tectonics. Ang topograpiya ay nakaiimpluwensya sa klima. Depende sa topograpiya ng isang lugar, kung ito ba ay mabundok o matubig o ma-yelo, nag-iiba-iba din ang klima dito.

 

[4]   Dahil dito, nagkakaroon ng pag-iiba-iba sa bolyum ng sinag mula sa araw na maaaring umabot sa mundo  at gayundin, sa distribusyon nito sa iba’t ibang panig ng mundo.  Dahil dito, naaapektuhan ang klima – ang mga lugar na di gaanong nasisinagan ng araw sa isang takdang panahon ay natural na magiging malamig at mainit naman sa inaabot nito.

 

[5]  Ang mga prosesong ito ay nakapagpapasingaw o nagpapakawala ng mga gases at iba pang particles sa kalawakan na nakaaapekto sa klima.  Sa kalakhan ay mayroon itong ‘cooling effect’ dahil bahagya nitong nababarahan ang transmisyon ng solar radiation papasok sa daigdig.

 

[6] 90% ng bagong init na pumapasok sa kalawakan ay hinihigop ng karagatan. Ngunit may mga bagong pag-aaral na nagpapakita ng pagkabawas (kumpara sa dati) ng kakayahan ng karagatan ng daigdig na humigop ng init.  Dahil ito sa malawakan at matagalang kondisyon ng pag-init ng karagatan.  Ang pag-init o paglamig ng karagatan at ang kakayahan nito na humigop ng init, ay umaapekto sa pagbabago ng klima.

 

[7]  Ang terminonganthropogenic ay pumapatungkol sa mga epekto, proseso o bagay na resulta ng mga aktibidad na gawa ng tao.  Ang salitang ito ay unang ipinakilala ni Paul Crutzen, isang atmospheric scientist, nuong mid-70’s.  Una itong ginamit  sa konteksto ng usapin ng polusyon mula sa mga industriya.

 

 

[8] IPCC report, 2008

[9] Ang Protocol ay isang internasyunal na kasunduan na makatitindig sa sarili ngunit kadugtong ng isang tratado.  Ibig sabihin,  ang Kyoto Protocol ay umaalinsunod sa mga prinsipyo at layunin na inilatag ng UNFCCC, na siya namang tratado.  Mula sa mga prinsipyo at layuning ito, nagdaragdag ng mga bagong komitment para sa pagpapahigpit pa ng mga naunang kaisahan at idinedetalye ang pagpapatupad sa mga ito.

[10] Cloud whitening : Spraying seawater through unmanned ships to make clouds “whiter” by increasing the condensation nuclei in clouds, thereby reflecting more of the sun’s rays back to space.

 

Space sunshades: Trillions of small free-flying spacecrafts launched a million miles above the earth or space mirrors, made from a reflective mesh of aluminum threads and placed between the Earth and sun.

 

Albedo enchancements: increasing the reflectiveness of the Earth’s surface by planting shinier crops, painting roofs and roads, or covering desert regions with white material.

 

[11]Biochar: Burning huge quantities of biomass through pyrolysis (low oxygen) and burying the concentrated carbon in soil, a proposal backed by the corporate-driven International Biochar Initiative.

 

Genetic engineering of algae: Genetically engineered algae, covering urban buildings, open ponds, or the surface of the ocean would be used to capture carbon dioxide.

 

Ocean upwelling or downwelling enchancement: Using giant pipes to bring up nitrogen or phosphorous enriched waters (relative to carbon) to the surface to cool surface waters and enhance ocean sequestration of C02.

 

 

 

[12] Mitigasyon ay ang pag-ampat o pagpigil sa paglala ng global warming at climate change.

[13] Adaptasyon ay tumutukoy sa abilidad o kapasidad ng mamamayan sa South (na syang pinakaburnerable sa mga epekto ng climate change) na makaangkop at patuloy na mabuhay sa gitna ng sitwasyon ng climate change.

 
 
Start blogging by creating a new post. You can edit or delete me by clicking under the comments. You can also customize your sidebar by dragging in elements from the top bar.
 

Google Analytics Yahoo crawler wikipedia